Stieber, Wilhelm J.C.E. Tr., Jan van Heurck. The Chancellor's Spy. New York: Grove Press, 1979. [Chambers]
Steiber established Imperial Germany's first official secret service, the Foreign Office Political Field Police (later, the Secret Field Police), in June 1866. He headed an expanded service, the Central Intelligence Bureau, until the mid-1870s. His organization was gradually eclipsed by the General Staff's competitive organization, the Intelligence Bureau, established in 1867. Richelson, A Century of Spies (1995), p. 6.
Stiefler, Todd. "CIA's Leadership and Major Covert Operations: Rogue Elephant or Risk-Averse Bureaucrats?" Intelligence and National Security 19, no. 4 (Winter 2004): 632-654.
The author offers three variables that he believes "most directly impact how CIA leaders assess the costs and benefits of covert action to their organization: public opinion, the value of strategic intelligence, and the state of inter-agency competition."
Stigall, Steven M. "A Strategy Framework for the Intelligence Analyst." Studies in Intelligence 56, no. 3 (Sep. 2012): 59-64. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol.-56-no.-3/pdfs/Stigall-Lessons%20from%20NWC.pdf]
"As intelligence officers, we obviously must be keenly aware of the foreign issues we assess and the context of the intelligence we provide to policymakers. It also behooves us to know the strategic context of policymakers themselves -- the cognitive and national security framework they consciously (or simply instinctively) use to make policy."
Stiles, Bradford R. "Environmental Law and the Central Intelligence Agency: Is There a Conflict Between Secrecy and Environmental Compliance?" New York University Environmental Law Journal 2 (1993): 347ff.
Stiller, Werner. Tr. and annotated by Jefferson Adams. Beyond the Wall: Memoirs of an East and West German Spy. New York: Brassey's, 1992.
Surveillant 2.6 describes Beyond the Wall as the "true story of a disillusioned East German superspy." This edition is a translation of the German version, issued in 1986, "updated with a new epilogue to cover recent events." Allen, DIJ 2.1, adds that Stiller was a Stasi officer who, disillusioned with communism, became a West German double agent. "This is a clear picture of everyday workings of a foreign intelligence organization -- and clearly fascinating reading."
To Frank, FILS 11.6, the book is "exceptional reading" which "may in many ways be unique." It is "well written and informative." For Foot, I&NS 8.4, Stiller's is a "clear, frank autobiography." The author exposes "how corrupt the innermost circles in East Germany had become," and gives a "good vivid story of his final escape."
Stillwell, Paul. "The Lead Code-Breaker of Midway." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 138, no. 6 (Jun. 2012): 62-65.
The author emphasizes that the breaking of the Japanese codes was a team effort, not just the the work of Commander Joseph Rochefort. Here he summarizes the life and work of Lt. Commander (later Captain) Thomas H. Dyer.
Stillwell, Paul, ed. Air Raid, Pearl Harbor: Recollections of a Day of Infamy. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1981.
From publisher: "An anthology of first-person reminiscences including Japanese accounts and the reaction in Washington."
Stinnett, Robert. Day of Deceit: The Truth about FDR and Pearl Harbor. New York: Free Press, 1999.
According to Macartney, AFIO WIN 47-99 (25 Nov. 1999), Stinnett supports "the old revisionist conspiracy theory that FDR 'encouraged' the Japanese to attack Pearl Harbor because he needed to overcome isolationist pressure that was keeping the US from going to Britain's aid in the war against Hitler."
The History Channel web site carries a lengthy rebuttal to Stinnett's thesis: Jacobsen, "'Day of Deceit': An Analysis by a Veteran Navy Cryptologist," [substantially the same review is also available in Cryptologia 24.2 (Apr. 2000), 110-118]. With no small touch of sarcasm, Jacobsen notes that "through his exceptional foresight, unique expertise and diligence, Stinnett was able to see through [President Roosevelt's] monstrous conspiracy and its cover-up to reveal its details to us some 58 years later when all previous efforts by revisionist conspiracy theorists have failed and all the participants are dead and cannot defend themselves."
Although "Stinnett came up with many new documents not generally known to be available..., these documents do not add anything new to the question of who knew what and when. In his zeal, Stinnett misinterprets not only these documents but comes up with new meanings for the plain words and characterizations of well accepted documentation already available in this Pearl Harbor arena." Stinett's theory is unproven and an "impossibility": "No U.S. officials knew beforehand of the Japanese plans to attack PH or discovered that the Kito Butai was on its way to Hawaii."
Clark comment: Jacobsen's review should be read in full to get the flavor of some of the "gross omissions, errors and misinterpretations that Stinnett had to assemble to try to make his revisionist conspiracy theory seem plausible to the uninitiated." See also Jacobsen, "Foreknowledge of Pearl Harbor? No!: The Story of the U.S. Navy's Efforts on JN-25B," Cryptologia 27.3 (Jul. 2003): 193-205.
Prados, Washington Post, 5 Mar. 2000, X7, concludes that "Day of Deceit furnishes a frustrating and ultimately unsatisfactory rendition of the months before Pearl Harbor." For Zelikow, FA 79.2 (Mar.-Apr. 2000), the author's most sensational nuggets of evidence "are premised on the false belief that American intelligence had broken the Japanese naval code before the attack.... Stinnett never fashions his nuggets of research into a coherent argument, much less a convincing portrait." Brooks, NIPQ 16.1, finds himself unable to accept Stinnett's thesis in the face of too many unproven assumptions.
Similarly, Budiansky, Cryptologia 24.2, sees the author "recycl[ing] all of the arguments familiar to readers of the Pearl Harbor revisionists." It has been "establish[ed] unambiguously that ... no current decryption at all [of the Japanese naval codes] was taking place at the time of Pearl Harbor."
Carpenter, IJI&C 14.2, comes down on the other side of the issue of the credibility of the author's work. The reviewer concludes that he is "inclined to agree with" Stinnett's conclusion. In the same vein, Barkin and Westerfield, IJI&C 14.3, believe that "Stinnett's highlighting of Japan's vulnerability to the U.S. Navy's direction-finding and traffic-analysis strengths is impressive." They seem to accept that information that would establish U.S. government culpability is still being withheld.
Zimmerman, I&NS 17.2, produces a critique of Day of Deceit that is second only to Jacobsen's (above) in laying to waste any credibility that Stinnett's work might seem to have. Zimmerman declares flatly that "none of the book's major assertions can withstand critical scrutiny," and proceeds to demonstrate the fallacies in those assertions. This "Review Essay" also provides an excellent overview of "Revisionist" historiography.
Stinson, Douglas R. Cryptography: Theory and Practice. Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press, 1995. 3d ed. Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2006.
This is a standard textbook for courses in cryptography. Writing about the third edition, Kruh, Cryptologia 30.2 (Apr. 2006), says that "this authoritative text continues to provide a solid foundation for future breakthroughs."
Stirling, Tessa, Daria Nalecz, and Tadeusz Dubicki, eds. Fwd., Tony Blair. Intelligence Co-Operation between Poland and Great Britain during World War II: The Report of the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee. Vol. 1. Edgware, UK, and Portland, OR: Vallentine Mitchell, 2005.
From publisher: "The Anglo-Polish Historical Committee was established in 2000 with the full support of the Prime Ministers of both countries. The committee, made up of historians and official experts from both countries, was set up to identify and evaluate surviving historical records which would show the extent of the contribution made by Polish Intelligence to the Allied victory.... In order to assist the committee's work, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Chief Historian has been granted access to the archives of the British Intelligence Services. The Polish historians have concentrated their efforts on those documents publicly available in the archives of, for example, Britain, Poland and the United States of America."
DKR, AFIO WIN 34-05 (6 Sep. 2005), notes that this is the work of one British and two Polish historians, "with contributions from a variety of researchers. The result relates not only the story of the acquisition of Enigma but how the Poles smuggled to England in the middle of the war a copy of the German V-2 rocket and its top-secret fuel. [R]eaders ... will learn that Polish intelligence was active from Japan to every part of Europe, whether Nazi occupied or neutral."
According to Peake, Studies 50.1 (Mar. 2006), "Foreign Office historian Gill Bennett is the major British contributor to this volume. In her summary of the Anglo-Polish wartime relationship, she describes both the difficulties and the successes resulting from the collaboration. She leaves no doubt that the Polish contribution was a positive one whose recognition was long overdue. This book is a major contribution to intelligence history."
Stith, S.B. Foundation for Victory: Operations and Intelligence Harmoniously Combine in Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign (1862), A Master's Thesis. Monteray, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1993. [Surveillant 3.4/5]
Stivers, William. "Was Sovietization Inevitable? U.S. Intelligence Perceptions of Internal Developments in the Soviet Zone of Occupation in Germany." Journal of Intelligence History 5, no. 1 (Summer 2005). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/journal.html]
From Abstract: The author looks at "the way US-intelligence perceived internal developments in the Soviet zone in Germany until the end of the Berlin blockade in May 1949. His account shows that American intelligence analysts came to the correct conclusion that the Soviets had no master plan for Germany and that the fate of Germany was largely undetermined."
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