Russell, Charles A., and Robert E. Hildner. "Intelligence and Information Processing in Counterinsurgency." Air University Review 24 (Jul-Aug. 1973): 46-56. [Petersen]
Russell, Charles Edward. True Adventures of the Secret Service. New York: Burt, 1923. New York: Doubleday, Page, 1924.
Petersen: "AEF intelligence and counterintelligence."
Russell, Charles Edward. Espionage and Counterespionage. Garden City, NY: Country Life Press, 1926.
Wilcox: "Dated but interesting collection of lectures to Army officers."
Russell, Charles Edward. Haym Salomon and the Revolution. New York: Cosmopolitan Book Corp., 1930.
Russell, Francis. The Secret War. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1981.
Petersen: "Intelligence, secret weapons, covert action, propaganda, deception in World War II."
Russell, Frank S. Information Gathering in Ancient Greece. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1999.
Sheldon, IJI&C 14.2, views this work as "a long overdue treatment of intelligence activities in the classical Greek world." The reviewer finds some bibliographic shortcomings in the author's presentation but also credits his use of both modern and ancient sources. Overall, the reviewer concludes that this is "an eminently readable and useful volume."
Russell, Henry Dozier [LTG/USANG (Ret.)]. Pearl Harbor Story. Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 2001.
Brooks, NIPQ 18.2/3, notes that the author served on the Army Pearl Harbor Board of 1944 and wrote these recollections of the Board's work in 1946. He "provides interesting insights into the inter-personal chemistry of the Board members, debates among them, and 'color commentary' on the proceedings.... Russell's bottom line is that Washington was every bit as much at fault for the surprise at Pearl Harbor as was Honolulu."
Russell, James A. Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewah Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010.
From publisher: "Between 2005 and 2007,... some U.S. units [began] integrating counterinsurgency tactics and full-spectrum operations to great effect." The author "outlines how this change was spearheaded by the innovative actions of brigade and company commanders in Anbar and Ninewah."
[MI/Ops/Iraq/Books & SpecOps/Counterinsurgency]
Russell, Kevin. "The Subjectivity of Intelligence Analysis and Implications for the U.S. National Security Strategy." SAIS Review 24, no. 1 (Winter-Spring 2004): 147-163.
Russell, Richard L. "CIA: A Cold War Relic?" International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 8, no. 1 (Spring 1995): 11-20.
The author concludes that the CIA occupies a "unique niche" and should be looking for new ways to carry out its business. Essentially, Russell presents a small number of mild suggestions as to the direction CIA "reform" should take. This is not a particularly insightful presentation, although it might be of some interest to nonspecialists.
Russell, Richard L. "CIA's Strategic Intelligence in Iraq." Political Science Quarterly 117, no. 2 (Summer 2002): 191-207.
This article "traces the uses and limitations of strategic intelligence in major dimensions of the Gulf War to include the warning and waging of war. The article concludes with an assessment or balance sheet of the strengths and weaknesses of strategic intelligence during the Gulf crisis. It draws insights from this case study to inform the future evolution of American intelligence and its support of statecraft, particularly in situations where policy makers face dilemmas posed by the use of armed force."
[CIA/90s/90-92; CIA/00s/02; MI/Ops/90s/Storm]
Russell, Richard L. "Intelligence Failures: The Wrong Model for the War on Terror." Policy Review 123 (Feb.-Mar. 2004): 61-72.
Russell, Richard L. Sharpening Strategic Intelligence: Why the CIA Gets It Wrong and What Needs to Be Done to Get It Right. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
Peake, Studies 51.4 (2007), finds that the author provides "a perceptive insider view. This is not to say that he has got it right but rather that his observations deserve close attention.... Russell recommends a number of solutions intended to improve CIA and Intelligence Community performance. None are startling, and each concentrates on the 'what,' not the 'how.'" For Denton, IJI&C 22.3 (Fall 2009), the author "takes a balanced approach that gives full credit where due to successful CIA efforts." However, "his critique is unrelenting, his research is thorough, and his suggestions for substantive organizational change specific."
Russell, Richard L. "Tug of War: The CIA's Uneasy Relationship with the Military." SAIS Review 22, no. 2 (Summer-Fall 2002): 1-18.
Russell, Richard L. "A Weak Pillar for American National Security: The CIA's Dismal Performance against WMD Threats" Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 3 (Sep. 2005): 466-485.
The author argues that "the CIA has habitually failed to accurately gauge WMD programs.... These intelligence failings were due in large measure to poor human intelligence collection and shoddy analysis, areas that cannot be remedied [simply] by the creation of the DNI.... The establishment of the DNI ... unconstructively adds to the already bureaucratically bloated intelligence community." In addition, the creation of new intelligence centers for terrorism and proliferation further "bloats the intelligence community's bureaucracy and does nothing to increase competency in human intelligence collection or analysis."
[CIA/00s/05; CIA/Components/DI & DO; Reform/00s/05/Gen]
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