Rose

 

Rose, Alexander. "The Strange Case of John Honeyman and Revolutionary War Espionage." Studies in Intelligence 52, no. 2 (Jun. 2008): 27-41.

The author argues that "key parts of the [Honeyman] story were invented or plagiarized long after the Revolution and, through repetition, have become accepted truth." Kenneth A. Daigler, aka P.K. Rose, "In Defense of John Honeyman (and George Washington)," Studies in Intelligence 53, no. 4 (Dec. 2009), 87-89, takes issue with Alexander Rose's conclusion with regard to Honeyman. In particular, he believes that Washington was both experienced in and capable of directly running a singleton spy such as Honeyman.

[RevWar/Other]

Rose, Alexander. Washington's Spies: The Story of America's First Spy Ring. New York: Bantam, 2006.

According to Peake, Studies 51.1 (Mar. 2007), the main topic of this book is the Culper Ring. The author's "documentation is exemplary," and the book "is well written, eminently readable and the best account of the Culper Ring to date." Zeman, I&NS 22.3 (Jun. 2007), finds that "[a]ll the elements of a great cloak-and-dagger story are present" in this "most interesting and engaging" book. The author "gives a comprehensive overview" of the Culper Ring.

[RevWar/Hale & Overviews]

Rose, David. "'I Gave Bomb Secrets to Russia So It Could Stand Up to the West.'" Telegraph (London), 12 Sep. 1999. [http://www.telegraph.co.uk]

"In an exclusive interview ... Melita Norwood [revealed] the background to a remarkable story of treachery which compromised Britain's atomic weapons programme. More remarkable, the elderly widow who passed documents to the Soviets over three decades remains unrepentant."

[UK/SpyCases/99/Fever]

Rose, David. "Romeo Targeted 'Diana.'" Telegraph (London), 19 Sep. 1999. [http://www. telegraph.co.uk]

"A British woman, code-named Diana, became the victim of an attempted 'Romeo'-style recruitment by East German intelligence. She agreed to carry out missions for the Stasi while living in East Germany, but broke contact after returning to Britain."

[UK/SpyCases/99/Fever]

Rose, Kenneth. Elusive Rothschild: The Life of Victor, Third Baron. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2003.

West, IJI&C 17,3, says that this biography of Victor Rothschild, "while not entirely uncritical,... either neglects to mention the most significant" controversies of Rothschild's life "or simply misrepresents them." One problem is that the author "simply does not understand the basics of the field [i.e., intelligence] he is attempting to investigate.... As a detailed analysis and assessment of the evidence of Victor's loyalty or treachery, Elusive Rothschild has very little value."

For Andrew, Sunday Times (London), 16 Mar. 2003, the author's "well-written, often entertaining biography is full of insights into Rothschild's extraordinarily varied career.... The complexities of Rothschild’s subterranean attempts to rescue his reputation are such that even Rose occasionally loses his way.... Elusive Rothschild is, none the less, a memorable biography of an immensely talented man."

[UK/Biogs]

Rose, P.K. [Pseud., Kenneth A. Daigler] "The Civil War: Black American Contributions to Union Intelligence." Studies in Intelligence (Winter 1998-1999): 73-80.

"[I]ntelligence on Confederate forces provided by Negroes ... represented the single most prolific and productive category of intelligence obtained and acted on by Union forces throughout the Civil War."

[CivWar/Un/Gen]

Rose, P.K. [Pseud., Kenneth A. Daigler] "The Founding Fathers of American Intelligence." Intelligencer 11, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 9-15. [Appeared originally in Studies in Intelligence (Summer 2000).]

Vignettes of "George Washington: The First American Intelligence Chief," "John Jay: America's First Counterintelligence Chief," and "Benjamin Franklin: Master of Covert Action." See also, Kenneth A. Daigler.

[RevWar/Overviews]

Rose, P.K. [Pseud., Kenneth A. Daigler] "Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950." Studies in Intelligence 11 (Fall-Winter 2001): 57-65.

The failure to correctly predict, first, the North Korean invasion and, then, the Chinese attack, when all reports indicated that in each instance the capability existed, was rooted in perceptions in Washington that only the Soviet Union could order such acts, and Stalin would not do so.

Thomas J. Patton, "Commentary on 'Two Strategic Intelligence Mistakes in Korea, 1950': A Personal Perspective," Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 3 (2002): 81-83, finds that Rose's article is "somewhat unbalanced and incomplete, and an injustice to analytic personnel of the early 1950s.... [A] current reader of the Rose study might assume that all the information he describes and lists so thoroughly was available fairly promptly and on a fairly universal basis within the Agency. Such was not the case.".

[GenPostwar/50s/Korea]

Rose, R.S., and Gordon D. Scott. JOHNNY: A Spy's Life. (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010.

According to Peake, Studies 54.3 (Sep. 2010) and Intelligencer 18.1 (Fall-Winter 2010), the central character here is Johnan Heinrich Amadeus de Graaf who in his lifetime was a communist radical, GRU operative, and double agent for MI6 after 1933. This "is an unusual story of a double agent who fought the Nazis and the communists and survived."

[Russia/SovDefectors; UK/WWII/Services/MI6]

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