Unrath, Walter J. "A Matter of Hindsight: Army Clandestine Intelligence Operations and the Klaus Barbie Affair. A Personal Perspective on the Vagaries of the Intelligence Profession." American Intelligence Journal 14, no. 1 (Autumn/Winter 1993): 47-51.
This is a personal account of the investigation and report by the Department of Justice in 1983 of a clandestine U.S. Army Counter Intelligence Corps operation culminating in the exfiltration of Barbie from Europe to South America. Unrath was the chief of the Technical Specialist Division of the 66th CIC Group. Barbie was "a covert informant/agent targeted against East Germany and the Soviet Union, among other targets" whose "continued presence in the theater of operations could seriously jeopardize U.S. security." The author believes there is a "need for legislative clarification of accountability and also for a much needed official definition of 'lawful orders.'"
Unsinger, Peter Charles. "Meeting a Commercial Need for Intelligence: The International Maritime Bureau." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 12, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 58-72.
The International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) "has largely acted on the premise that something needed to be done to assure the maritime world -- those who ship, those who receive, and those who carry -- that all has been done to remove or identify criminal acts that threaten international trade. Its principal vehicle for monitoring these problems is the International Maritime Bureau."
Unsinger, Peter C. "Three Intelligence Blunders in Korea." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 3, no. 4 (Winter 1989): 549-561.
In addition to the well-established intelligence failures of the Korean War -- the failures to predict the North Korean invasion and China's entry into the war -- the author briefly discusses "Third Force" covert activities directed from Taiwan against the PRC as a third "blunder."
Unverhau, Dagmar, ed. State Security and Mapping in the German Democratic Republic: Map Falsification as a Consequence of Excessive Secrecy? Berlin: Lit Verlag, 2006.
Krieger, JIH 6.2 (Winter 2006-2007), notes that in October 1965 the GDR's National Defence Council "passed a ruling which specified how publicly distributed maps had to be modified in order to meet the concerns not only of GDR security agencies but equally of the Soviet Union.... The authors amply illustrate how military installations were diminished in size or made to look like farm buildings. Railway lines were deleted, electrical power lines made to vanish..... The 1965 order also banned grid coordinates which made it possible to move road intersections or even villages by several kilometres."
Upshur, Giles C. [CAPT/USN (Ret.)] "The US Naval Attaché." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 9, no. 1 (Jan. 1993): 9-11.
Brief overview of the development of the Defense Attaché System. This is an extract of a study done at the National War College in 1969.
Ural'skij, Yu [Lt. Col.]. Tr., Thomas R. Hammant. "Soviet Comint and the Civil War." Cryptologia 25, no. 1 (Jan. 2001): 50-60.
From abstract: "By January 1919, a radio intelligence service had been established in the Red Army, although shortages of equipment and comint personnel limited its operation during the civil war. Both sides in the civil war suffered from poor communications security."
Urban, George R. Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War Within the Cold War. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.
From advertisement: The author is "emeritus director of Radio Free Europe." "This book is a unique, personal account of Cold War combat over the airwaves, of psychological battles that succeeded in eroding the international appeal of the Soviet system and ultimately in helping to bring about the implosion of the Soviet empire." Kirkus Reviews (1 Jan. 1998), says this book is "[p]assionate, courageous, balanced in its assessments,... [and] filled with some wise and highly original reflections on the greatest conflict of our times."
Urban, John M. "The Sutter Connection." Periscope 4, no. 3 (1979): 6.
John Sutter was the owner of Sutter's Mill during the 1800s California Gold Rush.
Urban, Mark. Big Boys' Rules: The Secret Struggle Against the I.R.A. London: Faber and Faber, 1992. 2001.
Greenhalgh, I&NS 9.2, finds that Urban presents a "convincing analysis of the intelligence war in Northern Ireland.... [H]is examination of the role of undercover soldiers ... breaks new ground." This is the "clearest and most balanced analysis of British operations against the IRA to date."
Urban, Mark. "The Magnum Force." Telegraph (London), 1 Sep. 1996. [http://www. telegraph.co.uk]
The British decision "to part-pay for an American spy satellite came after the ... failure of an attempt to go it alone with an electronic snoop in space -- Zircon.... By the mid-Eighties the inequalities in the GCHQ-NSA relationship was causing real alarm....
"Zircon would be a geosynchronous satellite that would sit over the Soviet Union, feeding information direct to Whitehall. The vision was to survive from 1983, when initial studies began, to the autumn of 1986.... It was cost that doomed Zircon.... In 1987 GCHQ's entire annual budget was about £350 million. The cost to the UK of owning and maintaining a single satellite would have added about £100 million a year in perpetuity.... Ministers ... opted to buy American....
"The complex arrangements were agreed in a super-secret memorandum of understanding between the US and British governments which, it is thought, was signed in the latter part of 1988. One of the satellites would have a metaphorical Union flag on the side, but Britain could also consider itself part-owner of all of them. The UK would also have the right to 'task' any of the three satellites, but the 'British' satellite would never be delivered to the UK and the highly-sensitive technology within it remained within the NSA's security system. The NSA could also override GCHQ, even in tasking the craft."
Urban, Mark. The Man Who Broke Napoleon's Codes. New York: HarperCollins, 2001.
Brooks, NIPQ 19.1/2, says that this "history of the Peninsula campaign ... is engagingly written and provides unique insights into Wellington's strengths and ... weaknesses. The story is woven around the [cryptologic] contributions" of Lt. Col. George Scovell. For Goulden, Washington Times, 7 Dec. 2003, and Intelligencer 14.1, this is an "astounding work of historical research... [N]ot a single historain or biographer has addressed the significance" of the work of Scovell to Wellington's victories. This is "[a] good read, even for those of us who are happily ignorant of the mechanics of code breaking."
According to Kruh, Cryptologia 26.4, the author "chronicles Wellington's campaigns against the French from the battle of Corunna in 1809 to the 1815 victory at Waterloo, showing how Scovell's decoding of enemy communications was pivotal to Napoleon's defeat. This is an excellent book about a little known code breaker who helped to change the face of history."
Urban, Mark. Task Force Black: The Explosive True Story of the Secret Special Forces War in Iraq. New York: St. Martin's, 2011.
Martin, Proceedings 137.9 (Sep. 2011), finds that this "stirring history" takes "the reader inside the culture of the British and U.S. Special Forces units that performed 'black' or covert operations during the Iraq war." Urban "tracks British Special Air Service and Special Boat Service operators as they work alongside their American Delta Force counterparts." This is "a gritty tale of the war."
[MI/Ops/Iraq/Books & SpecOps/10s]
Urban, Mark. UK Eyes Alpha: The Inside Story of British Intelligence. London: Faber & Faber, 1996.
According to Surveillant 4.4/5, this book examines "how Britain's spies reacted to the fall of Communism and to the outbreak of new conflicts around the world ." The author surveys "the state of British espionage agencies, and asks what relevance they have today." West, WIR 16.1, finds some of Urban's claims "somewhat debatable," and he "relies upon a narrow range of sources." Nonetheless, his iconoclastic and provocative approach is refreshing.
The author's focus on the negative aspects of what he sees as British intelligence reliance on the United States resonates well with Lustgarten, I&NS 13.2, who says that his "only criticism of the book is [Urban's] complete failure to make use of all of scholarly writing."
Urquhart, Colin. "Enigma Machine Stolen From Bletchley Park." Times (London), 3 Apr. 2000. [http://www.the-times.co.uk]
One of the original Enigma machines has been stolen from the Bletchley Park museum. "The stolen Enigma was a special model used by elite SS units, smaller and more elegantly engineered than others; it is believed there are only two more in the world." See also, Michael Smith, "Enigma Code Machine Stolen in Bletchley Raid," Telegraph (London), 3 Apr. 2000; and Kate Watson-Smyth, "Enigma, Coding Machine that Cost Germans the War, Is Stolen," The Independent, 3 Apr. 2000.
Urquhart, Martin I. The Effectiveness of Human Intelligence in Operation Uphold Democracy. Ft. Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1996.
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