Rip - Riz

Rip, Michael Russell. "Military Photo-Reconnaissance during the Yom Kippur War: A Research Note." Intelligence and National Security 7, no. 2 (Apr. 1992): 126-132.

"Israeli tactical intelligence barely functioned during the first few days with little attempt at ground reconnaissance and the Air Force was essentially unable to conduct low-level photo-reconnaissance missions over the Canal region.... Overall, the Israelis lacked an effective fusion capability and process to blend electronic intelligence (ELINT), SIGINT, and imagery intelligence (IMINT) information."

[Israel/YomKippur][c]

Rip, Michael Russell, and Joseph F. Fontanella. "A Window on the Arab-Israeli 'Yom Kippur' War of October 1973: Military Photo-Reconnaissance from High Altitude and Space." Intelligence and National Security 6, no. 1 (Jan. 1991): 15-89.

After about 15 pages of background on Soviet and U.S. photo-reconnaissance platforms and activities, the authors get down to their primary subject: the satellite and aircraft deployments made by the Soviet Union and the United States to cover the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. "The dimension of Soviet involvement can be ascertained by noting that within a three and a half week period, no less than seven photo-reconnaissance satellites were launched: a rate almost four times that observed for the rest of the year.... Additionally,... Soviet-manned ... MiG-25R ... reconnaissance jet aircraft ... specifically performed high-altitude/high-speed photographic missions off the Israeli coastline and over the Sinai desert.... [I]t is practically certain that the US provided the Israelis with valuable IMINT and Sigint information during the 1973 conflict."

The authors go off into less well-grounded speculation (that orbits were modified to look at specific target areas does not prove their point) when they argue in favor of digital transmission of photographic imagery from KH-8 satellites. The authors fail to tie down with any precision the use of SR-71 aircraft to overfly the conflict area, relying too much on too many qualifiers to their argument. They also are on less than firm ground with their suggestion that U.S.-supplied tactical intelligence made possible the Israeli crossing of the Suez canal on 15 October 1973. However, the conclusion that "the 1973 Arab-Israeli war demonstrated that with their superior surge launch capability the Soviets certainly were at no tactical disadvantage with the US" is probably accurate.

[Israel/YomKippur; Recon/Sats; Russia][c]

Rip, Michael Russell, and David P. Lusch.

1. "The Precision Revolution: The Navstar Global Positioning System in the Second Gulf War." Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 2 (Apr. 1994): 167-241.

"[T]he Navstar Global Positioning System (GPS) [footnote omitted] and thermal night vision devices ... enabled Coalition forces to exploit the desert terrain with 24-hour-a-day freedom of maneuverability in all weather conditions, regardless of the lack of distinctive features and good roads...." Includes technical details of system, pp. 179-194. Looks at use in aerial operations (fixed-wing and helicopter) (pp. 195- 201), air-breathing missiles (cruise and air-to-surface) (pp. 201-206), ground forces (pp. 206-216), maritime operations (p. 216), and future military and civilian uses.

2. "The Navstar Global Positioning System in Operation Desert Storm." Intelligence and National Security 10, no. 2 (Apr. 1995): 327-335.

This is a follow-up article, drawing on additional information. The authors conclude: "In the future, with the rapid reliance on GPS-guided precision weaponry, the efficacy of the US military's precision strike capability could well be dependent on the integrity of the 24-satellite Navstar Global Positioning System."

[MI/Commo & Ops/DesertStorm][c]

Ripley, Tim. "Upgraded Predator UAVs Support Balkans Mission." Jane's Defence Weekly, 25 Apr. 2001, 30.

[Recon/UAVs]

Risen, James [New York Times].

Risher, Paulette M. [MAJGEN/USA] "U.S. Special Operations Command: Effectively Engaged Today, Framing the Future Fight." Joint Force Quarterly 40 (1st Quarter 2006): 49-53. [http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/issue40.htm]

"U.S. Special Operations Command is unique because it can act as a supporting or supported command, and it has its own budget authority and program objective memorandum. Its relatively small number of assigned forces (49,000) and portion of the defense budget (1.7 percent) offer a tremendous advantage: the abilty to combine a service-like force provider role with a supported war-fighter role."

[MI/SpecOps/00s]

Rislakki, Jukka. "Finland's Military Intelligence in War and Peace." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 3 (Fall 2008): 461-486.

"The present article was written to provide a general survey of the topic for American readers without a reading knowledge of Finnish." (p. 479/fn. 1)

[OtherCountries/Finland; WWII/Eur/Finland]

Riste, Olav. "Intelligence and the 'Mindset': The German Invasion of Norway in 1940." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 4 (Aug. 2007): 521-536.

The German invasion of Norway and Denmark in April 1940 "was a brilliantly successful surprise attack." For both Norwegian and British policy-makers "the idea that Germany was about to launch a major invasion of Norway was remote from any of the preconceived scenarios about Germany's next move."

[UK/WWII/Overviews; WWII/Eur/Res/Norway]

Riste, Olav, and Arnfinn Moland. Top Secret: The Norwegian Intelligence Service, 1945-1970. London: Frank Cass, 1999.

From advertisement: "[F]or the first time a western intelligence service has opened its most secret archives from this period to two independent historians.... The book describes a service which grew from a handful of specialists in 1946 to a multifaceted organization with a personnel of about one thousand by the end of the 1960s."

Kruh, Cryptologia 24.3, sees this as a "thoroughly documented history of the growth of the Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS) during the Cold War."

According to Hess, IIHSG [International Intelligence History Association] Newsletter 7.2 (Winter 1999/2000) [http://intelligence-history.wiso.uni-erlangen.de/ reviews.htm], "Riste meticulously traces the 'looking-glass' activities, which pierced the Iron Curtain and provided invaluable intelligence results for the countries of the Atlantic Alliance.... This extraordinary book throws light on many intelligence aspects of the Cold War. The author has provided a thorough account of the NIS and struck the right balance between technical detail and readability. The book is well edited and richly documented."

Salmon, I&NS 16.3, says that Riste tells his story "with exceptional clarity and fluency." The author "avoid[s] sensation, and yet ... bring[s] out the very substantial achievements of Norwegian intelligence."

[OtherCountries/Norway]

Riste, Olav, and Berit Nokleby. Norway 1940-45: The Resistance Movement. Oslo, Norway: Tanum, 1970. [Wilcox]

[WWII/Eur/Resistance/Norway]

Ritchie, Sebastian. Our Man in Yugoslavia. The Story of a Secret Service Operative. London: Frank Cass, 2004.

According to Subelj, JIH 6.1 (Summer 2006), the subject of this book, Owen Reed, was the author's grandfather. While working for the BBC in Cairo, Reed "was recruited by SIS ... as a field officer for infiltration into Yugoslavia. He "had little knowledge of Yugoslavia and spoke no Serbo-Croat," but in 1943 he "was dispatched to Croatia with a radio operator and interpreter." Eventually, he would carry out several separate missions in Yugoslavia. "The book is very interesting,... with much information and a very good index."

[WWII/OSS/Balkans/Yugo]

Ritter, Gerhard. The German Resistance. London: Allen and Unwin, 1958.

[WWII/Eur/Ger/Res]

Ritter, Scott. Endgame: Solving the Iraq Problem Once and for All. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1999.

Clark comment: Ritter is the former U.S. Marine who served as a UN weapons inspector in Iraq from 1991 until his resignation in 1998 as chief of UNSCOM's Concealment Investigations Unit. He, then, went public with criticisms of the Clinton administration's policies involving Iraq and the UN inspections. Ritter seemed to damn President Clinton and Secretary of State Albright from every conceivable angle, accusing them of being too soft on Saddam Hussein by undercutting the UN inspections regime and being too aggressive in using the cloak of the inspection teams to conduct U.S. intelligence operations. Only a fool would not expect the latter activities to be going on by whatever nationals are on such inspection teams. Ritter's protestations ring hollow, and are suspect as being political in origin.

Ajami, Washington Post, 18 Apr. 1999, also finds that there seem "to be many Ritters, often at odds with each other.... There was Ritter the 'international civil servant,' incensed that UNSCOM had become an instrument of American power.... There was Ritter the cloak-and-dagger man, boasting that he had supplied American intelligence with the address of Saddam Hussein's mistress for use in a possible assassination attempt. There was Ritter the hawk, dismissing Operation Desert Fox as a 'relatively puny' endeavor that did nothing to change the standoff with Saddam. And there was Ritter the dove, concerned about the endless sanctions imposed on Iraq."

For Cohen, FA 78.4, Endgame would fascinating "if Ritter's writing were not so disjointed." The author also shows that he has "little talent for policy analysis," and produces "particularly weak policy recommendations." Dorn, IJI&C 12.4/446/fn.46, comments that although "the interpretive and prescriptive elements of Ritter's analysis are questionable, his detailed description of his own UNSCOM experiences and its information-gathering methods appear[s] to be valid."

[GenPostCW/90s/99/UN-Iraq]

Ritter, Scott. Iraq Confidential: The Untold Story of the Intelligence Conspiracy to Undermine the UN and Overthrow Saddam Hussein. New York: Nation Books, 2005.

Peake, Studies 50.2 (2006), comments that "Ritter’s story of the problems experienced by the inspection team is interesting but not new. His depiction of the primacy of his role in the events is surprising and unlikely to be accepted by others familiar with the situation.... Iraq Confidential should be read with caution."

[GenPostCW/90s/99/UN-Iraq; GenPostCW/00s/Gen]

Rivers, Gayle, and James Hudson. The Tehran Contract. New York: Doubleday, 1981. [Wilcox]

[GenPostwar/80s/Iran/HostageRescue]

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