Shane, Scott. "Official Reveals Budget for U.S. Intelligence." New York Times, 8 Nov. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Speaking at an intelligence conference in San Antonio, Mary Margaret Graham, "deputy director of national intelligence for collection, said the annual intelligence budget was $44 billion.... Steven Aftergood, director of the Project on Government Secrecy at the Federation of American Scientists, expressed amused satisfaction that the budget figure had slipped out." See also, Paul Bedard, "Washington Whispers: This Time We Know Who the Leaker Is," U.S. News & World Report, 14 Nov. 2005, 20.
Shane, Scott. "Panel Rebukes C.I.A. and F.B.I. for Shortcomings in Overhauls." New York Times, 16 Apr. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]
In a letter to President Bush, the WMD commission "has sharply criticized reform plans drafted by the C.I.A. and F.B.I. at the request of President Bush, saying that glaring shortcomings of both proposals illustrate 'the difficulty of bringing about real change' in the nation's spy agencies.... The panel's letter was posted on its Web site" on 31 March 2005."
Shane, Scott. "Panel to See Papers on Agency's Eavesdropping." New York Times, 26 Oct. 2007. [http://www.nytimes.com]
On 25 October 2007, the White House "offered to share secret documents on the National Security Agency's domestic surveillance program with the Senate Judiciary Committee, a step toward possible compromise on eavesdropping legislation.... Only Senate Intelligence Committee members and their staffs have seen the documents. Last week, the committee approved a bill that would step up court oversight of N.S.A. eavesdropping while granting legal immunity to telecommunications companies."
Shane, Scott. "Report Questions Legality of Briefings on Surveillance." New York Times, 19 Jan. 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"A legal analysis by the nonpartisan Congressional Research Service [CRS] concludes that the Bush administration's limited briefings for Congress on the National Security Agency's domestic eavesdropping without warrants are 'inconsistent with the law.'" The CRS memorandum "explores the requirement in the National Security Act of 1947 that the committees be kept 'fully and currently informed' of intelligence activities. It notes that the law specifically allows notification of 'covert actions'" to the Republican and Democratic leaders of the House and Senate and of the Intelligence Committees, (the so-called Gang of Eight), "but says the security agency's program does not appear to be a covert action program."
See Alfred Cumming, "Memorandum: Statutory Procedures Under Which Congress Is To Be Informed of U.S. Intelligence Activities, Including Covert Actions" (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 18 Jan. 2006). [Available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/m011806.pdf.]
Shane, Scott. "Robert Gates, a Cautious Player From a Past Bush Team." New York Times, 9 Nov. 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"In choosing Robert M. Gates as his next defense secretary, President Bush reached back to an earlier era in Republican foreign policy.... Gates, 63, is in many ways the antithesis of Donald H. Rumsfeld.... He has been privately critical of the administrations failure to execute its military and political plans for Iraq, and he has spent the last six months quietly debating new approaches to the war, as a member of the Iraq Study Group run by James A. Baker III and Lee H. Hamilton."
Shane, Scott. "Senate Democrats Say Bush Ignored Spy Agencies' Prewar Warnings of Iraq Perils." New York Times, 26 May 2007. [http://www.nytimes.com]
A 226-page report by the Senate intelligence committee on prewar intelligence predictions of the effects of toppling Saddam Hussein drew differing assessments along partisan lines. "Democrats ... accused the Bush administration of ignoring preinvasion warnings ... that a war in Iraq could be followed by violence and division and that it could strengthen the hands of Al Qaeda and of Iran.... Republicans said the report exaggerated the prescience of the intelligence agencies." See also, Walter Pincus and Karen DeYoung, "Analysts' Warnings of Iraq Chaos Detailed: Senate Panel Releases Assessments from 2003," Washington Post, 26 May 2007, A1.
Shane, Scott. "6 Years After 9/11, the Same Threat." New York Times, 18 Jul. 2007. [http://www.nytimes.com]
On 17 July 2007, the nation's intelligence agencies released a declassified summary of a National Intelligence Estimate suggesting that "the threat of terrorist violence against the United States is growing worse, fueled by the Iraq war and spreading Islamic extremism."
Shane, Scott. "Some Worry U.S. May Bend Facts for Policy." Baltimore Sun, 4 Apr. 2003. [http://www.baltimoresun.com]
"The Bush administration's unswerving position that Saddam Hussein's regime poses a direct threat to the United States ... poses a dilemma for the nation's ... intelligence agencies: What happens when their findings clash with the assumptions behind U.S. policy? Some former intelligence officers and historians say they are seeing a worrisome pattern of Vietnam-style politicization of intelligence....
"After Sept. 11, 2001, the intelligence agencies came under fire for failing to put together the clues in time to thwart the terrorist attacks. Now some critics are saying the agencies have gathered relevant information about Iraq, but it has been overwhelmed by the strong convictions of the president and his top advisers....
"On occasion, aware of the dangers of spin, presidents have gone out of their way to be sure intelligence officers are indeed telling it like it is, says J. Ransom Clark, a retired CIA officer. "John Kennedy used to pick up the phone and call the desk officers in the CIA or state department," Clark says. "It drove the supervisors crazy, but Kennedy was trying to reduce the number of times the information he got went through a strainer."
Shane, Scott. "The Thinking Man's Spy: Michael Vincent Hayden." New York Times, 18 Feb. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]
In six years as NSA chief, Lt. Gen. Michael V. Hayden "has mastered the technical wizardry of information-age spying, proved skillful in maneuvering for the agency's share of the Pentagon's annual intelligence budget, won powerful allies at the White House and on Capitol Hill, and forged ties with officials throughout the American intelligence archipelago." At NSA, General Hayden has been "a tough agent of change." According to current and former intelligence officials, "[h]e forced a rapid turnover in personnel as the agency belatedly adjusted to post-cold-war targets, replacing Russian with Arabic linguists, and took on such technological challenges as tapping into fiber-optic cable and breaking computerized encryption."
Shane, Scott. "U.S. Reclassifies Many Documents in Secret Review." New York Times, 21 Feb. 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"In a seven-year-old secret program at the National Archives, intelligence agencies have been removing from public access thousands of historical documents that were available for years, including some already published by the State Department and others photocopied years ago by private historians." See also, Matthew M. Aid, ed., Declassification in Reverse: The Pentagon and the U.S. Intelligence Community Secret Historical Document Reclassification Program (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 21 Feb. 2006). [http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB179/]
Shane, Scott. "U.S. to Declassify Secrets at Age 25." New York Times, 21 Dec. 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"At midnight on Dec. 31, [2006,] hundreds of millions of pages of secret documents [25 years old or older] will be instantly declassified, including many F.B.I. cold war files on investigations of people suspected of being Communist sympathizers.... [T]he end of 2006 means the government's first automatic declassification of records." The documents will be declassified "unless agencies have sought exemptions on the ground that the material remains secret.... [E]very year from now on, millions of additional documents will be automatically declassified as they reach the 25-year limit.... Practical considerations, including a growing backlog of records at the National Archives, mean that it could take months before the declassified papers are ready for researchers."
Shane, Scott. "With Only Reputations at Stake, Talk on C.I.A. Report Turns to How Much to Publish." New York Times, 27 Aug. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]
"Most of the central figures faulted" in CIA Inspector General (IG) John L. Helgerson's "report, notably [former DCI] George J. Tenet,... retired last year." On 25 August 2005, "the September 11 Advocates group demanded the immediate declassification and release of Mr. Helgerson's report.... On the other side, Mr. Tenet and some of his colleagues have been fighting ... to soften the report's tough judgments, which they consider unfair, distorted and uninformed." Tenet's supporters say the "report is seriously flawed" because the IG's "investigators never talked to policy makers to get their views on the C.I.A.'s performance. Even some key people inside the agency were not interviewed, they say, including Charles E. Allen, whose title in 2001 was assistant director of central intelligence for collection."
Shane, Scott. "Woman in Rendition Case Sues for Immunity." New York Times, 14 May 2009. [http://www.nytimes.com]
Sabrina De Sousa, charged with kidnapping in Italy in the 2003 seizure of radical Muslim cleric Abu Omar, filed a lawsuit in U.S. District Court in Washington on 13 May 2009 "seeking to force the State Department to invoke diplomatic immunity to halt the prosecution." Italian prosecutors claim that De Sousa "was a C.I.A. officer serving under diplomatic cover" in the U.S. Consulate in Milan at the time of the abduction. In the lawsuit, De Sousa describes herself as a diplomat and denies that she worked for the CIA. "The lawsuit asks the court to order the government to invoke diplomatic immunity, provide her with legal counsel in Italy and pay her legal bills and other costs associated with the case."
Shane, Scott. "Year Into Revamped Spying, Troubles and Some Progress." New York Times, 28 Feb. 2006. [http://www.nytimes.com]
According to former and current officials, "[a] year after a sweeping government reorganization began, the agencies charged with protecting the United States against terrorist attacks remain troubled by high-level turnover, overlapping responsibilities and bureaucratic rivalry.... Progress has been made, most of the officials say, toward one critical goal: the sharing of terrorist threat information from all agencies at the National Counterterrorism Center. But many argue that the biggest restructuring of spy agencies in half a century has bloated the bureaucracy, adding boxes to the government organization chart without producing clearly defined roles."
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