Tucker

Tucker, Darren S. "The Federal Government's War on Economic Espionage." University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 18, no. 3 (Fall 1997): 1109-1152. [Calder]

[GenPostwar/Econ/Govt]

Tucker, David. The End of Intelligence: Espionage and State Power in the Information Age. Redwood City, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014.

Freedman, FA 94.1 (Jan.-Feb. 2015), notes the author concludes that "the information age has been less transformational than supposed." States have likely benefited the most from new technologies. For Maffeo, Proceedings 141.2 (Feb. 2015), Tucker "presents an impressive and broad analysis of [the] vibrant history and current condition" of intelligence. This "is a perceptive and thoughtful contribution to the literature." Peake, Studies 59.2 (Jun. 2015), finds that this work "presents some unusual concepts, all of which challenge the mind. Making sense of them, as formulated, is a project without end."

[GenPostCW/10s/Gen]

Tucker, David, and Christopher J. Lamb. United States Special Operations Forces. New York: Columbia University Press, 2007.

From publisher: In this book, "two national security experts and Department of Defense insiders put the exploits of America's special operation forces in historical and strategic context." This "overview of America's turbulent experience with special operations ... illustrate[s] the diversity of modern special operations forces and the strategic value of their unique attributes."

[MI/SpecOps/00s]

Tucker, Jonathan B. "Bioterrorism Is the Least of Our Worries." New York Times, 16 Oct. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

In this Op-Ed piece, the author, "a former biological weapons inspector in Iraq," argues that "a bioterrorist attack in the United States in which thousands of people are killed remains extremely unlikely. While planning for such an event is warranted, government authorities should pay attention to a far more probable scenario: small-scale incidents involving food or drug contamination, which could cause widespread fear and economic disruption."

[Terrorism/99/Virus]

Tucker, Jonathan B., ed. Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000.

From publisher: This compilation "provides in-depth case studies of twelve terrorist groups and individuals who, from 1946 to 1998, allegedly acquired or employed CBW agents.... By comparing the twelve cases, the book identifies characteristic motivations and patterns of behavior associated with CBW terrorism and provides an empirical basis for prudent, cost-effective strategies of prevention and response."

[Terrorism/00/Gen]

Tucker, Mike, and Charles Faddis. Operation Hotel California: The Clandestine War Inside Iraq. Guildford, CT: Lyons, 2008. 2010. [pb]

Clark comment: In terms of operational detail, this work cannot compete with Schroen's First In (2005) or Berntsen's Jawbreaker (2005) on the intital operations in Afghanistan immediately after 9/11. Whether this is the fault of the brave and dedicated Faddis, who led the CIA team into northern Iraq, or his journalist co-author Tucker is difficult to ascertain. In some ways, this book reads as though the journalist just turned on his pocket recorder and let Faddis take the lead in the conversation; and that Faddis too often simply vented his deeply felt frustration over the way things played out in his assignment. Were there no challenging questions? Was there no seeking for greater depth of understanding? Other than a few brief quotes from a handful of other opinionated individuals, there is no research to back up Faddis's arguments. That Faddis clearly believes Washington (he ultimately blames President Bush as the person in charge but both DCI Tenet and Defense Secretary Rumsfeld are heaped with scorn as well) dropped the ball in its failure to use the CIA assets in Iraqi Kurdistan to carry the war to Saddam's forces in the north. Washington's failure to deal with Turkey's intransigence on the movement of men and supplies through Turkish territory undoubtedly hampered the team's efforts (and ultimately the entire war effort) and placed its members and their Kurdish partners at even greater risk. Rumsfeld's refusal to allow the team to be the lead operational unit in the north when the war started reeks of CIA envy. Faddis may well be correct in his appraisal of these and other matters, but it is impossible to validate on the basis of this book alone. I would have preferred to read more first-hand information about the organization and conduct of operational activities than constant (and repetitive) rants about how this effort was screwed up by Washington.

Keiser, Proceedings 135.1 (Jan. 2009), calls this an "engaging account" of the activities of an eight-man, CIA-led counterterrorist team in Iraqi Kurdistan prior to and during the formal invasion of Iraq in March 2003. However, "the book's epilogue is disappointing because it detracts from impressive combat actions by lurching into a largely unrelated agenda."

For Matt P., Studies 54.2 (Jun. 2010), Faddis "provides a litany of alleged US strategic mistakes in the preamble to the war." He is also "crudely critical of the Scorpions, the CIA-trained Iraqi-Arab force charged with conducting sabotage inside regime-controlled Iraq.... This book has limitations. The interviews with Faddis reflect one point of view, sometimes leaving the book thin on context"; and Tucker "misses opportunities to put Faddis's insights into perspective." Although it "is little more than an edited interview with one former CIA officer," the book is still "a relevant addition to intelligence discourse."

[CA/Iraq/Post-9/11; CIA/00s/03; MI/Ops/00s/Iraq/Books]

Tucker, Nancy. Patterns in the Dust: Chinese-American Relations and the Recognition Controversy, 1949-1950. New York: Columbia University Press, 1983.

[GenPostwar/ColdWar]

Tucker, Neely. "Spy for Cuba Sentenced to 25 Years." Washington Post, 17 Oct. 2002, B1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 16 October 2002, Ana Belen Montes was sentenced to 25 years in prison for spying for Cuba. U.S. District Judge Ricardo M. Urbina "was unmoved" by a five-minute speech from the "unapologetic ["I obeyed my conscience rather than the law," Montes said in court] spy who used shortwave radios and encrypted transmissions to relay sensitive U.S. secrets to the Cuban government."

[SpyCases/U.S./Montes]

Tucker, Spencer C., ed. The Encyclopedia of the Cold War: A Political, Social, and Military History. 5 vols. Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2007.

Covers from World War II to 1991.

[GenPostwar/CW]

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