Smith, Abbot E. "Notes on 'Capabilities' in National Intelligence." Studies in Intelligence 1, no. 2 (Winter 1956): 1-18.
This article represents an early attempt to establish a functional doctrine for intelligence analysts (as opposed to military analysts) in writing national estimates.
Smith, Abbot E. "On the Accuracy of National Intelligence Estimates." Studies in Intelligence 13, no. 4 (Fall 1969): 25-35.
"A master estimator discusses the difficulties of scoring the accuracy of National Intelligence Estimates and of estimating in general."
Smith, Alan B. "Costing Nuclear Programs." Studies in Intelligence 10, no. 1 (Winter 1966): 23-38.
"Direct and analog methods of determining what foreign countries spend on atomic energy for military and peaceful uses."
Smith, Alfred, and Hermann G. Hasken, III [CAPT/USA] "Space Systems Expertise for the 21st Century." Military Intelligence 24, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun. 1998): 25-27.
The National Systems Development Program (NSDP) was designed to train officers "to work in space systems intelligence collection, operations, and mission management."
Smith, Arthur L., Jr. Kidnap City: Cold War Berlin. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2002.
Brown, I&NS 20.2 (Jun. 2005), notes that from an intelligence point of view the author's "recognition of the key role played by the US Army's Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC)" is of particular interest. Smith "reminds his readers that the CIC was first to the front lines in the covert war against the Soviets."
Smith, Bethania Meradith. "Civil War Subversives." Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society 45 (1952): 220-240.
Smith, Bradley F.
Smith, Bruce A. "Pentagon Weighs Key Reconnaissance Issues Highlighted by Gulf War." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22 Apr. 1991, 78-79.
The Air Force came out of the Gulf War with a strong belief that tactical reconnaissance needs to be developed further. There is also a feeling that steps are needed to speed up the flow of intelligence to theater commanders from a variety of sensor systems.
Smith, Bruce A. "U-2/TR-1s Provided Critical Data to Theater Commanders." Aviation Week & Space Technology, 19 Aug. 1991, 60-61.
Smith reviews U-2/TR-1 operations during the Gulf War, and surveys the state of organizational (including the reactivation of the 2nd Air Force) and operational changes being made to ease the coordination and integration of reconnaissance and surveillance data.
Smith, Charles. "Our Pact with Nuclear Danger." WorldNetDaily.com, 4 May 1999. [http://www.worldnetdaily.com]
Since a 1978 agreement between President Carter and Chinese Premier Deng Xioping, "CIA and Chinese Army intelligence agents [have] jointly share[d] two military radio signal intercept stations in China. The two sites are located deep inside the far-western province of Xinjiang at Qitai and Korla....
"The original intention of the joint U.S-Sino pact was to watch Soviet missile launches and nuclear tests during the cold war.... Today, the Soviet Union is no more. There is nothing for the sites at Qitai and Korla to monitor." Yet, "a 1995 'Chinagate' document forced from the Clinton administration by Federal Court,... suggests that the joint PLA/CIA operation to gather signals from Russia may not have ended with the Cold War. Operations at these two sites appear to have expanded to include Asian military communication, radar and computer networks."
Smith, Charles L. "Soviet Maskirovka." Airpower Journal 2 (Spring 1988): 28-39. [Seymour]
Smith, Clarence E. "CIA's Analysis of Soviet Science and Technology." In Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA's Analysis of the Soviet Union, eds. Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2003.
From "Introduction": "Smith asserts ... that a revolution in technical intelligence collection capabilities at CIA during the Cold War led to the development of new analytic techniques as well. These advances ultimately brought significant successes in discerning Soviet scientific and technical capabilities, especially with respect to advanced offensive and defensive weapons.... While stressing CIA's role, Smith credits the entire Intelligence Community for contributing to the technological breakthroughs. In his view the new collection systems enabled US policymakers to become increasingly confident in their ability to discern Soviet military capabilities and to provide warnings of possible Soviet attack."
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