Shively, Stanley, and Arthur T. Coumbe. "Florida Army National Guard: The Counter-Drug Role." Military Intelligence 18, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun. 1992): 23-27.
Shively, Stanley, and Arthur T. Coumbe. "Florida Army National Guard: The Counter-Drug Role." Military Intelligence 18, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun. 1992): 23-27.
[MI/Army][c]
Shlaim,
Avi. "Failures in National Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War."
World Politics 28, no. 3 (Apr. 1976): 348-80.
[Israel/YomKippur]
Shoemaker, Christopher. The NSC Staff: Counseling the Council. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991.
[GenPostwar/Orgs/NSC]
Shoemaker, Lloyd R. The Escape Factory: The Story of MIS-X, the Super-Secret U.S. Agency behind World War II's Greatest Escapes. New York: St. Martin's, 1990.
Surveillant 1.1: This book is about the "organization responsible for supervising [escape] attempts by American POWs in Nazi prison camps."
[UK/WWII/MI-9; WWII/Eur][c]
Shoenberg, David. "Kapitza, Fact and Fiction." Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 4 (Oct. 1988): 49-61.
Although Kapitza has been referred to in connection with both the development of the Soviet atom bomb and the Cambridge spy ring, the author argues that he really was not part of either activity.
[Russia/Sov/Spies][c]
Shoham, Dany. "The Anthrax Evidence Points to Iraq." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 39-68.
The title correctly states the thesis of this article.
[Terrorism/03/Gen]
Shoham, Dany. "An Antithesis on the Fate of Iraq's Chemical and Biological Weapons." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 1 (Spring 2006): 59-83.
In his antithesis, the author argues -- while assessing later information -- that an Iraqi CBW arsenal existed well past 1991 and that arsenal may have been smuggled into Syria.
[GenPost-CW/00s/06/WMD]
Shoham, Dany, and Stuart M. Jacobsen. "Technical Intelligence in Retrospect: The 2001 Anthrax Letters Powder." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 1 (Spring 2007): 79-105.
"A wide range of ... implications -- geopolitical, legal, strategic, technological, scientific, and medical -- emanate from th[e] failure" to solve the late 2001 anthrax letters attacks in the United States.
[Terrorism/07/Gen]
Shope, Virginia C., and Kutulas, Nancy, comps. Special Operations: A Selective Bibliography. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College Library, March 1989.
Gibish (1995) updates, but does not duplicate, this work.
[MI/SpecOps/Ref; RefMats/Topical]
Shore, Jacques J.M. "Intelligence Review and Oversight in Post-9/11 Canada." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 456-479.
"To date, Canada has demonstrated that it can achieve a balance between the protection of its citizens via security and intelligence measures, and the protection of their individual rights and freedoms from abusive government interference through review and oversight mechanisms that monitor the national police force and the state security and intelligence bodies and their activities."
[Canada/00s]
Shore, Zach. "Hitler, Intelligence and the Decision to Remilitarize the Rhine." Journal of Contemporary History 34, no. 1 (Jan. 1999): 5-18.
"[T]he decision to remilitarize the Rhine in March 1936 ... resulted not only from Hitler's recognition of Italy's estrangement from France, but also from Neurath's consistent assurances to Hitler that France would not fight. Neurath's conviction in turn was based partly on accurate intelligence regarding the intentions of French political and military leaders."
[Germany/Interwar]
Short, Anthony. The Communist Insurrection in Malaya, 1948-1960. London: Frederick Mueller, 1975. New York: Crane, Rusak, 1975.
Comber, I&NS 18.3, says that Short's work "still remains the standard account of the Malayan Emergency."
[UK/Postwar/Malaya]
Short, Frisco W. Crisis Resolution: Presidential Decision-Making in the Mayaguez and Korean Conflicts. Boulder, CO: Westview, 1978.
[GenPostwar/50s/Korea; GenPostwar/70s/Mayaguez]
Short, K.R.M., ed. Western Broadcasting Over the Iron Curtain. London: Croom Helm, 1986. [Cummings]
[CA/Radios]
Shortsleeve, Brian J. [1LT/USMC] "Realtime Imagery for Ground Commanders in Bosnia-Herzegovina." Marine Corps Gazette, Apr. 1998, 34-35.
Discusses the use of mobile remote receive stations (RRSs) to downlink live imagery from Navy P-3C Orions to remotely situated troops, and suggests that the same configuration would be an asset to Marine expeditionary unit (MEU) operations in littoral areas where P-3Cs are operating.
[MI/Ops/Bosnia & Imagery]
Showell, Jak P. Mallmann. Enigma U-Boats: Breaking the Code. Shepperton, UK: Ian Allen, 2000.
According to Erskine, I&NS 17.1, this work "examines in detail the sinking or boarding of about 13 U-boats by the Allies during the Second World War, together with the capture of some Kriegsmarine weather ships and patrol boats which yielded Enigma-related documents." However, the work "contains very little ... about the Enigma-related documents or material captured during these incidents, or their value for Sigint purposes." The reviewer concludes that Hugh Sebag-Montefiore's Enigma: The Battle for the Code "is much the better book."
[UK/WWII/Ultra]
Showell, Jak P. Mallmann. German Naval Codebreakers. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2003. Hersham, UK: Ian Allen, 2003.
Rielage, NWCR 59.1 (Winter 2006), finds that "the book suffers from an unfortunate organization. Attempting to avoid a chronological history of the war at sea, the author has arranged his material in a series of short vignettes, separated by ship type and area of operations. Lost in this organization is the common thread of the B-Dienst itself." Nevertheless, "[w]ithin these sections there are historical gems." However, all such gems, suffer "from the second major failing of the book -- an almost complete lack of documentation."
According to Jonkers, AFIO WIN 11-03, 19 Mar. 2003, the author presents "high points" of the German Naval Radio Monitoring Service's "interception, decoding and intelligence activities" in World War II. The work "covers the growth of 'B-Dienst' and the integral part intelligence played in naval battles."
Kruh, Cryptologia 28.1, notes that "the book gives an account of some of the successes and failures of German codebreaking activities and how these impacted upon naval operations in European waters.... While unable to prevent the defeat of Germany, the author believes their codebreakers had a significant influence on the course of the war at sea."
For Beard, I&NS 19.1, "the German codebreaking effort, whose successes played a crucial role in the Battle of the Atlantic in 1942 and 1943, remains a tale untold."
Bath, NIPQ 20.2, finds that "the book provides a useful appendix on the wartime organization of the German Naval Intelligence Service."
[WWII/Eur/Ger]
Showers, D. M. [RADM/USN (Ret.)]
Shrader, Charles R., ed. Reference Guide to United States Military History 1919-1945. New York: Facts On File, 1994. [http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/RefBibs/intell/ww2/oss.htm]
[MI/RefMats]
Shrader, Katherine [Associated Press].
Shreeve, Thomas W. "On the Case at the CIA." Training & Development, Mar. 1997, 53-54.
The author, "director of the CIA Case Method Program and a senior instructor in the CIA's Office of Training and Education," describes in broad outline the development of the use of the case method in CIA training.
[CIA/C&C/DA][c]
Shreeve, Thomas W., and James J. Dowd, Jr. "Building a Learning Organization: Teaching with Cases at CIA." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
10, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 97-107.
[CIA/C&C/DA][c]
Shryock, Richard W. "For an Eclectic Sovietology." Studies in Intelligence 8, no. 1 (Winter 1964): 57-64.
In official Washington, there are a number of identifiable schools of Sovietology, "each holding the others in disdain.... [There is] precious little exchange of helpful ideas." The author offers some thoughts about how to overcome this dissonance.
In response, John Whitman, "Better an Office of Sovietology," Studies in Intelligence 8, no. 1 (Winter 1964): 65-66, argues that while "all schools are needed,... they will continue to work at cross purposes so long as they remain in different bureaucracies." They need to be united "in a single organizational framework devoted to exploiting all methodologies for a single aim -- the analysis of Soviet politics as a research problem."
[Analysis/Sov]
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