Sontag, Deborah. "Israel Eases Secrecy Over Nuclear Whistle-Blower's Trial." New York Times, 25 Nov. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Sontag, Deborah. "Israel Eases Secrecy Over Nuclear Whistle-Blower's Trial." New York Times, 25 Nov. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]
On 24 November 1999, the Israeli government allowed the newspaper Yediot Ahronot "to publish censored excerpts from the classified transcript of [Mordechai Vanunu's] treason trial of 12 years ago. They provided the first glimpse ever into the courtroom where ... Vanunu was convicted for blowing the whistle on Israel's secret nuclear program."
[Israel]
Sontag, Sherry, and Christopher Drew, with Annette Lawrence Drew. Blind Man's Bluff: The Untold Story of American Submarine Espionage. New York: Public Affairs, 1998.
Broad, NYT, 8 Nov. 1998, says that this book "recounts in rich detail, going far beyond earlier sketchy accounts," one of the Cold War's most successful spying operations. "Ingenious cable taps," placed in such places as the Sea of Okhotsk and the Barents Sea, "produced a torrent of intelligence data."
According to Bates, NIPQ 14.4, the authors of this book use the type of documentation ("Anonymous") favored by investigative journalists, which "allows them to weave fact, speculation, and fiction into a story that then takes on an aura of authenticity, but is next to impossible to verify."
Jonkers, AFIO WIN 39 (14 Oct. 1998), sees this as "an early-Tom Clancy-like adventure novel masquerading as history,... with the line between fact and fiction, truth and speculation, exaggeration or deception, unrecognizable and unknown.... [Nevertheless,] read it as a superb historical novel and a monument to courage. Highly recommended."
For Raviv, Washington Post, 30 Nov. 1998, this book "is filled with specifics, notably new details of incidents previously leaked, but thankfully not presented in the dry techno-speak of many military histories. This one is very human and easy to read."
Friedman, Proceedings, Feb. 1999, finds the book a "somewhat unsatisfactory" product that "cannot be considered complete," given that the documentation remains classified. Many of its "details are often thin, and the book is padded with irrelevancies." Nonetheless, Blind Man's Bluff shows that the submarine service "did something important and worthwhile during the Cold War." Sontag and Drew respond to Friedman's comments in "Comment and Discussion," Proceedings, Jun. 1999, 24.
The book is both "boosted and panned" by Anderson, Intelligencer 10.1. He finds "the style, the florid writing, the exaggeration, and poor choice of words objectionable.... Nevertheless, it is a readable, lively book and puts a lot of new information in the public domain" about sensitive operations.
Warren, CIRA Newsletter 23.5, notes that the telling of the "Soviet side of the story is not as exhaustive as that of the Americans, but it is almost as compelling." Carpenter, IJI&C 12.2, says that Blind Man's Bluff is "a unique story" that makes for "fascinating reading." See also, Richard J. Newman, "Tales from the Sea Floor," U.S. News & World Report, 23 Nov. 1998, 44.
[MI/Navy/To90s]
Soohoo, Edmund L. "An Elint Vigil, Unmanned." Studies in Intelligence 12, no. 2 (Spring 1968): 21-27.
Discusses the potential use of automated systems (note the date) for monitoring hard-to-get and/or infrequent electronic signals. The example is the Soviet SA-2 Guideline.
[GenPostwar/Issues/S&T/To90s]
Soper, Karl. "Getting Serious About Restructuring Intelligence." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 12, no. 1 (Jan. 1996): 1-3.
The following exchange was carried in "NIP Forum," Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 12, no. 2 (Apr. 1996), p. 14.
"Just finished Soper's article, 'Getting Serious About Restructuring Intelligence,' and can hear the howls all the way [o]ut here in Ohio. Soper's outline of a truly centralized intelligence structure (my words, not his) deserves more discussion than I fear it will achieve.
"The concept of a 'Department of Intelligence' has an appealing simplicity, and would do much to rationalize the existing multiple intelligence organizational entities and chains of command. It also offers more from a management point of view than continued 'restructuring' by the creation of ever more entities, a direction begun under Cheney and Gates but toward which Deutch and others seem to lean.
"One quibble worth mentioning is Soper's neglect of counterintelligence. Or is he assuming that CI will become totally the FBI domain? J. Ransom Clark, New Concord, OH."
"The author replies: 'The issue of responsibility for CI is a difficult one and I semiconsciously neglected it for that reason. I did allude, however, to intelligence ceding responsibility to the FBI in law enforcement areas. But to address the issue squarely, I view the current division of responsibility for CI as an unmitigated failure, as demonstrated most recently in the Ames case. In my view, the only way to rectify the problem is to give the FBI full authority in CI matters, including HUMINT operations outside the United States."
[Reform]
Sorenson, Anne. Stasi og den vesttyske terrorisme [STASI and the West German Terrorism]. Aarhus, Denmark: Aarhus Universitetsforlag, 2006.
According to Hansen, IJI&C 21.1 (Spring 2008), this work is "based largely on source material from the BStU" and provides "a comprehensive description of the relationship between West German terrorist groups and the GDR's" STASI. The reviewer believes that the book, available only in Danish, is a "very important historical work [that] goes far beyond its original Danish audience."
[Germany/ East & West]
Sorenson, Thomas C. The Word War: The Story of American Propaganda. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
[CA/Psyops]
Sorley, Lewis. A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America's Last Years in Vietnam. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1999.
According to Isaacs, Washington Post, 8 Aug. 1999, "Lewis Sorley appears to have given himself two missions in this book. The first, which he largely achieves, is to rescue Gen. Creighton Abrams's reputation from the wreck of Vietnam. The second is to reevaluate the U.S. campaign there as a success, not a failure, even if in the end America's objective was not met. Here, Sorley is less persuasive.... Even if his conclusion is absurdly overstated, Sorley assembles a good deal of evidence that the United States fought more intelligently and effectively in the war's later years, due largely to Gen. Abrams's leadership."
Jonkers, AFIO WIN 32-99, 12 Aug. 1999, finds that "this book contributes a balancing view to the many self-serving apologia ubiquitously available, and is worthwhile and recommended reading." Similarly, Cushman, Proceedings, Sep. 1999, calls A Better War "a gripping case study in leadership [that] makes a major contribution to our understanding" of the Vietnam War.
For Waller, CIRA Newsletter 24.4, Sorley's "deep inspection and his obvious writing skills make this book a major contribution to a dark hour in the history of America's Cold War. It surgically dissects the anatomy of war and counter-insurgency in Vietnam.... Sorley has ... produced a military history that both historians and war buffs should read."
Lefever, IJI&C 13.2, sees A Better War as a "provocative and well-researched book" that "makes a consequential contribution to understanding the Vietnam enigma."
[Vietnam]
Sorley, Lewis. The Central Intelligence Agency: An Overview. Intelligence Profession
Series. McLean, VA: Association of Former Intelligence Officers, 1990.
[CIA]
Soroos, Marvin S. "Environmental Security: Choices for the Twenty-First Century." National Forum
75, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 20-25.
[GenPostwar/NatSec/Environment]
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