Shultz, Richard H., Jr. "Coercive Force and Military Strategy: Deterrence Logic and the Cost-Benefit Model of CounterinsurgencyWarfare." Western Political Quarterly 32 (Dec. 1979): 444-466.
Shultz, Richard H., Jr. "Covert Action and Executive-Legislative Relations: The Iran-Contra Crisis and Its Aftermath." Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 12, no. 2 (Spring 1989).
Shultz, Richard H., Jr. The Marines Take Anbar: The Four-Year Fight against al Qaeda. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2013.
Moir, Proceedings 139.8 (Aug. 2013), finds that the author "enables his readers to better recognize a more holistic perspective of a transformative endeavor."
Shultz, Richard H., Jr. The Secret War Against Hanoi: Kennedy and Johnson's Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam. New York: HarperCollins, 1999.
Clark comment: While intending only to scan Shultz' work over the Christmas holidays 2002, I found it so well done that a closer read became necessary. Although the outlines of the activities of Military Assistance Command Vietnam Studies and Observation Group (MACVSOG or SOG) have been more widely known than some reviewers seem to think, the flesh that Shultz puts around the existing bones is finely molded. That he sympathizes with the people given SOG's particularly impossible mission does not in any way displace the author's critical eye. Whether discussing strategy (or the lack thereof), operational planning, or tactical activities, Shultz' insightful mind drives his sharp pen to skewer the decision makers of the period in a fashion that rings true. That Shultz has chosen to present his material in overlapping scenarios may seem redundant or repetitive to some. However, the style is a marvelous teaching tool, and the author uses it to good effect in putting SOG's role into the broader perspective of Washington's waging of the Vietnam War. This is a superb work.
For Ignatius, Washington Post, 10 Nov. 1999, Shultz "offers a startling new glimpse" at the Vietnam War.
Loeb, Washington Post, 24 Nov. 1999, notes that the secrets of America's covert actions in Vietnam "remained locked in a Pentagon vault until Shultz gained access four years ago to 3,000 pages of classified SOG files.... Shultz's treasure trove of a book is most fascinating as an operational text, describing intelligence cons and deception games worthy of John LeCarre at his best."
To Bernstein, NYT, 12 Jan. 2000, this is an "illuminating account" and a "searching, critical, dispassionate analysis." In Shultz' account, President "Kennedy showed no sign of souring on the war and wishing ... to bring about a U.S. disengagement. On the contrary,... Kennedy was so impatient to get results that when the CIA failed to do so, he transferred the operation to the Pentagon."
Friedman, CIRA Newsletter 25.1, says that this book "is the first-ever definitive and comprehensive account of the covert paramilitary and espionage campaign [in Vietnam], with many eye-opening disclosures."
Less impressed is Gatlin, Proceedings 126.4 (Apr. 2000), who makes the cardinal mistake of misspelling Shultz' name. Although the work "does provide the most complete picture yet of the origins, organization, and administration of SOG,... the uneven scholarship and lapses into an astonishing flippancy and clear agenda suggest [Shultz] (understandably) fell in love with his subjects.... Partly owing to ... reporting every word of interviewees ... the result is ... an unintended litany of excuses for SOG's relative ineffectiveness."
Cohen, FA 79.3 (May-Jun. 2000), sees Shultz' "understandable admiration for the courage and ingenuity of America's operatives and their Vietnamese allies" differently: "In the end, Shultz's respect for the agents involved does not compromise his dispassionate assessments of their accomplishments."
According to Andrade, IJI&C 14.4, Shultz "deftly outlines the evaluation of the covert program and its execution. Perhaps most importantly, he notes the consequences of Washington's micromanagement of OPLAN 34A." However, Shultz' sources "are so tightly focused on their subject that they lose the larger perspective.... Worse, he fails to examine sources from the other side."
Shultz, Richard H., Jr. The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Warfare: Principles, Practices, and Regional Comparisons. Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1988.
Valcourt, IJI&C 3.1, says that this book "breaks relatively new ground." The author seeks "to show ... that Soviet support of so-called 'wars of national liberation' is part of an evolving process." Shultz concludes that "the Soviet Union had no coherent plan to conquer the world, nor any significant revolutionary ideology to offer as unification to those waging guerrilla or political warfare." The book presents four cases: Vietnam, the PLO, Angola, and Central America, particularly Nicaragua. The author has undertaken a "comprehensive review of how Soviet newspapers and journals report and interpret that country's international involvements." The writing style is "dry and soporific."
[CA/Africa/Angola; CIA/80s/Nicaragua; OtherCountries/Arab/Palestinian; Russia/To89; Vietnam/Gen]
Shultz, Richard H., Jr., and Andrea J. Dew. Insurgents, Terrorists, and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat. New York: Columbia University Press, 2006.
Longino, Proceedings 133.5 (May 2007), says that the authors "have done a thorough, yet concise, job assisting readers in understanding why modern warfare is different.... The book is well researched and written and flows nicely toward a conclusion full of lessons learned.... Shultz and Dew present a precise and effective analysis" of the conflicts in Somalia, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
For Crowther, Parameters 37.2 (Summer 2007), this is "an excellent primer on the nature of warfare and our likely enemies in the twenty-first century." The authors argue that "tribal societies will comprise the enemies of the future.... The nature of these societies have led to a preferred type of warfare -- decentralized, violent, and family-based." One theme that continues "throughout the book is the propensity for militaries and policymakers in developed countries to underestimate the warfighting capacity inherent in these tribal/clan based societies.... [T]his book is thoroughly researched and impressively referenced."
McIntosh, JFQ 48 (1st Quarter 2008), notes that the authors "propose that an awareness of how tribes and clans operate creates opportunities for the soldier.... They push the reader to consider that the 'primitive' enemy has a logic of his own that can be anticipated and used against him. They show that while the logic of clan violence is not the only factor to consider, it is one we ignore at our peril."
To Peake, Intelligencer 16.1 (Spring 2008), this work "leaves no doubt that knowing today's enemies is essential to national survival." Ladwig, Military Review (Mar.-Apr. 2007), finds that this work "is a useful introduction to the topic of traditional warriors and modern warfare. However, the lack of prescriptive guidance for responding to the challenges posed by tribal irregulars leaves the reader wanting more."
Shultz, Richard H., Jr., and Roy Godson. Dezinformatsia: Active Measures in Soviet Strategy. New York and London: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1984. 1984. [pb]
According to Pforzheimer, this book "has been well received by knowledgeable students.... Written in straightforward, readable prose,... it is of value to the intelligence officer, members of the academic community, journalists, and the general public.... Chapter V is given over to interviews ... with two major defectors in the field of active measures - Stanislav Levchenko ... and Ladislav Bittman." Milivojevic, I&NS 2.2, praises the work as a "systematic, well-documented and convincing analysis." He views Chapter 4 as "the most interesting and original in the entire book, analysing Soviet covert political techniques used against the West between 1960 and 1980."
Shultz, Richard, Roy Godson, and
1. Ted Greenwood, eds. Security Studies for the 1990s. Washington, DC: Brassey's (US), 1993.
Individual chapters review a major security studies course, propose needed changes, and present a model syllabus.
"The course entitled 'Introduction to International Security' is a model for those institutions that can offer no more than one course in the field.... [T]he book presents a richly interdisciplinary exposure to the topics, approaches, literature, and teaching techniques across an array of courses from a broad curriculum in international security studies." Robert H. Dorff, "A Commentary on Security Studies for the 1990s as a Model Curriculum Core," International Studies Notes 19, no. 3 (Fall 1994): 23-31:
2. George Quester, eds. Security Studies for the 21st Century. Washington, DC: Brassey's (US), 1997.
The update to Security Studies for the 1990s (1993).
Shultz, Richard H., Jr., and Andreas Vogt. "The Real 9/11 Intelligence Failure and the Case for a Doctrine of Striking First." In Terrorism and Counterterrorism, eds. Russell Howard and Reid Sawyer, 405-428. Rev ed. New York: McGraw Hill, 2003.
Shultz, Richard H., Jr., et al. Guerrilla Warfare and Counterinsurgency: U.S.-Soviet Policy in the Third World. Lexington, MA: Heath, 1989.
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