Tuo - Turn

Tuohy, Ferdinand. The Secret Corps: A Tale of "Intelligence" on All Fronts. London: Murray, 1920. [Chambers]

[WWI/UK]

Turbergue, Jean-Pierre, ed. Mata-Hari. Le Dossier Secret Du Conseil de Guerre. [Mata Hari: The Secret Dossier of the Council of War] Intro., Patrick Pesnot; epilogue, Gen. (CR) André Bach. Paris: Éditions italiques, 2001.

For Brückner, JIH 4.1, the opening of the dossier of the military court that tried Mata Hari and condemned her to death in 1917 demonstrates "that, contrary to established opinion, the 3rd Military Court gave Margaretha Geertruida Zelle MacLeod alias Mata-Hari a fair trial, and that she nearly got away." In the end, it was her confession that did her in, not the French justice system.

[France/WWI]

Turing, Alan M. "Visit to National Cash Register Corporation of Dayton, Ohio." Cryptologia 25, no. 1 (Jan. 2001): 1-7.

This is a report that Turing made following his visit to NCR, where the U.S. Navy's Bombe project was underway, in December 1942. Lee A. Gladwin provides an introduction, and adds an extended commentary in a separate article: Lee A. Gladwin, "Alan Turing's Visit to Dayton," Cryptologia 25, no. 1 (Jan. 2001): 11-17.

[WWII/Magic/Cooperation]

Turnbull, Malcolm. The Spycatcher Trial. Richmond and Victoria: Heinemann Australia, 1988. London: Heinemann, 1988.

Clark comment: Turnbull was Peter Wright's attorney in Australia in the litigation brought by the British government against Wright and his publishers in an effort to prevent the publication of Spycatcher.

Cram notes the author's "brilliant cross-examination of British Cabinet secretary, Sir Robert Armstrong," and opines that the book "provides a full and often amusing account of this celebrated legal event."

McCorquodale, I&NS 4.3, finds that the book "is well written and reasonably easy to read, except when the large number of extracts from the trial transcripts test the reader's legal interest."

[UK/Postwar/Spycatcher]

Turner, Michael A. "CIA-FBI Non-Cooperation: Cultural Trait or Bureaucratic Inertia?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 259-273.

"The CIA's culture ... alone does not account for the lack of interagency cooperation between the CIA and the FBI.... Additional causes are vested in the vagueness of the governing legislation and the bureaucratic inertia created by the historic separation of the two agencies." The bipartisan Presidential Commission "has the opportunity to affect the structural relationship between the CIA and the FBI in a positive way by addressing the legal ambiguities and promoting training in interagency cooperation." However, such changes will last "only if accompanied by steps to significantly affect the attitudes of key officials in each of the agencies."

[CIA/Components/Culture; Liaison/U.S./Domestic][c]

Turner, Michael A. "A Distinctive U.S. Intelligence Identity." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 42-61.

"[T]he U.S. intelligence identity reflects the ambiguity that Americans have about secret intelligence. United States citizens want the intelligence function to serve the national interest, but in ways that are palatable to the country's democratic sensibilities. Ultimately, this kind of identity, though providing the basis for important intelligence work, becomes also a prescription for intelligence failure."

Philip H.J. Davies, "Intelligence Culture and Intelligence Failure in Britain and the United States," Cambridge Review of International Affairs 17, no. 3 (Oct. 2004), comments that "it is very hard to tell whether Turner's US intelligence identity really is distinctive without some kind of comparative data against which to demonstrate that distinctiveness. As a result, whether Turner's characterisation is accurate or not, it contributes very little that is new to our understanding of intelligence in America."

[GenPostCW/00s/Gen]

Turner, Michael A. Historical Dictionary of United States Intelligence. Historical Dictionaries of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, No. 2. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2005.

From advertisement: "This compendium of over 500 entries on the most important and relevant personalities, programs, activities, and agencies of U.S. intelligence ... covers the myriad pieces of legislation that have governed the activities of U.S. intelligence, from the National Security Act of 1947 ... to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.... Each entry is cross-referenced for easy navigation and provides a definition as well as a brief but complete historical evaluation of the subject."

Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall/Winter 2006-2007), finds that this work "has just too many errors.... The author and the publisher have left the fact-checking to the reader."

For Hay, DIJ 15.1 (2006), the author "covers a range of topics," including "some important non-U.S. intelligence terms." Nevertheless "both a strength and a weakness of this dictionary" is that "it is centered on the CIA," and thereby "omits some significant intelligence terms unique to other agencies.... Perhaps the most impressive and useful section ... is the extensive bibliography."

[RefMats/Dictionaries]

Turner, Michael A. "Intelligence Reform and the Politics of Entrenchment." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 383-397.

"[T]he Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, passed in December 2004, does not significantly alter the U.S. Intelligence Community.... The Department of Defense, its advocates in congressional oversight committees, and the White House ... [worked] to blunt [the] effects [of the 9/11 Commission report] and produce legislation that mollified the proponents of reform but did nothing more than reshuffle America's intelligence leadership."

[Reform/00s/04/Act; Reform/00s/05/Gen

Turner, Michael A.

1. "Issues in Evaluating U.S. Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 275-285.

2. "Understanding CIA's Role in Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 4, no. 3 (Fall 1990): 295-305.

[CIA/90s][c]

Turner, Michael A. "Setting Analytical Priorities in U.S. Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 3 (Fall 1996): 313-327.

"In reality, agenda-setting in U.S. intelligence is an interactive bargaining process among three environments: the policy, the bureaucratic process, analyst/collector environments."

[Analysis][c]

Turner, Michael A. Why Secret Intelligence Fails. Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2005.

From advertisement: The author "argues that the root causes of failures in American intelligence can be found in the way it is organized and in the intelligence process itself.... Rather than focusing on case studies, the book takes a holistic approach, beginning with structural issues and all dysfunctions that emanate from them."

Peake, Studies 49.4 (2005), says that the author provides "a good summary of the elements of the intelligence profession and [raises] a number of issues that should stimulate thinking. But we never learn just why secret intelligence fails."

[GenPostCW/00s/Gen; Overviews/U.S./00s]

Turner, Richard. "Cracks in the Story." Newsweek, 11 Nov. 1996, 64-65.

The San Jose Mercury News' story about Nicaraguan drug dealers with connections to the contras and the CIA "has largely been discredited because it promised more than it could deliver.... [T]he paper overhyped and overpackaged the story. The big papers ... trundled out reams of evidence to demolish [the story's] simplistic contention."

[CIA/90s]

Turner, Robert F. "The CIA's Nicaragua 'Murder Manual': A Sandinista 'Dirty Trick?'" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 9, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 33-41.

"[A] powerful, if not conclusive, case can be made that the manual incident was less an example of CIA perfidy than of a brilliant Sandinista 'dirty trick' designed to discredit the CIA and the Reagan Administration by using an agent [Edgar Chamorro] to covertly insert a few objectionable sentences into a generally admirable training manual -- and then leaking the end product to the press during an election campaign."

[CIA/80s/Manual]

Turner, Robert F. "Coercive Covert Action and the Law." Yale Journal of International Law 20, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 427-449.

[CA; Overviews/Legal]

Turner, Robert F. "Killing Saddam: Would It Be a Crime?" Washington Post, 7 Oct. 1990, D1-D2.

[Overviews/Legal/Assassination]

Turner, Robert F. "Truman Didn't 'Ignore Congress' on Korean War: Declassified 'Top Secret' Revelations." National Security Law Report 16, no. 9 (Sep. 1994): 1-6.

Turner seeks to revise the "conventional wisdom" based on a "collection of ... State Department documents, reprinted in Volume VII (Korea) in the series, Foreign Relations of the United States since 1950." The documents are the "record of ... key meetings in the form of memoranda prepared by Ambassador at Large Philip C. Jessup."

[GenPostwar/50s/Korea]

Turner, Stansfield.

Turner, William W. Hoover's FBI: The Men and the Myth. Los Angeles, CA: Sherbourne Press, 1970. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1993. [pb]

Petersen refers to to this book as a "[c]ritical account by a former agent."

Surveillant 3.2/3 notes that it was "[p]ublished to coincide with the release of ... Coppola's feature film on ... Hoover."

[FBI/90s]

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