Smith, R. Jeffrey. "Agency Is Faulted on Practices in Iraq, Secrecy Amid Probe." Washington Post, 26 Aug. 2004, A18. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 25 August 2004, a report by Maj. Gen. George R. Fay on the U.S. Army's internal investigation into the abuse of detainees in Iraq "concluded that the CIA's detention and interrogation practices in Iraq 'led to a loss of accountability, abuse, reduced interagency cooperation, and unhealthy mystique that . . . [ellipses in original] poisoned the atmosphere' in the Abu Ghraib prison near Baghdad, in which detainees were mistreated."
Smith, R. Jeffrey. "Another Splotch on the CIA: Its Cozy Relationship with Guatemalan Thugs Undercut U.S. Human Rights Efforts." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 10-16 Apr. 1995, 33.
Smith, R. Jeffrey. "CIA Chief Fires Two Over Scandal in Guatemala." Washington Post, 30 Sep. 1995, A1.
Smith, R. Jeffrey. "CIA Drops Over 1,000 Informants." Washington Post, 2 Mar. 1997, A1, A19. "Scrubbing Up at the CIA: More Than a Thousand Secret Informants Have Been Pared from the Agency's Worldwide Payroll." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 10 Mar. 1997, 34.
The numbers "scrubbed" included more than 100 informants "who, the agency's officers concluded, were implicated in major crimes abroad...-- and who also were judged to have provided inadequate intelligence to remain on the payroll." The total number let go were nearly one-third of the informants employed by the CIA at the time.
Smith, R. Jeffrey. "The CIA's Ill-Advised Dumping Ground." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 1-7 August 1994, 32.
A "new classified study" by "a panel of independent experts," chaired by Jeffrey H. Smith, "sharply criticizes the CIA for what Smith describes as a series of management blunders during the period of Ames's admitted spying."
Smith, R. Jeffrey. "CIA Missed Signs of India's Tests, U.S. Officials Say." Washington Post, 13 May 1998, A1. "The CIA Was Asleep at the Switch." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 18 May 1998, 15.
"[W]hen 'clear-cut' evidence of the nuclear test preparations was recorded by a satellite at midnight in Washington on Sunday, six hours before the tests, no CIA warning was issued because the U.S. analysts responsible for tracking the Indian nuclear program had not expected the tests and were not on alert.... The intelligence community's failure to predict the three nuclear blasts ignited fierce criticism from U.S. policymakers [on 12 May 1998], and prompted two congressional oversight committees and the CIA itself to launch probes of the agency's conduct during the preceding weeks and months....
"Several officials credited India's new government, which was elected less than two months ago, with a shrewd campaign of disinformation designed to put Washington off the scent of a nuclear test.... 'It's just not fair to look at this at the narrow perspective of why someone was not awake looking at pictures of the Pokharan site. They would have been more vigilant if the policy community believed this was likely,' an official said."
Smith, R. Jeffrey. "CIA Station Chief 'Sat On' Information." Washington Post, 25 Mar. 1995, A1.
Smith, R. Jeffrey. "Clinton to Sign Bill Giving CIA Three New Managers; Measure also Expands Powers of FBI, NSA." Washington Post, 5 Oct. 1996, A4.
Smith, R. Jeffrey. "Deutch Outlines Plan to Centralize Control of Intelligence Community." Washington Post, 20 Dec. 1995, A23.
Smith, R. Jeffrey. "A Director Who Has Trouble Reading the Political Tea Leaves." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 31 May-5 Jun. 1994, 7-8.
DCI R. James Woolsey's relations with Congress have reached the point that, with the exception of former Defense Secretary Les Aspin, Woolsey "has received more criticism from his congressional overseers than any other cabinet-level official in this administration." Some people point to the DCI's "zealous defense of the agency" as a source of his problems, while others find the root cause in "President Clinton's perceived lack of interest in intelligence matters and foreign policy issues." But even his friends believe that Woolsey's "argumentative and sometimes abrasive personal style" exacerbates his difficulties.
Smith, R. Jeffrey. "Even Among Allies, Sharing Has Limits." Washington Post, 27 Sep. 1996, A18.
Smith, R. Jeffrey. "Former Top CIA Official Indicted: Foggo Accused of Steering Contracts to GOP Fundraiser." Washington Post, 14 Feb. 2007, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Kyle "Dusty" Foggo, who was the CIA's executive director from November 2004 until May 2006, "was indicted [on 13 February 2007] by a San Diego grand jury for allegedly corrupting the intelligence agency's contracts." He is "accused of using his seniority and influence at a prior CIA job in Europe to steer business deals to his longtime friend Brent R. Wilkes, a California businessman." Foggo is formally charged with "conspiracy to commit honest services fraud and money laundering."
Smith, R. Jeffrey. "A History of Missed Connections: U.S. Analysts Warned of Potential Attacks but Lacked Follow-Through." Washington Post, 25 Jul. 2003, A14. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The joint report by the House and Senate intelligence committees, "particularly its detailed chronology of events in the last weeks when the attack might have been prevented[,] makes clear that the disaster was the result as much of lapses in government follow-through as it was the result of defects of intelligence."
Smith, R. Jeffrey. "Homeland Security Department Curtails Home-Grown Terror Analysis." Washington Post, 7 Jun. 2011. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to current and former department officials, DHS "has stepped back for the past two years from conducting its own intelligence and analysis of home-grown extremism.... The decision to reduce the department's role was provoked by conservative criticism of an intelligence report on 'Rightwing Extremism' issued four months into the Obama administration.... In the two years since, the officials said, the analytical unit that produced that report has been effectively eviscerated." A senior DHS official said "that the FBI -- not DHS -- is 'the primary lead for the federal government' on domestic terrorism."
Smith, R. Jeffrey. "KGB's Italian Agents May Have Hurt West." Washington Post, 17 Oct. 1999, A26. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"Soviet intelligence officers successfully recruited dozens of paid agents in Italy during the Cold War who may have compromised secrets of potential importance to NATO and the United States.... But so far, the revelations have provoked little public response besides weariness at the fresh political warfare the documents have ignited between Italian right and left."
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