Tovar, B. Hugh.
1. "Chronicle of a Secret War." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 245-254.
Tovar was the CIA's senior representative in Laos from September 1970 until May 1973. This is a "Review and Commentary" article on Jane Hamilton-Merritt's Tragic Mountains, and warrants reading on its own merits.
2. "Managing the Secret War in Laos." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 367-378.
This is a "Review and Commentary" article on Timothy Castle's At War in the Shadow of Vietnam, and should be consulted to balance some of Castle's presentation.
Tovar, B. Hugh. "The Indonesian Crisis of 1965-1966: A Retrospective." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 7, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 313-338.
Tovar is former Chief, Covert Action Staff, CIA. This article addresses inaccuracies of Kathy Kadane's Washington Post article of 21 May 1990. Their continued reverberations led Tovar into an interview for a BBC series produced by John Ranelagh. Tovar provides a brief version of events surrounding the Communist coup and aftermath. He does not think the killings "took place on a scale comparable to what we reported and what was common belief." This is because of lack of evidence for such killings in succeeding years: "I just don't see the evidence."
Tovar, B. Hugh. "The Not-So-Secret War, or How State-CIA Squabbling Hurts U.S. Intelligence." Studies in Intelligence 25, no. 1 (Spring 1981): 43-49. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 185-193. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.
"[M]ore than one intelligence failure can be traced to the inability" of the State Department and the CIA "to collaborate effectively." Tovar mentions a proposal submitted to the Murphy Commission on Governmental Reorganization to create a unified personnel system for the foreign affairs agencies; needless to say, the idea went nowhere.
Tovar, B. Hugh. "Thoughts on Running a Small War." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 3 (1986): 85-93.
"[I]ntelligence (including counterintelligence) and covert action go hand-in-glove. The relationship is symbiotic; separation would be disasterous for both." (p. 87)]
Tovar, B. Hugh. "Tibet's Long Years of Struggle." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 13, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 215-226.
This is simultaneously an excellent review of Knaus' Orphans of the Cold War (1999) and a useful essay on the CIA operation with the Tibetan resistance.
Tovar, B. Hugh. "Vietnam Revisited: The United States and Diem's Death." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 5, no. 3 (Fall 1991): 291-312.
"The overthrow of President [Ngo Dinh] Diem constituted the opening of the floodgates of American involvement in Indochina.... By intruding as it did -- crassly and blind to the consequences -- the burden of responsibility for winning or losing was removed once and for all from South Vietnamese shoulders, and placed upon America's own."
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