Roach, Kent. September 11: Consequences for Canada. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003.
1. Archangel: CIA's Supersonic A-12 Reconnaissance Aircraft. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2007.
This is an excellent monograph by the CIA's Chief Historian. Robarge has admirably achieved the first part of his two-pronged goal of making "the narrative informative to lay readers..., while retaining enough technical detail to satisfy those most knowledgeable about aeronautics and engineering." The second part is for others than this reader to judge.
2. Archangel: CIA's Supersonic A-12 Reconnaissance Aircraft. 2d ed. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2012. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/a-12/index.html]
3. "Archangel: CIA's Supersonic A-12 Reconnaissance Aircraft." Journal of Intelligence History 7, no. 2 (Winter 2007-2008). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/7-2.html]
Robarge, David. "CIA's Covert Operations in the Congo, 1960-1968: Insights from Newly Declassified Documents." Studies in Intelligence 58, no. 3 (Sep. 2014): 1-9.
The author calls FRUS, 1964-1968, XIIIX, Congo, 1960-1968 "a comprehensive set of primary sources about CIA activities in the Congo." Robarge provides an excellent, readable overview of CIA covert operations in 1960s Congo.
Robarge, David S. "Getting It Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War " Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 1 (2005): 1-7.
Sometimes the intelligence process works "almost perfectly. On those occasions, most of the right information was collected in a timely fashion, analyzed with appropriate methodologies, and punctually disseminated in finished form to policymakers who were willing to read and heed it. Throughout those situations, the intelligence bureaucracies were responsive and cooperative," and the DCI "had access and influence downtown. One such example that can be publicly acknowledged" is the Six-Day War in 1967.
[Analysis/Critiques; GenPostwar/60s/Gen; Israel/Overviews]
Robarge, David. "The James Angleton Phenomenon: 'Cunning Passages, Contrived Corridors': Wandering in the Angletonian Wilderness." Studies in Intelligence 53, no. 4 (Dec. 2009): 43-55. [Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol53no4/201ccunning-passages-contrived-corridors201d.html]
This nicely done article presents a brief profile of Angleton and, then, identifies and comments on nonfictional and fictional depictions of an individual who "was one of the most influential and divisive intelligence officers in US history.... Necesary restrictions on information about the enterprise that [Angleton] considered the foundation of all other intelligence work probably will prevent us from seeing the reality of him and instead consign us to continue looking at shadows and reflections. Angleton may remain to history, as he fancied himself in life, an enigma."
Robarge, David S. "A Long Look Back: Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946-2005." Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 3 (2005).
"The DCI really did not 'direct' something called 'central intelligence.' He was responsible for coordinating national collection and analysis, but he lacked the authority to do so, faced formidable competitors in other agencies, and had no constituency to support him. He had to walk the knife's edge between politics and politicization, and was the handy scapegoat for intelligence missteps often committed or set in train years before."
Robarge, David. "Moles, Defectors, and Deceptions: James Angleton and CIA Counterintelligence." Journal of Intelligence History 3, no. 2 (Winter 2003): 21-49. [Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol53no4/pdf/JIH-Angleton-Robarge-2003.pdf]
From abstract: "James Angleton ... shaped American counterintelligence for good and bad for nearly 20 years.... He conducted his search for moles in the CIA during a time when the West was under unprecedented intelligence attack from the USSR, but some of his tactics were extreme and did more damage than good. An anti-Angleton orthodoxy emerged after his forced retirement, causing a laxity in counterintelligence that contributed to later security lapses. The 'Angleton Syndrome' still influences counterintelligence practices in the United States government and public perceptions of the CIA."
Robarge, David. "Perspective on the Jewels from the C.I.A.'s Chief Historian." 27 Jun. 2007. New York Times Blog. [http://washington.blogs.nytimes.com]
Among some 500 pages of substantive material, "except for an account of the use of Mafioso Johnny Roselli in a plot to kill Castro (12-16) ... there are only passing references to already disclosed assassination plots and drug-testing programs and next to nothing of importance about purely foreign operations.... [T]he collection is nearly all about activities involving American citizens or occurring inside the United States ... and includes much about agency contact with the White House 'Plumbers,' the Watergate break-in perpetrators, and now-obscure characters such as the fugitive financier Robert Vesco." Indeed, "the long set of documents about C.I.A.'s involvement with United States Government activities targeting American dissidents suspected of receiving foreign assistance to help them disrupt the presidential nominating conventions in 1972 (549-74)" shows "the extent to which MHCHAOS and related programs concentrated on the foreign angle."
Robarge, David S. "Richard Helms: The Intelligence Professional Personified." Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 4 (2002): 35-43.
From 1997 to 2002, the author worked as a research assistant for Helms while the Ambassador was working on his memoirs, A Look Over My Shoulder (2003). Here, Robarge provides a mini-biography and an appreciation of the man.
Robb, Stephen C. [LTCOL/USMC]. "Marine Corps Signals Intelligence: The Warfighter's Force Multiplier." American Intelligence Journal 15, no. 1 (Spring-Summer 1994): 25-29.
"Approximately two-thirds of all Marine Corps SIGINT assets reside within the Fleet Marine Force."
Robbins, Carla Anne. "CIA Nominee Faces Heat from Senate Cold Warriors." Wall Street Journal, 17 Jan. 1997, A14.
Robbins, Carla Anne. "Failure to Predict India's Tests Is Tied to Systemwide Intelligence Breakdown." Wall Street Journal, 3 Jun. 1998, A8.
1. Air America: The Story of the CIA's Secret Airlines. New York: Putnam's, 1979. The Invisible Air Force: The Story of the CIA's Secret Airline. London: Macmillan, 1979. New York: Corgi, 1979. [pb] New York: Avon Books, 1985. [pb]
NameBase pontificates that "Air America ... is known for ferrying opium to market in exchange for Meo support of the CIA's military strategy in Laos. Robbins has one chapter on the opium question, but concentrates more on material he collected from 'personal interviews with pilots, copilots, kickers, ground personnel, administrative workers, CIA men, journalists, and people on the fringe of the strange world of the Agency's air proprietaries.'"
For Constantinides, the book contains "errors, both large and small," including the author's insistence that CIA operations in Laos were hidden from Congress. In addition, the writing style is more appropriate "for a series in an adventure magazine."
2. The Ravens: The Men Who Flew in America's Secret War in Laos. New York: Crown, 1987.
Tovar, IJI&C 8.3, calls the book "an interesting anecdotal account of the operations of the Ravens." Kross, IJI&C 3.2, says that Robbins "weaves an intricate and detailed picture of the main players in America's covert Laotian operation [and] of the political struggle in both Washington and Vientiene."
Richard Helms, IJI&C 3.4, challenges Kross' review: "There are some points in the Kross review ... which seem at odds with the book itself and with history as I knew it.... In the field the ambassador was the boss.... The CIA Station['s] ... latitude was exercised within established policy at the ambassador's daily discretion.... [T]he Ravens ... were administered by the Air Attaché.... CIA did not fight in Laos. The Lao did the fighting."
Robbins, James S. This Time We Win: Revisiting the Tet Offensive. New York: Encounter, 2010.
According to Laurie, Studies 55.2 (Jun. 2011), the author "shows that Tet may have shocked the public, but it came as no surprise to US intelligence officials, soldiers, or politicians.... All had anticipated a last-ditch offensive in South Vietnam months in advance, prepared for it militarily, and rapidly defeated it once it occurred, inflicting a clear military defeat on the communists, who failed to achieve any of their goals." Yet, "[t]he idea that Tet constituted an American catastrophe settled in the public's mind and never went away."
Robbins, Lawrence S. "[Letters:] Heed the Evidence." Washington Post, 12 Feb. 1999, A34. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"As lead counsel for Theresa Squillacote,... I write to correct the serious misimpression created by ... The Post's account of the sentencing.... In fact, the government never even charged Terry with 'obtain[ing] secrets for East Germany,' nor was there the slightest evidence that she ever did so. Rather, the evidence showed that, through an elaborate sting operation, the government managed to induce Terry to provide four classified documents to an undercover FBI agent (posing, not as an East German, but as a South African)."
Robb-Webb, Jon. "Anglo-American Naval Intelligence Co-operation in the Pacific, 1944-45." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 5 (Oct. 2007): 767-786.
"The experience of the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) at the operational and tactical levels of war demonstrates a degree of co-operation that was perhaps more intimate than any other Allied services" during World War II.
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