Shane, Scott, and Lowell Bergman. "F.B.I. Struggling to Reinvent Itself to Fight Terror." New York Times, 10 Oct. 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com] Shane, Scott, and Lowell Bergman. "F.B.I. Struggling to Reinvent Itself to Fight Terror." New York Times, 10 Oct. 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"Five years after the Sept. 11 attacks spurred a new mission, F.B.I. culture still respects door-kicking investigators more than deskbound analysts sifting through tidbits of data. The uneasy transition into a spy organization has prompted criticism from those who believe that the bureau cannot competently gather domestic intelligence, and others, including some insiders, who fear that it can."
[FBI/00s/06]
Shane, Scott, and Tom Bowman. "No Such Agency." Baltimore Sun, reprint of six-part series, 3-15 December 1995, 1-16.
Clark comment: The Baltimore Sun 's series is the first extensive public discussion of NSA since the publication of Bamford's The Puzzle Palace. The series lacks the weight of a well-defined research base, but it is generally accurate. However, its journalistic conception is clearly shown in the subject areas the writers have chosen to address. They probably believe that they asked the "hard questions"; I am not so sure of that. Nonetheless, this is the best easily available look inside the gates at Ft. Meade.
Part 1: "America's Fortress of Spies," 1-3; Part 2: "A Strange and Secret Workplace," 4-6; Part 3: "Espionage from the Front Lines," 7-8; Part 4: "Rigging the Game," 9-11; Part 5: "Catching Americans in NSA's Net," 12-13; Part 6: "Battling High-Tech Warriors," 14-16.
Surveillant 4.3 says that "[t]his series reprint is highly recommended." For Kruh, Cryptologia 20.2, the articles are "a fascinating report sprinkled with new or little known information" about NSA.
[NSA/Gen]
Shane, Scott, Stephen Grey, and Margot Williams. "C.I.A. Expanding Terror Battle Under Guise of Charter Flights." New York Times, 31 May 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Aero Contractors Ltd., based at Johnston County Airport outside Smithfield, NC, is "a major domestic hub of the Central Intelligence Agency's secret air service. The company was founded in 1979..., and it appears to be controlled by the agency, according to former employees. Behind a ... thin cover of rural hideaways, front companies and shell corporations that share officers who appear to exist only on paper, the C.I.A. has rapidly expanded its air operations since 2001 as it has pursued and questioned terrorism suspects around the world." The flagship of the CIA's air fleet "is the Boeing Business Jet, based on the 737 model, which Aero flies from Kinston, N.C., because the runway at Johnston County is too short for it."
According to "public editor" Byron Calame, "The Thinking Behind a Close Look at a C.I.A. Operation," New York Times, 19 Jun. 2005, "[a] striking number of readers have denounced The New York Times for describing the Central Intelligence Agency's covert air operations for transporting suspected terrorists." Calame then discusses the paper's "process for handling covert intelligence stories." He concludes: "I think the worst fears of the Times readers ... should be eased by the assurance that the C.I.A. had ample opportunity to challenge the publication and didn't do so."
[CIA/00s/05/Gen; Terrorism/00s/05/War]
Shane, Scott, David Johnston, and James Risen. "Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations." New York Times, 4 Oct. 2007. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"[S]oon after Alberto R. Gonzales’s arrival as attorney general in February 2005," the Justice Department issued a secret opinion that was "an expansive endorsement of the harshest interrogation techniques ever used by the Central Intelligence Agency." According to officials briefed on it, the opinion "provided explicit authorization to barrage terror suspects with a combination of painful physical and psychological tactics, including head-slapping, simulated drowning and frigid temperatures." Later in 2005, "the Justice Department issued another secret opinion" declaring that "none of the C.I.A. interrogation methods violated" the standard of no “cruel, inhuman and degrading” treatment.
[CIA/00s/07; Terrorism/00s/07]
Shane, Scott, and Eric Lichtblau. "Cheney Pushed U.S. to Widen Eavesdropping." New York Times, 14 May 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"In the weeks after the Sept. 11 attacks, Vice President Dick Cheney and his top legal adviser [David S. Addington] argued that the National Security Agency should intercept purely domestic telephone calls and e-mail messages without warrants in the hunt for terrorists, according to two senior intelligence officials. But N.S.A. lawyers ... insisted that it should be limited to communications into and out of the country, said the officials, who were granted anonymity to discuss the debate inside the Bush administration late in 2001."
[NSA/00s/06]
Shane, Scott, and Mark Mazzetti. "Ex-C.I.A. Chief, in Book, Assails Cheney on Iraq." New York Times, 27 Apr. 2007. [http://www.nytimes.com]
In his book, At the Center of the Storm (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), former DCI George J. Tenet "has lashed out against Vice President Dick Cheney and other Bush administration officials..., saying they pushed the country to war in Iraq without ever conducting a 'serious debate' about whether Saddam Hussein posed an imminent threat to the United States." Tenet argues that the “slam dunk” remark "was taken out of context and that it had little impact on President Bush’s decision to go to war. He also makes clear his bitter view that the administration made him a scapegoat for the Iraq war."
[CIA/DCIs/Tenet/07; MI/Ops/00s/Iraq]
Shane, Scott, and Mark Mazzetti. "Lawmakers Raise Concerns Over Call for Investigation of C.I.A. Watchdog’s Work." New York Times, 13 Oct. 2007. [http://www.nytimes.com]
On 12 October 2007, Sen. Christopher S. Bond (R-MO), "[t]he top Republican on the Senate Intelligence Committee[,] joined Democrats ... in expressing strong concern about an unusual inquiry into the work" of CIA Inspector General John L. Helgerson, "saying the review could undermine Mr. Helgerson’s role as independent watchdog."
[CIA/00s/07; CIA/Components/DCIA]
Shane, Scott, and Mark Mazzetti. "Moves Signal Tighter Secrecy Within C.I.A." New York Times, 24 Apr. 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Intelligence officials with knowledge of the investigation said on 23 April 2006 that the CIA's "crackdown on leaks ... that led to the dismissal of a veteran intelligence officer last week included a highly unusual polygraph examination for the agency's independent watchdog, Inspector General John L. Helgerson."
[CIA/00s/06/Firing; CIA/Components/DCIA]
Shane, Scott, and Mark Mazzetti. "Tapes by C.I.A. Lived and Died to Save Image." New York Times, 30 Dec. 2007. [http://www.nytimes.com]
CIA officers knew that "[i]f Abu Zubaydah ... died in American hands,... much of the world would believe they had killed him. So in the spring of 2002,... they set up video cameras to record his every moment: asleep in his cell, having his bandages changed, being interrogated.... [I]nterviews with two dozen current and former officials,... show how political and legal considerations competed with intelligence concerns in the handling of the tapes."
[CIA/00s/07/Tapes]
Shane, Scott, and Mark Mazzetti. "Top C.I.A. Pick Has Credentials and Skeptics." New York Times, 6 May 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Gen. Michael V. Hayden, who senior administration officials say is the President's "likely choice" to head the CIA, "has a stellar résumé for a spy and has long been admired at the White House and on Capitol Hill." But he "would also face serious questions about the controversy" over the NSA's "domestic surveillance program, which he oversaw and has vigorously defended."
[CIA/DCIAs/Hayden/Confirmation]
Shane, Scott, and James Risen. "C.I.A. Report Said to Fault Pre-9/11 Leadership." New York Times, 26 Aug. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]
CIA Inspector General John L. Helgerson's "report on the agency's performance before the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks includes detailed criticism of more than a dozen former and current agency officials, aiming its sharpest language at George J. Tenet, the former director, according to a former intelligence officer who was briefed on the findings and another government official who has seen the report."
The report recommends that CIA Director Porte J. Goss "convene 'accountability boards' to recommend personnel actions against those faulted in the report, who are identified by title rather than by name. Officials said the only action possible against ... officials who have retired would probably be to send them a letter of reprimand."
[CIA/00s/05/IGReport]
Shane, Scott, and Ariel Sabar. "Coded Warnings Became Clear Only in Light of Sept. 11 Attacks." Baltimore Sun, 20 Jun. 2002. [http://www.baltimoresun.com]
[NSA/02]
Shane, Scott, and David E. Sanger. "Bush Panel Finds Big Flaws Remain in U.S. Spy Efforts." New York Times, 1 Apr. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"In a scorching assessment of chronic dysfunction inside American intelligence agencies," the WMD commission told President Bush on [31 March 2005] that the underlying causes of the failure to have understood Iraq's weapons programs 'are still all too common.' It also warned that the United States 'knows disturbingly little about the nuclear programs of many of the world's most dangerous actors.'...
"The breadth and detail of the indictment, written in vivid, colloquial language rare in Washington, went beyond previous critiques. The report was particularly blistering about the low quality of the 'President's Daily Brief,' the morning intelligence review that once was deemed the gold standard of American intelligence."
[GenPostCW/00s/05/WMD]
Shane, Scott, and David E. Sanger. "Daily Intelligence Briefings Are Vague, Officials Say." New York Times, 3 Apr. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]
According to WMD commission co-chairs Charles S. Robb and Laurence H. Silberman "[t]he small group of top government officials who read the President's Daily Brief" told the commission "that they find the highly classified document of little value."
[GenPostCW/00s/05/WMD]
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