Thomas, Andy. "British Signals Intelligence after the Second World War." Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 4 (Oct. 1988): 103-110.
The author gleans several nuggets of information about British Sigint up to the early 1950s from records available at the Public Record Office.
Thomas, David. "KGB Anti-CIA Literature: A Preliminary Review." Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene 5, no. 4 (Jul.-Aug. 1986): 1.
Thomas, David. "U.S. Military Intelligence Analysis: Old and New Challenges." In Analyzing Intelligence: Origins, Obstacles, and Innovations, eds. Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, 138-154. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2007.
Hulnick, IJI&C 24.4, p. 756/fn. 13, refers to this as a "good source on intelligence collection and analysis to support combat operations."
Thomas, Edward. "Norway's Role in British Wartime Intelligence." In Britain and Norway in the Second World War, ed. Patrick Salmon, 121-128. London: HMSO, 1995.
Thomas, Edward E. "A Sidelong Glance at Alan Turing." In In the Name of Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Walter Pforzheimer, eds. Hayden B. Peake and Samuel Halpern, 461-469. Washington, DC: NIBC Press, 1994.
Thomas, Gordon. Gideon's Spies: The Secret History of the Mossad. New York: St. Martin's, 1999. London: Macmillan, 1999. 6th ed. New York: Dunne, 2012.
Travis, New York Post, 4 Mar. 1999, reports that this work charges that "Israel blackmailed President Clinton with phone-tapped tapes of his steamy sex talks with Monica Lewinsky.... The price Clinton paid for the silence of the Mossad spy agency was calling off an FBI hunt for a top-level Israeli mole ["Mega"] ... who was, and could still be, deep within the White House." Gurdon and Davies, Telegraph (London), 4 Mar. 1999, and Sammon and Gertz, Washington Times National Weekly Edition, 8-14 Mar. 1999, also report this aspect of Thomas' book.
The reviewer for Publisher's Weekly, 22 Feb. 99, believes that "[a]stute readers ... will question whether" the author's "unnamed informants have given the straight scoop.... Thomas writes with the pulpy charm familiar to readers of English tabloids; however, his use of unnamed sources and his reliance on conjecture will leave readers intrigued but determined to reserve judgment."
Foster, Contemporary Review, Nov. 1999, comments that "[d]espite its pace and sensational Sunday-paper readability, [Thomas'] book covers the ground thoroughly and generally accurately." However, the author "[o]ccasionally ... gives way to temptations which he should have resisted," as in speculating about Mossad's role in the death of the Princess of Wales. Commenting on the 6th edition, Peake, Studies 57.1 (Mar. 2013), says that the "trademark" of the author's books is that "they are well written, badly documented, and packed with errors." This one is no different. "The work is entertaining but not reliable."
[Israel/Overviews & U.S./Relations/Mega]
1. Journey Into Madness: Medical Torture and the Mind Controllers. London: Bantam, 1988. [Peake, Studies 52.2] Journey Into Madness: The True Story of CIA Mind Control and Medical Abuse. New York: Bantam, 1989. [Petersen]
2. Secrets and Lies: A History of CIA Mind Control and Germ Warfare. Old Saybrook, CT: Konecky, 2007.
Peake, Studies 52.2, (Jun. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), notes that this is a revision of Journey Into Madness (1988), and suggests that "[s]cholars and other serious students of intelligence may ignore it without penalty."
Thomas, Gordon. Secret Wars: One Hundred Years of British Intelligence Inside MI5 and MI6. New York: Thomas Dunne, 2009. New York: St. Martin's, 2010. [pb]
Peake, Studies 53.3 (Sep. 2009) and Intelligencer 17.2 (Fall 2009), finds that with regard to intelligence operations shared by Britain and the United States, "Thomas makes a dazzling muddle of each case he mentions, some of which never happened.... When it comes to describing CIA and its personnel, Thomas doesn't let up in erring.... [T]hree observations can be supported. First, no other book on intelligence has as many errors. Second, the facts that are correct are not new. Third,... no source notes are provided."
To Fitsanakis, intelNews.org, 29 May 2009, this work provides "a useful historical narrative." The author's "skilled storytelling" is marred, however, by the "inexcusable" absence of source notes. In addition, the work "contains some historical inaccuracies, as well as several uncritical statements, which are perhaps indicative of Thomas' political preconceptions." Maxwell, NPR 15 Apr. 2009, sees Secret Wars as a "thoroughly enjoyable if flawed history of British intelligence." It "is such a rollicking good read" that "Thomas can almost be forgiven for his ... somewhat sycophantic approval of any action pursued, legally or not, in the name of British security."
Dastych, Canada Free Press, 20 Mar. 2009, calls Secret Wars "a fascinating read.... The best and undisputable value" is Thomas' "encounters with real flesh and blood intelligence people, including some of them that turned the tide of history." The reviewer also finds "exceptionally high value" in the author's "factual description and professional assessment of the substantial changes in the intelligence community, caused by [the] new political and military situation of the world at large."
For Rutten, Los Angeles Times, 25 Mar. 2009, "[t]his captivating study ... draws its power from rich anecdotes and interviews." This work is a "rollicking, readable new history of Britain's famous spy organizations." Although this is a "popular history,... the quality of the storytelling is such that even many specialists are likely to find new nuggets of insight.... While the author's eye and ear for the nuances of British society and politics are keen, he sometimes fumbles with American details." King, NIPQ 26.2 (Jun. 2010), finds it "difficult ... to distinguish between facts and conjecture" in this book.
West, IJI&C 24.1 (Spring 2011), eviscerates the author's book. Thomas takes the reader into the "realm of fiction" where "every purported fact needs to be looked at" closely. The author's "tendency to invent dialogue pervades the book.... The scale of Thomas's apparent determination to misrepresent well-established fact is breathtaking.... The list of ... absurdities is endless."
Thomas, Gordon, and Martin Dillon. The Assassination of Robert Maxwell: Israel's Superspy. London: Robson, 2002. Robert Maxwell, Israels Master Spy: The Life and Murder of a Media Mogul. New York: Carroll and Graf, 2002.
Peake, Studies 47.3, comments: "That Robert Maxwell was a ruthless, corrupt, tax-dodging international businessman who served as an Israeli agent is highly probable. But Thomas and Dillon have not established the relationship with high confidence, nor the corollary that he was murdered."
Thomas, Jack E. [MGEN/USAF (Ret.)] "Reorganization of Intelligence Activities in the Office of the Secretary of Defense." American Intelligence Journal 14, no. 3 (Autumn-Winter 1993-1994), 41-47.
President Nixon's 5 November 1971 memorandum, "Reorganization of the U.S. Intelligence Community," directed the DCI to "prepare a consolidated intelligence program budget.... The DCI established an Intelligence Community Staff (ICS), a primary responsibility of which was to develop the NFIP budget for the DCI. President Nixon had given the DCI budget responsibilities, but no authorities, and the new ASD(I) largely staved off direct ICS participation in development of DoD inputs to the NFIP budget." E.O. 12036 of 24 January 1978 "gave the DCI authorities as well as responsibilities for the NFIP budget that still exist.... Interrelationships between the DCI and senior DoD officials are complicated because of the quite comprehensive program and budget responsibilities and authorities assigned by the President and the Congress to the DCI for the [NFIP]."
Thomas, John [Jack] Oram. No Banners: The Story of Alfred and Henry Newton. London: W.H. Allen, 1955. London: Corgi, 1974. [pb]
Thomas, John Oram. The Giant Killers: the Story of the Danish Resistance Movement, 1940-1945. New York: Taplinger, 1976. London: Michael Joseph, 1976.
Constantinides sees The Giant Killers as an "episodic, disconnected work wherein the author tells or lets individuals relate particular experiences." In addition, it lacks indications of sources, while relating verbatim conversations. The book should be read along with the more general account in Petrow's The Bitter Years.
Thomas, Louis. "Alexander Rado." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 3 (Summer 1968): 41-61.
Alexander (Sandor) Rado headed the Soviet Union's Swiss-based "Rote Drei" net during World War II. At the time this article was written, he was playing "a leading role in Soviet Bloc mapping programs," particularly "collecting geographic intelligence on the West" from his base in Budapest. Rado's intelligence-related activities "lasted nearly 50 years and may earn him a place in the pantheon of major intelligence figures of the times." (Footnote omitted)
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