Richard, Daniel. "Congress Approves FY 97 Intelligence Authorization Bill." National
Security Law Report 18, no. 6 (Oct. 1996): 8.
Richard, Daniel. "Congress Approves FY 97 Intelligence Authorization Bill." National
Security Law Report 18, no. 6 (Oct. 1996): 8.
The conference report on the intelligence authorization (H.R. 3259) was passed by both the House and the Senate as the 104th Congress concluded. The report authorized 2.3 percent more than the President's budget request.
[GenPostwar/Budgets][c]
Richard, Joseph E. "The Breaking of the Japanese Army's Codes." Cryptologia 28, no. 4 (Oct. 2004): 289-308.
This article consists of the author's reminiscences of service as an Army Signal Corps cryptanalyst in World War II, primarily in the Central Bureau, first, in Melbourne and, then, in Brisbane after its move in September 1942.
[WWII/FEPac/Australia&Gen]
Richards, Brooks (Sir).
1. Secret Flotillas: Clandestine Sea Lines to France and French North Africa 1940-1944. London: HMSO, 1996.
According to Bates, NIPQ 13.1, the author describes "134 clandestine sea transport operations to the French coast, and a few further north from Britain; 78 individual escape attempts out of Breton ports; and 147 operations from Gibraltar and other bases in the Western Mediterranean." Also fascinating in this account are "the descriptions of the intricate relationships between the Gaullists, the supporters of Petain's Vichy government, and the British, Americans and Poles.
2. Secret Flotillas. 2 vols.
a. Vol. 1. Clandestine Sea Operations to Brittany, 1940-1944. London: Frank Cass, 2002.
b. Vol. 2. Clandestine Sea Operations to the Mediterranean, North Africa and the Adriatic, 1940-1944. London: Frank Cass, 2004.
Seaman, I&NS 20.1 (Mar. 2005), 40, says that this "expanded, two-volume version ... include[s] additional new material on naval operations in the Mediterranean."
[UK/WWII/Services/Navy]
Richards, Pamala
Spence. Scientific Information in Wartime: The Allied-German Rivalry,
1939-1945. Contributions in Military Studies, No. 151. Westport, CT:
Greenwood, 1994.
Surveillant 4.1: "Scientific intelligence in World War II."
[WWII/TechIntel]
Richards, Robert
R. Alias "The Fox": The Wartime Recollections of Robert R.
Richards. Columbus, OH: Richards/Morgan, 1994.
Chambers: CIC, 7th Army memoirs.
[WWII/Eur; WWII/U.S./Services/CIC]
Richey, Warren. "Aggrieved with CIA, a Former Spy Goes to Court." Christian Science Monitor, 11 Jan. 2005.
Reviews arguments in Tenet v. Doe.
[CIA/00s/05/Gen]
Richissin, Todd. "Blair Facing Pressure over Iraq Intelligence: Investigation Is Sought on Justifications for War." Baltimore Sun, 1 Feb. 2004. [http://www.sunspot.net]
"The warning that Prime Minister Tony Blair gave to the House of Commons and a national television audience before the war with Iraq was stark.... [Now,] there are growing calls in Great Britain -- as there are in the United States -- for an independent inquiry into how apparently false information was used to justify going to war....
"J. Ransom Clark ... said he has little doubt that the intelligence agencies in Britain sent nuanced reports to their superiors, full of caveats explaining the percentage of confidence in their conclusions. The caveats would have been particularly prominent coming from a country such as Iraq, a 'denied area' in intelligence parlance, meaning agents could not work freely and would have tight limitations on the amount of firsthand knowledge they could obtain. 'The information works its way up the bureaucracy, and a caveat is taken out here, another there, and then you have a boss standing in front of the president, and suddenly the answer is, "Yes, Iraq is storing chemical weapons,"' Clark said. 'Presidents want answers, not equivocations, and prime ministers don't want probabilities.'"
Loch K. Johnson, author of several books on intelligence, said that "[a]mong those who should share any blame ... are the British and U.S. intelligence agencies for not going public and explaining that their information was far from certain. And congressional and parliamentary oversight committees should have reviewed the intelligence and then raised questions about whether conjecture was being presented as fact, Johnson said."
[UK/PostCW/04]
Richter, Jan. "Czech Intelligence: Half of Russia’s Diplomats in the Czech Republic Are Spies." Czech Radio 7, Radio Prague, 22 Nov. 2007. [http://www.radio.cz]
According to the 2006 annual report by the Czech counterintelligence service, published on 21 November 2007, about half of the "60 Russian Federation diplomats based in the Czech Republic ... work for Russian intelligence services." The report "maintains that Russian diplomats who were expelled from other democratic countries are often sent to the Czech Republic.... Other favourite covers for collaborators with Russian intelligence include journalists and positions in Russian-owned businesses."
[OtherCountries/Czech; Russia/00s/07]
Richter, Walter. Der Militärische Nachrichtendienst der Nationalen Volksarmee der DDR und seine Kontrolle durch das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit: Die Geschichte eines Geheimdienstes. [The Military Intelligence Service of the National People's Army and Its Control by the Ministry for State Security: The History of a Secret Service] 2d ed. Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, 2004.
Kahn, IN&S 23.2 (Apr. 2008), notes that this work is based "on the many documents that have survived from the military intelligence service and the Stasi ministry."
[Germany/East]
Ricklefs, Richard
G. [MAJ] "FORTITUDE SOUTH: D-Day Deception." Military Intelligence
22, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun. 1996): 48-50.
This article is a very basic and brief look at Fortitude South, the Allied deception operation designed to convince Hitler that the Allied landing would come in France at the Pas de Calais. A fictitious invasion force (the First U.S. Army Group) was "built up" in Kent, complete with commensurate radio activity.
[WWII/Eur/D-Day][c]
Ricks, Thomas E. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. New York: Penguin, 2006.
Freedman, FA 85.5 (Sep.-Oct. 2006), calls this a "thorough look at the inability of the U.S. forces to adjust quickly and sensitively after the invasion to the reality of an insurgency." However, "[t]he book suffers from its narrow focus," and "there is little on the enemy and the nature of the insurgency." In addition, "[t]he British experiences in southern Iraq are not chronicled at all."
For Little, Proceedings (Sep. 2006), this book includes "a brutal assault on the White House and Pentagon." However, it "is much more than simply a blunt condemnation of the war's military and civilian leaders, and its depth of reporting and detailed reconstruction of recent history should make it hard to ignore.... [T]he book offers a sober and enlightened account that deserves to be taken seriously."
Peake, Studies 51.1 (Mar. 2007), sees Fiasco as "a critical, although not antagonistic, depiction of the war in Iraq.... Ricks covers the Washington side of events to some extent, but his main emphasis is on the situation in Iraq, how it came about, and the ignored lessons of history.... No element of the national secuity community escapes blame" for the fiasco that is Iraq.
[MI/Ops/00s/Iraq/Books]
Ricks, Thomas E. "Intelligence Problems in Iraq Are Detailed." Washington Post, 25 Oct. 2003, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
A report published this week by the Center for Army Lessons Learned, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, says that "[t]he U.S. military intelligence gathering operation in Iraq is being undercut by a series of problems in using technology, training intelligence specialists and managing them in the field."
[MI/Ops/Iraq]
Ricks, Thomas E, "U.S. Officials Say Evidence Abounds to Support Military Strike in Sudan." Wall Street Journal, 1 Sep. 1998, 20.
[Terrorism/98/AirStrikes]
Ricks, Thomas E., and Dafna Linzer. "Hayden Faces Senate and CIA Hurdles if Named; General Has Streak of Independence and Nonconformity." Washington Post, 7 May 2006, A6. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"Despite his military background," Gen. Michael Hayden "is something of a nonconformist. There is a pattern in his career of independent thinking, probably one reason he was able to thrive in the current security environment."
[CIA/DCIAs/Hayden/Confirmation]
Ricks,
Thomas E., and Vernon Loeb. "Special Forces Open Ground Campaign."
Washington Post, 19 Oct. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Defense Officials said on 18 October 2001, that "U.S. Special Forces have begun the ground phase of America's war against terrorism in Afghanistan, operating in small numbers in southern Afghanistan in support of the CIA's effort in the Taliban heartland."
[Terrorism/01/WTC]
Ricks, Thomas E., and Robin Wright. "Analyst Who Is Target of Probe Went to Israel." Washington Post, 29 Aug. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Officials say that Lawrence A. Franklin, "a career analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency who specializes in Iran," is at the center of an FBI "investigation into whether classified information was passed to the Israeli government.... Officials and colleagues said [on 28 August 2004] that Franklin had traveled to Israel, including during duty in the Air Force Reserve." According to a former co-worker at the DIA, Franklin "may have been based at the U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv on those tours,... but was never permanently assigned there."
[SpyCases/U.S./Franklin]
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