Schiattareggia, M. H. [Pseud.] "Counterintelligence in Counterguerrilla Operations." Studies in Intelligence 57, no. 2 (Jun. 2013): 39-63. [Originally published in Studies in Intelligence 6, no. 3 (Summer 1962).]
"[W]hile it is manifestly impossible for counterintellgence forces to carry out by themselves the whole responsibility for counter-guerrilla operations, their role in these operations is a critical one on which the success of the enterprise can very well hang."
Schiff, Stacy. A Great Improvisation: Franklin, France, and the Birth of America. New York: Henry Holt, 2005.
Isaacson, NYT, 3 Apr. 2005, finds that the author scrupulously researches the details of Franklin's mission and skillfully spices up the tale with the colorful spies, stock manipulators, war profiteers and double-dealers who swarmed around him. Most delightful are the British spy Paul Wentworth ... and the flamboyant playwright and secret agent Beaumarchais." For DKR, AFIO WIN 13-05 (28 Mar. 2005), this is "an elegant account of Franklin's seven years in France."
Schiffman, Maurice K. "Technical Intelligence in the Pacific in World War II." Military Review 31 (Jan. 1952): 42-48. [http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/RefBibs/intell/ww2/tech.htm]
Schiller, Lawrence. Into the Mirror: The Life of Master Spy Robert P. Hanssen -- Based Upon an Investigation by Norman Mailer and Lawrence Schiller. New York: HarperCollins, 2002. [Peake, Studies 48.3/92/fn2]
Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, David H. "Russian Military Intelligence on the Manchurian Front, 1904-05." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 1 (Jan. 1996): 22-31.
When Russia went to war with Japan in 1904, "St. Petersburg trusted faulty and incomplete assessments of its potential adversary.... The war with Japan was clearly a failure of Russian intelligence.... On the strategic plane, Russian intelligence simply failed adequately to assess the strength of the Japanese Army.... [T]actical intelligence was not much better at keeping generals up to date during the war."
Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, David H. "Russian Intelligence and the Younghusband Expedition to Tibet." In Intelligence and Statecraft: The Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society, eds. Jennifer L Siegel and Peter J. Jackson, 109-126. New York: Praeger, 2005.
Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, David H. "Tsarist Codebreaking: Some Background and Some Examples." Cryptologia 22, no. 4 (Oct. 1998): 342-353.
This article "provides a brief overview of the development of the Russian Foreign Ministry's black chamber, from its creation in the 18th century to 1917." It includes a discussion of some of the holdings relevant to codebreaking at the Imperial Russian Foreign Ministry's archive (AVPRI).
Schindler, John R. A Dangerous Business: The U.S. Navy and National Reconnaissance during the Cold War. Ft. George G. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 2004. Available at: http://www.nsa.gov/about/_files/cryptologic_heritage/publications/coldwar/dangerous_business.pdf.
This brochure was published by NSA "to celebrate the dedication of the U.S. Navy memorial at National Vigilance Park.... [It] outlines the history of Naval aerial reconnaissance during the Cold War, and commemorates the many veterans of that long, secret struggle, especially the sailors ... who gave their lives."
Schindler, John R. "A Hopeless Struggle: Austro-Hungarian Cryptology during World War I." Cryptologia 24, no. 4 (Oct. 2000): 339-350.
"Austria-Hungary's cryptologic effort was the most successful of WWI.... Habsburg cryptology played a major role in staving off defeat, keeping Austria-Hungary in the war to the end, and its leader, Max Ronge, was a noteworthy intelligence pioneer."
Schindler, John R. "Redl -- Spy of the Century?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 483-507.
Working from both Russian and Austrian sources, the author retells and adds to the Redl story. His conclusion: "While its operational significance has perhaps been overestimated, its psychological impact on the ailing Habsburg Empire would be difficult to overstate."
Schirmann, Léon. Mata-Hari. Autopsie D'Une Machination. Paris: Éditions italiques, 2001.
Brückner, JIH 4.1, notes that this book is being "presented ... as the companion volume to the file of the Military Court" [see Turbergue, ed., Mata-Hari (2001)]. The author claims that Mata Hari's death sentence resulted from "the combined machinations of three men": French counterintelligence officer Captain Ladoux, German military attaché in Madrid Major Kalle, and examining magistrate of the Military Court Major Bouchardon. "However, a closer look at the documents and at the facts of the case shows that the author would be well advised to reconsider his position."
Schisgall, Oscar. "Our Defense Secrets Are for Sale Cheap." Look, 27 Aug. 1963, 78-80.
Petersen: "Sensitive material in the public domain."
Schleher, D. Curtis. Introduction to Electronic Warfare. Dedham, MA: Artech House, 1986.
Schleiffer, Ron. "Democracies, Limited War and Psychological Operations." Review of International Affairs 2 (Spring 2003): 41-54.
The author argues that in limited wars the democracies are particularly weak in waging the struggle for hearts and minds. On the other hand, insurgents make extensive use of psychological warfare in seeking to gain access to the media. Proposed changes within democracies are offered so psychological warfare might be more effectively employed.
Schleiffer, Ron. "Psychological Operations: A New Variation of an Age Old Art: Hezbollah versus Israel." Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 29 (2006): 1-19.
Schleiffer, Ron. Psychological Warfare in the Intifada: Israeli and Palestinian Media Politics and Military Strategies. Portland, OR: Sussex Academic Press, 2006.
For Gordon, DIJ 16.2 (2007), this work "provides valuable insights into the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians." It "is especially strong in its discussion of media policy in the furtherance of strategy.... Israeli fear and distrust of propaganda resulted in an information mechanism [that] was inadequate to deal with the challenge presented by the Intifada. Palestinians on the other hand ... understood the power of propaganda and did not hesitate to employ it in their struggle."
Perry, NWCR 61.2 (Spring 2008), believes that this work "offers a unique, though logically flawed, perspective of the first intifada, which he describes as 'political warfare.'" The author "analyzes the successful Palestinian tactics and compares them to the unsuccessful Israeli response through the components of 'psychological operations' (PSYOP) as presented in the U.S. Army Manual of Psychological Warfare.... [T]his work is ultimately unsatisfying, because its organization and thesis have logical flaws."
Schleifman, Nurit. Undercover Agents in the Russian Revolutionary Movement: The SR Party, 1902-1914. London: Macmillan, 1988. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988.
Barros, I&NS 7.3, finds this to be an "excellent study" on a little-studied subject, "the Okhrana's role during the tumultuous political events that marked the road to the revolutions of 1917."
Schlesinger, Stephen. "Cryptanalysis for Peacetime: Codebreaking and the Structure of the United Nations." Cryptologia 19, no. 3 (Jul. 1995): 217-235.
The author argues that the United States used information obtained from the decrypted messages of some of the participating countries, including Allies, to target its diplomacy in support of the UN Charter. Schlesinger says that references to the secret messages in the diary of Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., make clear the importance of the messages to the U.S. effort. David Kahn calls this "one of the most important articles in the history of cryptology.... Only two cases are known in which cryptanalysis has significantly affected world events in peacetime." This is one of the two. (Ed. note, p. 217.)
Schlesinger, Stephen, and Stephen Kinzer. Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story of the American Coup in Guatemala. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1982. Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1983. [pb]
Blum, NameBase, calls this work "one of the more complete accounts of the CIA operation to overthrow the democratically-elected government of Jacobo Arbenz of Guatemala in 1954.... The authors make extensive use of U.S. government publications and documents, as well as interviews with former CIA and other officials and individuals who played a role in the events."
Return to S Table of Contents
Return to Alphabetical Table of Contents