Michael Russell Rip

Rip, Michael Russell. "Military Photo-Reconnaissance during the Yom Kippur War: A Research Note." Intelligence and National Security 7, no. 2 (Apr. 1992): 126-132.

"Israeli tactical intelligence barely functioned during the first few days with little attempt at ground reconnaissance and the Air Force was essentially unable to conduct low-level photo-reconnaissance missions over the Canal region.... Overall, the Israelis lacked an effective fusion capability and process to blend electronic intelligence (ELINT), SIGINT, and imagery intelligence (IMINT) information."

[Israel/YomKippur][c]

Rip, Michael Russell, and Joseph F. Fontanella. "A Window on the Arab-Israeli 'Yom Kippur' War of October 1973: Military Photo-Reconnaissance from High Altitude and Space." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 15-89.

After about 15 pages of background on Soviet and U.S. photo-reconnaissance platforms and activities, the authors get down to their primary subject: the satellite and aircraft deployments made by the Soviet Union and the United States to cover the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. "The dimension of Soviet involvement can be ascertained by noting that within a three and a half week period, no less than seven photo-reconnaissance satellites were launched: a rate almost four times that observed for the rest of the year.... Additionally,... Soviet-manned ... MiG-25R ... reconnaissance jet aircraft ... specifically performed high-altitude/high-speed photographic missions off the Israeli coastline and over the Sinai desert.... [I]t is practically certain that the US provided the Israelis with valuable IMINT and Sigint information during the 1973 conflict."

The authors go off into less well-grounded speculation (that orbits were modified to look at specific target areas does not prove their point) when they argue in favor of digital transmission of photographic imagery from KH-8 satellites. The authors fail to tie down with any precision the use of SR-71 aircraft to overfly the conflict area, relying too much on too many qualifiers to their argument. They also are on less than firm ground with their suggestion that U.S.-supplied tactical intelligence made possible the Israeli crossing of the Suez canal on 15 October 1973. However, the conclusion that "the 1973 Arab-Israeli war demonstrated that with their superior surge launch capability the Soviets certainly were at no tactical disadvantage with the US" is probably accurate.

[Israel/YomKippur; Recon/Sats; Russia][c]

Rip, Michael Russell, and David P. Lusch.

1. "The Precision Revolution: The Navstar Global Positioning System in the Second Gulf War." Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 2 (Apr. 1994): 167-241.

"[T]he Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) [footnote omitted] and thermal night vision devices ... enabled Coalition forces to exploit the desert terrain with 24-hour-a-day freedom of maneuverability in all weather conditions, regardless of the lack of distinctive features and good roads." The article includes technical details of the system, pp. 179-194, and looks at use in aerial operations (fixed-wing and helicopter) (pp. 195- 201), air-breathing missiles (cruise and air-to-surface) (pp. 201-206), ground forces (pp. 206-216), and maritime operations (p. 216), as well as future military and civilian uses.

2. "The Navstar Global Positioning System in Operation Desert Storm." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 2 (Apr. 1995): 327-335.

This is a follow-up article, drawing on additional information. The authors conclude: "In the future, with the rapid reliance on GPS-guided precision weaponry, the efficacy of the US military's precision strike capability could well be dependent on the integrity of the 24-satellite Navstar Global Positioning System."

[MI/Commo & Ops/90s/DesertStorm][c]

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