Sibbert, Daniel B. "Commercial Remote-Sensing: Open Source Imagery Intelligence." American Intelligence Journal 14, nos. 2 & 3 (Spring-Summer 1993): 37-40.
Sibbert, Daniel B. "MASINT: Intelligence for the 1990s." American Intelligence Journal 11, no. 3 (Summer-Fall 1990): 23-26.
Sibeck, Gary. "Chinese Corporate Espionage." American Intelligence Journal 28, no. 2 (2010): 66-71.
This article presents some of the leading cases brought against the Chinese before and after passage of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996.
Sibley, George N. "The Indian Nuclear Test: A Case Study in Political Hindsight Bias." WWS Case Study 3/02. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson School, 7 Aug. 2002.
Sibley, Katherine A.S. Red Spies in America: Stolen Secrets and the Dawn of the Cold War. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2004.
Peake, Studies 49.4 (2005), says that this work is "well documented," "well written," and looks at domesic counterintelligence in America "from a new perspective." Nonetheless, the author's thesis that the FBI was more active prior to the end of World War II than previously thought "is not proved."
For Kirkland, JIH 5.1 (Summer 2005), the author's "scholarship is impressive, drawing upon multi-archival research in the United States and Russia.... Her work is balanced and perceptive and is a compelling and authoritative treatment of Soviet spying and the actions the United States took to counter it." Craig, I&NS 21.1 (Feb. 2006), comments that while "[t]here is little new" in the author's "generalized thesis,... [w]hat is unique ... is [Sibley's] assessment of espionage in the manufacturing, military, and industrial sectors.... [T]he book is enlightening and a good read."
Sibley, Katherine A.S. "Soviet Industrial Espionage against American Military Technology and the US Response, 1930-1945." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 2 (Summer 1999): 94-123.
The author notes that the Soviet espionage activities against U.S. industrial and military technology were "highly successful." Although these activities were known to Washington officials, the United States "mounted only a limited response," because of preoccupation, first, with the Depression and, then, with World War II.
Sick, Gary. All Fall Down: America's Tragic Encounter with Iran. New York: Random House, 1985.
The author was a staff member at the National Security Council at the time of the Iran crisis. Pipes, New Republic, 8 Jul 1985, refers to this work as "wise, even profound." For Hoffman, New York Times, 16 Jun. 1985, this is a "convincing, fair and balanced" account that provides "cool, sharp and restrained analysis."
Sick, Gary. October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election of Ronald Reagan. New York: Random House-New York Times Books, 1991. 1992. [pb]
Surveillant 3.1 notes that a congressional examination found no proof to support the charge of Reagan campaign complicity in delaying the release of the hostages. "Sick emphasizes repeatedly that the case is weak.... Two of his major sources -- Ari Ben-Menashe and Richard J. Brenneke -- have been characterized as highly unreliable by reputable reviewers."
For Beisner, WPNWE, 3-9 Feb. 1992, Sick "puts together a strong case for the truth of the allegations." Although "[i]t is not easy to determine the credibility of Sick's allegations,... [a]t the very least he demonstrates that the alleged actions were both possible and plausible." Strong, I&NS 8.2, comments that there are many "loose ends, and Sick's honesty in pointing them out, gives his book a ring of truth."
According to NameBase. "Gary Sick spent 24 years in the navy as an analyst and served on the National Security Council staff under Presidents Ford, Carter, and Reagan." Barbara Honegger first proposed the October Surprise scenario in 1987. "In April 1991 the New York Times ran an op-ed piece by Sick, who was beginning to get very interested in the issue, and 'Frontline' did a show on PBS on April 16.... By late 1992, however, many observers considered some of the sources for the story to be unreliable, and almost everyone lost interest."
Sides, Hampton. Ghost Soldiers: The Forgotten Epic Story of World War II's Most Dramatic Mission. New York: Random House, 2002.
According to Pounder, Air & Space Power [http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil], this is the story of how "a battalion of 200 U.S. Army Rangers and Filipino Scouts stormed the Cabanatuan POW Camp, rescuing hundreds of American and British prisoners" in early 1945. The author, "[e]xpertly mixing POW camp vignettes with details of the rescue mission,... has produced a stirring, memorable narrative" that is "[c]ompetently researched and superbly written." See also, Rottman, The Cabanatuan Prison Raid (2009).
Sieff, Martin. "Detained U.S. Military Aide To Be Sent Home from China." Washington Times, 18 Jan. 1996, A13.
Sieff, Martin. "New Mossad Chief to Inherit Deeply Troubled Agency." Washington Times, 2 Mar. 1998, A14.
Sieff, Martin. "Pollard Demand Put Clinton in Fix." Washington Times National Weekly Edition, 2-8 Nov. 1998, 17.
President Clinton stated "that he had reached no conclusion yet on whether he would pardon Pollard.... However, both diplomats and intelligence officials said Pollard's pardon and release now appear to be a done deal, and in a matter of weeks at the very most." See also, Rowan Scarborough, "Pollard Betrayed Crown Jewels of American Spy Data" Washington Times National Weekly Edition, 2-8 Nov. 1998, 3, with quotes by Joseph diGenova arguing against Pollard's release.
Sieff, Martin. "Two American Officers Ordered Out of China." Washington Times, 3 Aug. 1995, A1, A16.
Siegel, Jennifer. "British Intelligence on the Russian Revolution and Civil War--A Breach at the Source." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 3 (Jul. 1995): 468-485.
Siegel reviews the disputes between and around Robert Bruce Lockhart, Britain's representative in Russia after January 1918, and General Alfred Knox, the former British military attaché in Petrograd. After Lockhart's expulsion in October 1918, the British became even "more dependent upon less reliable sources." In the final analysis, however, "[e]vents and conditions in Russia were not the determining factors in the formation of British policy; on the contrary, it was domestic political and economic concerns which dominated the thoughts of policy-makers as they grappled with questions of intervention." Thus, the failures of British intelligence to provide an accurate picture of Civil War Russia may not have mattered.
Siegel, Jennifer L. "Training Thieves: The Instruction of 'Efficient Intelligence Officers' in Pre-1914 Britain." In Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society, eds. Jennifer L. Siegel and Peter J. Jackson, 127-138. New York: Praeger, 2005.
Siegert, Alice. "Hundreds of Soviets Scout West Germany." Chicago Tribune, 29 Mar. 1985.
Siehl, George. "Cloak, Dust Jacket, and Dagger." Library Journal 97 (15 Oct. 1972): 3277-3288. [Petersen]
Sifton, Elisabeth, and Fritz Stern. No Ordinary Men: Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Hans von Dohnanyi, Resisters Against Hitler in Church and State. New York: Review Books, 2013.
Hoffman, FA 93.4 (Jul.-Aug. 2014), says this "book offers a fascinating portrait of the anti-Nazi underground." The authors "have done an important service."
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