Bradley F. Smith

 

Smith, Bradley F. "Admiral Godfrey's Mission to America, June/July 1941." Intelligence and National Security 1, no. 3 (Sep. 1986): 441-450.

The material presented here includes Smith's comments on and text of the report by the British Director of Naval Intelligence, Adm. J.H. Godfrey, on his visit to the United States in June-July 1941. According to Smith, the document "shows Admiral Godfrey more closely involved with the developmental activities of William Stephenson ... and William Donovan ... than many scholars ... had realised.... Admiral Godfrey not only gave direct support to the cause of William Donovan and the COI, but ... he went to ... unprecedented lengths to assist them."

[UK/WWII/BSC; WWII/OSS/Donovan]

Smith, Bradley F. "The American Road to Central Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 12, no. 1 (Jan. 1997): 1-20.

Smith sweeps through the ups and downs of U.S. intelligence from 1861 to 1942. With the establishment of OSS in June 1942 and the development of British-American intelligence cooperation over the following year, the United States had "a large and sophisticated intelligence system comparable to that of the other great powers."

[Overviews/U.S.][c]

Smith, Bradley F. "Anglo-Soviet Intelligence Co-operation and Roads to the Cold War." In British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945-51, ed. Richard James Aldrich, 50-64. London: Routledge, 1992.

[Russia/45-89; UK/Postwar]

Smith, Bradley F. "The Birth of SIS: A Newly Released Document." Intelligence and National Security 13, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 183-189.

Smith provides brief background and commentary on the newly released "record of the second session of the 1909 Sub-Committee on Intelligence (of the Committee of Imperial Defence)" with regard to the formation of the Secret Intelligence Service. The document itself is reproduced at pages 185-189.

[UK/Historical][c]

Smith, Bradley F. "An Idiosyncratic View of Where We Stand on the History of American Intelligence in the Early Post-1945 Era." Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 4 (Oct. 1988): 111-123.

[CIA/40s][c]

Smith, Bradley F. "New Intelligence Releases: A British Side to the Story." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 168-175.

The author reviews the volume and diversity of intelligence-related materials released to the Public Record Office in recent years. He notes that British materials are spread across a larger number of record groups than the U.S. releases to the National Archives, because "Britain's most sensitive intelligence activities in World War II ... were spread much more widely across departments than has heretofore been recognized."

[RefMats/Release; UK/RefMats]

Smith, Bradley F. "The Road to the Anglo-American Intelligence Partnership." American Intelligence Journal 16, no. 2/3 (Autumn/Winter 1995): 59-62.

Based on a lecture at the 1995 NSA Cryptologic History Symposium, this article surveys some of the roots of Anglo-American intelligence cooperation from late last century through World War I and onto the unmatched cooperation of World War II.

[Liaison][c]

Smith, Bradley F. The Shadow Warriors: O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A. New York: Basic Books, 1983.

Despite its title, Bradley Smith's The Shadow Warriors focuses on OSS and World War II. In fact, Petersen regards this as "the best available full treatment of OSS." NameBase comments that Smith "concentrates more on Donovan's bureaucratic wars in Washington than on the campaigns in the field." Powers, Intelligence Wars (2004), p. 12, and NYRB, 12 May 1983, says that this work "contains many useful bits..., but it is dull to read." The concluding chapter "identifies the many ways in which the CIA, especially in its early years, learned the wrong lessons from the experience of the OSS."

[WWII/OSS/Gen]

Smith, Bradley F. Sharing Secrets with Stalin: How the Allies Traded Intelligence, 1941-1945. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1996.

Schneider, AHR 103.4, notes that this book "is a comprehensive and critical look at the exchange of military intelligence among Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States." The author uses "a broad range of new declassified archival sources" to produce "an important contribution in the study of the 'sociology of alliances.'"

According to Jonkers, AIJ 17.1/2, Smith finds that "[a] great deal of the intelligence was exchanged.... By the end of 1944 the Allies even provided ULTRA and MAGIC reports to the Soviets." This is a "[w]ell written book by the dean of British authors on intelligence." Stutteford, Publishers Weekly, 30 Sep. 1996, comments that Smith "has thoughtfully catalogued the long sequence of important intelligence materials passed along to the Anglo-Americans by the Soviets." Seamon, Proceedings 123.6 (Jun. 1997), calls this study "detailed and authoritative."

[WWII/Gen & Magic/Coop]

Smith, Bradley F. "Sharing Ultra in World War II." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 2, no. 1 (Spring 1988): 59-72.

[WWII/Magic/Coop; UK/WWII/Ultra][c]

Smith, Bradley F. "SOE in Afghanistan." In Special Operations Executive: A New Instrument of War, ed. Mark Seaman, 137-147. London: Routledge, 2006. [Capet]

[UK/WWII/Services/SOE]

Smith, Bradley F. The ULTRA-MAGIC Deals and the Most Secret Special Relationship, 1940-1946. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993. Shrewsbury, UK: Airline Press, 1993. Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994. [pb]

Surveillant 3.1 says this is a "fascinating study"; it is "well researched and clearly presented." Miller, IJI&C 7.1, finds that The ULTRA-MAGIC Deals has "many outstanding features"; it is an "extraordinarily detailed account ... of major interest to any intelligence professional." To Watt, I&NS 9.1, Smith shows "indefatigable scholarship in teasing out the main lines of his story." Rich, WIR 13.4, notes that the author demonstrates "just how much has come to light" since such groundbreaking works as Winterbotham's The Ultra Secret, Kahn's "invaluable" Hitler's Spies, and Holmes' "enduring, useful, and readable" Double-Edged Secrets.

McGinnis, Cryptolog 15.4, believes that Smith "deserves credit for his extensive research. The book contains considerable unique material. Further comments by the reviewer: Captain Safford, USN, head of OP 20-G in 1941, wrote a story for the publication CRYPTOLOGIA in which he made scathing comment on what the British gave and did as their part of the bargain when we delivered the two PURPLE machines. He titled that particular section 'Perfidious Albion'."

According to Kruh, Cryptolog 15.1, Smith "describes in great detail the history of cryptologic operations on both sides of the Atlantic. He tells of efforts to form a closer bond between U.S. units and between both nations. He explains the reasons for the concerns, distrust and suspicion harbored by key people with insight to their origins. It is a fascinating history of a basically unexplored subject.... [His] formidable research and his information is generally buttressed by official documents or interviews with participants.... The few inaccuracies should not prevent anyone from enjoying an extensive view of the development of the Anglo-American cryptologic partnership in WWII and the antagonisms between the U.S. Army and Navy which made it even more difficult to accomplish."

[Liaison/Nations; WWII/MAGIC/Coop]

Smith, Bradley F., and Elena Agarossi. Operation Sunrise: The Secret Surrender. New York: Basic, 1979. London: André Deutsch, 1979.

Constantinides calls this a "scholarly history" of the Allied effort to secure the surrender of German forces in Italy. The authors "go too far at times" in seeking to revise the view of Allen Dulles' role in the surrender negotiations, especially in suggesting that Dulles had accomplished nothing in OSS up to this time. See Dulles, The Secret Surrender (1966), for Dulles' firsthand account of Operation Sunrise.

[CIA/DCIs/Dulles; WWII/OSS/GerOps]

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