Sr - Stam

 

Srodes, James. Allen Dulles: Master of Spies. Washington, DC: Regnery, 1999.

Stein, Washington Post, 20 Jun. 1999, suggests that this is a story "that now has been told many times, unfortunately for James Srodes." In a similar vein, Hochschild, Times Literary Supplement, 17 Sep. 1999, suggests that the reason for a new biography of Dulles is that the author "apparently thinks Dulles deserves a more admiring view" than was given in Peter Grose's Gentleman Spy. For Goulden, Intelligencer 10.2, "Srodes' strength is that he grasps what made Mr. Dulles an effective spymaster." The author also "devotes major space to the OSS period, providing a keen insight into the daily activities of a working intelligence officer."

To Ford, IJI&C 13.2, "Srodes points up some weakness and failures," but overall he "generates marked and deserved gratitude for Dulles's many contributions to American life." He is especially good at pointing out that "Dulles had made a lifetime of contributions to United States diplomacy and foreign policy long before he had become DCI.... [And he] renders an excellent treatment of the many episodes of Dulles's incumbency as DCI." Bates, NIPQ, Spring 2000, calls the book "entertaining and easy to read." The narrative of Dulles' service in Bonn "is well done and describes in detail [his] fine espionage tradecraft." Srodes does spend "an inordinate amount of time on the Bay of Pigs fiasco."

[CIA/DCIs/Dulles]

Srodes, James. "Allen Dulles's 73 Rules of Spycraft." Intelligencer 17, no. 2 (Fall 2009): 49-55.

Srodes found these among Dulles's personal papers.

[CIA/DCIs/Dulles]

Srodes, James. Franklin: The Essential Founding Father. Washington DC: Regnery, 2002.

Jonkers, AFIO WIN 24-02 (19 Jun. 2002), suggests that the author provides "insights on our revolutionary past ... in an easily digestible form, while still creating food for contemplative thought." Franklin "was suited for his chosen role, of supporting the American revolution from abroad with skills as a diplomat, spymaster, covert operator and propagandist. He played a key role in bringing the revolution to a successful conclusion, and Srodes tells the story well, with an easy and readable style."

[RevWar/Foreign]

Stack, Kevin P. "Appreciating President Ford's Legacy to Intelligence." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 12, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 73-79.

"The presidential legacy of Gerald R. Ford has yet to be adequately assessed. But his positive role in defining intelligence community operations and options is certain to assume larger proportions as scholars give additional focus to these aspects of his administration."

[GenPostwar/70s/Gen]

Stack, Kevin P. "The Cold War Intelligence Score." American Intelligence Journal 18, no. 1/2 (1998): 69-72.

The "Editor's Note" appended to this article states: "This comparison effort is of interest even though readers may take exception to some of the author's positions and conclusions." Clark comment: I agree with that assessment. Using only open-source materials, Stack concludes that "the Soviet Union scored a win over the United States in the 'intelligence security war' of the Cold War." That conclusion may or may be correct, but the strongly conservative ideological bias shown in the author's analysis certainly does little to "prove" his point.

[GenPostwar/CW; Russia/To89][c]

Stack, Kevin P. "A Negative View of Competitive Analysis." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10, no. 4 (Winter 1997-1998): 456-464. "Commentary: Competitive Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 4 (Winter 1998): 194-202.

I have not performed a word-by-word comparison of these two articles, but the following quoted material, which sums up the author's argument, is identical in both articles: "[T]he use of outsiders to question judgments made by intelligence officials would not result in improved analysis.... Outsiders called in to refute or negate intelligence estimates would only muddle the process from the decisionmakers' perspective."

[Analysis/Teams][c]

Stack, Kevin P.

1. [CAPT/USMCR] "The Role of Intelligence at Inchon." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 14, no. 1 (Jan. 1998): 7-10.

Without denigrating the value of MacArthur's leadership to the victory that Inchon represents, the author offers some thoughts on the "vital role" that intelligence played in the planning process for that bold amphibious landing. Intelligence on the "terrain, weather conditions, and enemy activities played a key role in critical operational and tactical decisions." Despite an undervaluation of the role of national-level intelligence, Stack supports his conclusion that "intelligence analysis in support of the Inchon landing was highly effective and had direct operational payoff."

2. [MAJ/USMCR] "Intel Cinches Inchon." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Sep. 2000, 66-69.

See above.

[GenPostwar/50s/Korea]

Staerck, Chris, ed. Allied Photo Reconnaissance of World War II. San Diego, CA: Thunder Bay Press, 1998.

From publisher: "This book details several of the most important operations from the perspective of photo-reconnaissance, including Monte Cassino, the Normandy landings, and the hunt for and destruction of Germany's V-weapons."

[UK/WWII/AirRec]

Staerck, Christopher, and Paul Sinnott. Luftwaffe: The Allied Intelligence Files. Dulles, VA: Brassey's, 2002.

Tate, Air & Space Power Journal 19.1 (Spring 2005), finds that "the authors have produced a fine historical document. They include both background information and ... detailed data" on various German aircraft. Their "analysis addresses [each] aircraft's war record, performance characteristics, and intelligence history -- the latter reflecting the amount of actual information we had on German aircraft during the war."

[UK/WWII/Services/RAF; WWII/Eur/Germany & USServices/Air]

Stafford, David.

Stahl, Bob. You're No Good to Me Dead: Behind Japanese Lines in the Philippines. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995.

From publisher: "One of the best-kept secrets of World War II is the story of the Allied Intelligence Bureau (AIB), the Pacific theater's equivalent of the OSS. Inserted miles behind enemy lines, AIB agents established intelligence networks and guerrilla armies in advance of invasion, all while living off the land and avoiding enemy patrols. This is one agent's extraordinary account of 15 harrowing months 1,500 miles behind Japanese lines." Crerar, AIJ 16.2/3, sees this as "a compelling memoir, with insights for current and future special operations personnel."

[WWII/FEPac/AIB & Phil]

Stalker, John. Stalker. London: Harrap, 1988. New York: Viking Penguin, 1988.

Stallings, Ron and Michael Foley. "CI and HUMINT Operations in Support of Operation Enduring Freedom." Military Intelligence 29 (Oct.-Dec. 2003): 43-46.

The authors discuss the value of counterintelligence and human intelligence operations (including interrogation) in Afghanistan in 2003.

[MI/Ops/Afghanistan]

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