Toohey, Brian, and William Pinwill. Oyster: The Story of the Australian Secret Intelligence Service. Port Melbourne, Victoria: Heinemann Australia, 1989. Port Melbourne, Victoria: Mandarin, 1990. [pb]
Surveillant 1.1 calls Oyster a "fascinating sweep through ASIS's activity." Petersen notes that the book contains "many references to U.S. intelligence, mostly unfavorable."
Harvey Barnett (who retired as Director of the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) in 1985 and also served in ASIS for 20 years), I&NS 5.1, finds much wrong with this book, from the presentation of espionage as a "distasteful business," to the treatment of individuals, to the failure to understand ASIS' relationship within the Australian governmental structure. When their "factual evidence runs out," the authors fall into a mire of "conjecture and even conspiracy"; allegations are made "where supporting evidence is missing."
[Australia]
Tooley, Peter J. Operation Quicksilver. Romford, UK: Ian Henry Publications, 1988.
Surveillant 2.1: Operation Quicksilver was "devised in 1943 and involved building dummy landing craft and mooring them in various rivers and harbors on the coast, giving the impression to enemy reconnaissance planes that there was a build-up of belligerent forces in those areas."
[WWII/Eur/D-Day]
Toran, Janice. "Secrecy Orders and Government Litigants: 'A Northwset Passage Around the Freedom of Information Act.'" Georgia Law Review 27 (Fall 1992): 121-182. [Calder]
[Overviews/Legal/FOIA]
Toscano, Louis. Triple Cross: Israel, the Atomic Bomb and the Man Who Spilled the Secrets. New York: Birch Lane Press, 1990. [pb] Knightsbridge, 1991.
Clark comment: This is the story of Mordechai Vanunu's efforts to "expose" Israel's nuclear capability.
Rich, FILS 12.3, calls it a "slight book.... The only notable aspect of Mordechai Vanunu's sad life is that he managed to photograph Israel's Dimona nuclear bomb plant."
Moss, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 47.1, sees Toscano telling two stories. One story is that of Vanunu's life and beliefs, in which Vanunu "emerges as a sympathetic but confused individual." The other story concerns the Israel government's reactions to Vanunu's disclosures.
[Israel/Vanunu][c]
Toscano, Mario. "'Machiavelli' Views World War II Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 3 (1986): 41-52.
From IJI&C Editor's Note: This article originally appeared in Italian in 1963. It also appeared in U.S. in 1970 and was originally entitled "Specific Problems in World War II." The article concerns "the influence which the work of intelligence services had on several important political decisions before and during World War II." Examples include the negotiations leading up to the Soviet-German Pact of 1939 and the origins of the Rome-Berlin axis.
[WWII/Gen][c]
Toth,
Robert C. "U.S., China Jointly Track Firings of Soviet Missiles."
Los Angeles Times, 18 Jun. 1981, 1, 9.
[China/U.S.]
Toth, Robert C. "White House to Put Limits on Army's Secret Spy Unit." Los Angekes Times, 15 May 1983, 1, 10-11.
[MI/SpecOps/ISA]
Tourison, Sedgwick. Secret Army, Secret War: Washington's Tragic Spy Operation in North Vietnam. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995.
Bates, NIPQ 12.2, calls this book a "damning account of our almost entirely ineffective use of agent teams inserted by land, sea, and air into North Vietnam from 1961 until 1967.... [T]he North Vietnamese ... duplicated the British 'Double Cross' achievements by capturing most teams within hours or days of their insertion and convincing many of the captured radio operators to transmit what Hanoi wanted.... Secret Army, Secret War is extensively documented."
Gaddy, Periscope 21.2, notes that "[i]gnoring the evidence [of the capture of the teams and the turning of the radio operators], SOG officials continued to carry the infiltrators on the books, to resupply them, even to reinforce them, pursuant to the messages drafted in Hanoi."
For Crerar, AIJ 16.2/3, this is "a fascinating, depressing and tragic story" that is "highly recommended." Similarly, Reske, NIPQ 12.3, finds Secret Army, Secret War "[e]minently readable, well sourced, disquieting, and highly recommended." Unsinger, MI 24.1, agrees, noting that the "style keeps one's attention and the story, while sad, is worth discovering."
In a review article that stands well on its own, Ronnie E. Ford, I&NS 11.2, focuses less on the 34 Alpha operations per se and more on Tourison's linking of these activities and DESOTO intelligence collection operations to the Gulf of Tonkin incidents and the follow-on Congressional action. Ford regards Tourison's work as "a worthy addition to the history of the Vietnam War and a necessary addition to the existing Vietnam War intelligence literature."
[Vietnam]
Tourison, Sedgwick D. Talking with Victor Charlie: An Interrogator's Story. New York: Ivy Books, 1991.
Tegtmeier, at http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/shwv/articles/rrl-faq.htm, says that this account of the author's tour in Vietnam as a MACV interrogator has "[l]ots of information on the role of military intelligence, plus some surprising material on the Cu Chi tunnels [and] the Tonkin Gulf incident."
[Vietnam]
Tourtellot, Arthur B. William Diamond's Drum: The Beginning of the War of the American Revolution.
Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1957. [Petersen]
[RevWar/Overviews]
Towell, Pat. "Clinton's Pick of Lake for CIA Raises Senate GOP Hackles." Congressional Quarterly
Weekly Report, 21 Dec. 1996, 3442.
[CIA/90s/97/Lake]
Towell, Pat. "Gates Rejects Legislative Call, Sets Administrative Changes." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 4 Apr. 1992, 893-894.
On 1 April 1992, DCI Gates told joint Senate and House intelligence committees about organizational decisions coming out of the 14 task forces established in November 1991. The two committee chairmen "challenged Gates' decision not to create an agency in charge of all satellite and aerial reconnaissance," as had been recommended by the imagery task force.
[Reform/90s/CIA]
Towell, Pat. "Schwarzkopf Points Out Flaws in Wartime Intelligence." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 15 Jun. 1991, 1603.
In 12 June 1991 appearances before the Senate and House armed services committees, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf criticized Washington-generated intelligence as too cautious to be useful during the Gulf War. He called for equipping field commanders to collect their own intelligence about specific targets. He argued that "we focus too much on what might be called 'national systems.' which respond more to national directives out of Washington."
[MI/Ops/Storm; Reform]
Tower, John, Edmund Muskie, and Brent Scowcroft. The Tower Commission Report. New York: Times Books, 1987.
This is the Report of the President's Special Review Board, also known as the Tower Commission, which reviewed the operations of the National Security Council (NSC) in the wake of the Iran-Contra revelations.
[GenPostwar/80s/Iran-Contra]
Towle, Philip A. Pilots
and Rebels: The Use of Aircraft in Unconventional Warfare, 1918-1988.
Washington, DC: Brassey's, 1989. [Gibish]
[MI/SpecOps]
Townsend, Robert E. "Deception and Irony: Soviet Arms and Arms Control." American Intelligence Journal 14, nos. 2 /3 (Spring/Summer 1993): 47-53.
"A strong case can be made that for twenty years the Soviet Union was able to encourage in the minds of key US decision makers the spiral model of international relations and denigrate the deterrence model.... Clouseau ... will perhaps become the metaphor for US central intelligence during the Cold War."
[Analysis/Soviet][c]
Townshend, Charles. Britain's Civil Wars: Counter-Insurgency in the Twentieth Century. London/Boston: Faber, 1986.
[UK/Postwar/Counterinsurgency]
Toye, P.L., ed. Political and Military Intelligence Concerning Ottoman Turkey, 1750-1900. Neuchatel, Switzerland: Archive Editions, 1995.
Surveillant 4.2: "Primary (and very extensive) documents of the period."
[Historical/Other]
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