Donald P. Steury

 

Steury, Donald P. "Dissecting Soviet Analysis, 1946-50: How the CIA Missed Stalin's Bomb." Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 1 (2005), 19-26.

The CIA's Office of Reports and Estimates (ORE) "was responsible for producing the Intelligence Community's best judgment on when the Soviet Union would first produce an atomic bomb.... In retrospect, it seems that ORE's failure to accurately predict the advent of the Soviet atomic bomb was due less to any particular shortcoming than a general failure to piece everything together."

[Analysis/Sov]

Steury, Donald P. "Naval Intelligence, the Atlantic Campaign and the Sinking of the Bismarck: A Study in the Integration of Intelligence into the Conduct of Naval Warfare." Journal of Contemporary History 22, no. 2 (Apr. 1987): 209-233.

Sexton says that this "valuable source" covers the functioning of both British and German intelligence.

[UK/WWII/Navy; WWII/Atlantic; WWII/Eur/Ger]

Steury, Donald P. "Origins of CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union." In Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, eds. Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2003.

From "Introduction": "Steury's paper focuses on the evolution of an independent, analytical capability" at the CIA during the early years of the Cold War. He traces the development of the CIA "from the creation of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) in 1946 through the tenure of Lt. Gen. Walter Bedell Smith as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) in 1950-51. It was during this period that the nucleus of the Agency's future analytic organization -- the DI and a Board of National Estimates (BNE) -- was formed."

[Analysis/Sov]

Steury, Donald P. "Tracking Nazi 'Gold': The OSS and Project SAFEHAVEN." Studies in Intelligence 9 (Summer 2000): 35-50.

"Although it was evident from the outset that SAFEHAVEN would be primarily an intelligence-gathering problem, it does not appear to have occurred to anyone to consult the intelligence services, which were excluded from the planning and implementation of SAFEHAVEN until the end of November 1944.... Once the OSS was brought into the SAFEHAVEN fold, all the advantages of a centralized intelligence organization were brought to bear.... [For OSS,] SAFEHAVEN ... emerged as a joint SI [Secret Intelligence Branch]/X-2 [Counterintelligence Branch] operation..., especially in the key OSS outposts in Switzerland, Spain, and Portugal."

[GenPostwar/40s/Ger; WWII/OSS/GerOps]

Steury, Donald P. World War II Chronicles: The Intelligence Wars. New York: MetroBooks, 2000.

Kruh, Cryptologia 25.1, says that the author "vividly describes the covert activities that comprised the secret war from 1939 through 1945. The book is illustrated with full color maps and almost 150 photographs."

[WWII/Gen]

Steury, Donald P., ed. CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, 1947-1991. Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2001.

[Analysis/Sov]

Steury, Donald P., ed. Intentions and Capabilities: Estimates on Soviet Strategic Forces, 1950-1983. Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1996.

This is a selection of 41 National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) on Soviet strategic capabilities and intentions from the 1950s to 1983. Only the shorter NIEs have been reproduced in their entirety; for the longer Estimates, the "Summaries" and "Key Judgments," along with extracts from their other sections, are included.

Cohen, FA 75.5 (Sep.-Oct. 1996), sees this compendium as "an indispensable window into one of the central issues confronting the American national security establishment." Prados, JAH 83.4, finds that "a good selection of the relevant material" has been made. While this is "a useful contribution,... it has major drawbacks." These include the fact that much of information is "culled" from longer documents, giving the materials a fragmentary nature. Deletions for security reasons is a continuing problem. And the CIA "has failed adequately to identify the originals, which are given titles but not dated." (Italics in original)

[Analysis/Sov]

Steury, Donald P., ed. On the Front Lines of the Cold War: Documents on the Intelligence War in Berlin, 1946-1961. Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1999.

[GenPostwar/CW]

Steury, Donald P., ed. Sherman Kent and the Board of National Estimates: Collected Essays. Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1994.

Sherman Kent chaired the Board of National Estimates from 1952 to 1967. His influence in that time on the way the CIA and the intelligence community prepared the centerpiece National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) was substantial. This book brings together some of his writings on intelligence topics. Of particular significance is his article "The Law and Custom of the National Intelligence Estimate."

[Analysis/Estimates]

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