Roach, Kent. September 11: Consequences for Canada. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2003.
[Canada/PostCW]
Robarge, David. Archangel: CIA's Supersonic A-12 Reconnaissance Aircraft. Washington, DC: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2007.
This is an excellent monograph by the CIA's Chief Historian. Robarge has admirably achieved the first part of his two-pronged goal of making "the narrative informative to lay readers..., while retaining enough technical detail to satisfy those most knowledgeable about aeronautics and engineering." The second part is for others than this reader to judge.
[CIA/60s/A-12; Recon/Planes]
Robarge, David S. "Getting It Right: CIA Analysis of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War " Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 1 (2005), 1-7.
Sometimes the intelligence process works "almost perfectly. On those occasions, most of the right information was collected in a timely fashion, analyzed with appropriate methodologies, and punctually disseminated in finished form to policymakers who were willing to read and heed it. Throughout those situations, the intelligence bureaucracies were responsive and cooperative," and the DCI "had access and influence downtown. One such example that can be publicly acknowledged" is the Six-Day War in 1967.
[Analysis/Critiques; GenPostwar/60s/Gen; Israel/Overviews]
Robarge, David S. "A Long Look Back: Directors of Central Intelligence, 1946-2005." Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 3 (2005).
"The DCI really did not 'direct' something called 'central intelligence.' He was responsible for coordinating national collection and analysis, but he lacked the authority to do so, faced formidable competitors in other agencies, and had no constituency to support him. He had to walk the knifes edge between politics and politicization, and was the handy scapegoat for intelligence missteps often committed or set in train years before."
[CIA/DCIs/Gen]
Robarge, David. "Moles, Defectors, and Deceptions: James Angleton and CIA Counterintelligence." Journal of Intelligence History 3, no. 2 (Winter 2003). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/journal.html]
From abstract: "James Angleton ... shaped American counterintelligence for good and bad for nearly 20 years.... He conducted his search for moles in the CIA during a time when the West was under unprecedented intelligence attack from the USSR, but some of his tactics were extreme and did more damage than good. An anti-Angleton orthodoxy emerged after his forced retirement, causing a laxity in counterintelligence that contributed to later security lapses. The 'Angleton Syndrome' still influences counterintelligence practices in the United States government and public perceptions of the CIA."
[CIA/Angleton]
Robarge, David S. "Richard Helms: The Intelligence Professional Personified." Studies in Intelligence 46, no. 4 (2002): 35-43.
From 1997 to 2002, the author worked as a research assistant for Helms while the Ambassador was working on his memoirs, A Look Over My Shoulder (2003). Here, Robarge provides a mini-biography and an appreciation of the man.
[CIA/DCIs/Helms]
Robb, Stephen
C. [LTCOL/USMC]. "Marine Corps Signals Intelligence: 'The Warfighter's
Force Multiplier." American Intelligence Journal 15, no. 1 (Spring/Summer
1994): 25-29.
"Approximately two-thirds of all Marine Corps SIGINT assets reside within the Fleet Marine Force."
[MI/Marines; Reform][c]
Robbins, Carla
Anne. "CIA Nominee Faces Heat from Senate Cold Warriors." Wall
Street Journal, 17 Jan. 1997, A14.
[CIA/90s/97/Lake]
Robbins, Carla Anne. "Failure to Predict India's Tests Is Tied to Systemwide Intelligence Breakdown." Wall Street Journal, 3 Jun. 1998, A8.
[CIA/90s/98/IndianNukes]
Robbins, Christopher.
1. Air America: The Story of the CIA's Secret Airlines. New York: Putnam's, 1979. The Invisible Air Force: The Story of the CIA's Secret Airline. London: Macmillan, 1979. New York: Corgi, 1979. [pb] New York: Avon Books, 1985. [pb]
NameBase pontificates that "Air America ... is known for ferrying opium to market in exchange for Meo support of the CIA's military strategy in Laos. Robbins has one chapter on the opium question, but concentrates more on material he collected from 'personal interviews with pilots, copilots, kickers, ground personnel, administrative workers, CIA men, journalists, and people on the fringe of the strange world of the Agency's air proprietaries.'"
For Constantinides, the book contains "errors, both large and small," including the author's insistence that CIA operations in Laos were hidden from Congress. In addition, the writing style is more appropriate "for a series in an adventure magazine."
2. The Ravens: The Men Who Flew in America's Secret War in Laos. New York: Crown, 1987.
Tovar, IJI&C 8.3, calls the book "an interesting anecdotal account of the operations of the Ravens."
Kross, IJI&C 3.2, says that Robbins "weaves an intricate and detailed picture of the main players in America's covert Laotian operation [and] of the political struggle in both Washington and Vientiene."
Richard Helms, IJI&C 3.4, challenges Kross' review: "There are some points in the Kross review ... which seem at odds with the book itself and with history as I knew it.... In the field the ambassador was the boss.... The CIA Station['s] ... latitude was exercised within established policy at the ambassador's daily discretion.... [T]he Ravens ... were administered by the Air Attaché.... CIA did not fight in Laos. The Lao did the fighting."
[CIA/Laos]
Robbins, Lawrence
S. "[Letters:] Heed the Evidence." Washington
Post, 12 Feb. 1999, A34. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"As lead counsel for Theresa Squillacote,... I write to correct the serious misimpression created by ... The Post's account of the sentencing.... In fact, the government never even charged Terry with 'obtain[ing] secrets for East Germany,' nor was there the slightest evidence that she ever did so. Rather, the evidence showed that, through an elaborate sting operation, the government managed to induce Terry to provide four classified documents to an undercover FBI agent (posing, not as an East German, but as a South African)."
[SpyCases/U.S./Squillacote]
Robb-Webb, Jon. "Anglo-American Naval Intelligence Co-operation in the Pacific, 1944-45." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 5 (Oct. 2007): 767-786.
"The experience of the British Pacific Fleet (BPF) at the operational and tactical levels of war demonstrates a degree of co-operation that was perhaps more intimate than any other Allied services" during World War II.
[UK/WWII/Services/Navy; WWII/Magic/Cooperation]
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