Rao - Rat

 

Rapoport, David. "The Fourth Wave." Current History 100 (Dec. 2001): 419-425.

[Terrorism/00s/Gen]

Raschke, Diana M. "Discretionary Time: An Approach to Encouraging Creativity in Intelligence Analysis." Intelligencer 16, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 23-24.

The author argues for "providing analysts the time and incentive to pursue their own professional interests to create original analytical products."

[Analysis/Gen]

Rasenberger, Jim. The Brilliant Disaster: JFK, Castro, and America's Doomed Invasion of Cuba's Bay of Pigs. New York: Scribner, 2011.

Chapman, IJI&C 25, no. 1 (Spring 2012), finds that this is a "remarkably detailed" account that "gives a blow-by-blow description of the fighting on the beachhead." For Coffey, Studies 55.4 (Dec. 2011), "Rasenberger does a terrific job of documenting the faults of all parties engaged in the operation." Feinberg, FA 91, no. 5 (Sep.-Oct. 2012), notes that the author "puts forward the novel theory that, whether through luck or calculation, the outcome for [President] Kennedy was fortuitous: the failed invasion disposed of the pesky Cuban exiles and avoided the high costs of an American occupation."

[CIA/60s/BoP]

Raskin, Marcus. The Politics of National Security. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1979.

Raskin has nothing but contempt for the national security establishment and the government that sustains it.

[GenPostwar/NatSec]

Raskin, Marcus. "Coming in from the Cold: Let's Terminate the C.I.A." The Nation, 8 Jun. 1992, 776-784.

The author argues that "the cold war mission of the intelligence community has ended and that it should be dismantled, along with the atmosphere of paranoia and conflict that it fed and propagated at home and abroad."

Clark comment: Raskin's critique of post-Cold War intelligence cannot be taken seriously, given his long-held opposition to the American national security establishment. (See Raskin's The Politics of National Security.) He never accepted the Cold War mission of the CIA, so there should be no surprise that he would now like to disband the U.S. intelligence structure in the absence of the Cold War.

This article is accompanied by "Comments" from Gore Vidal, Gary M. Stern and Morton H. Halperin, David Corn, and John and Alice Tepper Marlin in response to the questions, "Should this country's intelligence services be abolished? If so, why? If not, what reforms or modification in the present system would you favor?"

[Reform/90s/CIA][c]

Rasmussen, William K. [Maj/USA] "Joint Military Intelligence Training: Understanding the Army Perspective." Defense Intelligence Journal 2, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 149-166.

[MI/Training][c]

Rasor, Eugene L. The China-Burma-India Campaign, 1931-1945: Historiography and Annotated Bibliography. Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1998.

From publisher: "The literature [on the CBI theater] is extensive and this book provides an evaluative survey of that vast literature. A comprehensive compilation of some 1,500 titles, the work includes a narrative historiographical overview and an annotated bibliography of the titles covered in the historiographical section."

[WWII/FEPac/CBI & RefMats/Bibs]

Rast, Vicki J. Interagency Fratricide: Policy Failures in the Persian Gulf and Bosnia. Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2004.

The author argues that "the gap between diplomats and warfighters dominates an interagency process likely to produce a policy that brings about war termination in the form of ceasefire. However, it almost inevitably fails to achieve conflict termination in the form of sustainable peace. This outcome results largely from interagency conflict that emanates from five key factors: 1. defects in leadership, 2. the absence of strategic vision, 3. dissimilar organization cultures, 4. disparate worldviews, and 5. the absence of an integrated interagency planning mechanism. These factors impede the effective development of crisis analysis, end-state vision, termination criteria, and termination strategy." (xix-xx) (emphasis in original)

Sarantakes, Air & Space Power Journal 20.4 (Winter 2006), comments that the first half of the book "is loaded with long, dull explanations on topics such as rational-choice theory and conflict-termination models. This material clearly needs to be present, but a reader pressed for time can safely skip it. The study becomes much more informative when Rast analyzes her two case studies, using source material in an effective and interesting fashion to support her claims." The author "has produced an informative and useful study for both the academic intellectual and the practitioner."

[GenPostwar/Policy/90s]

Ratcliff, R. A. [Rebecca Ann] Delusions of Intelligence: Enigma, Ultra, and the End of Secure Ciphers. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006.

Freedman, FA 86.1 (Jan.-Feb. 2007), calls this a "superb work of forensic history." The author explores the reasons why the Germans were so surprised when the story of Ultra finally became public in the mid-1970s. "Reading the book requires attention to organizational structures and the principles of cryptanalysis, but it is well worth the effort." Goulden, Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007) and Washington Times, 15 Oct. 2006, finds this to be "a sprightly account" that "is a splendid contribution to signals intelligence." It "covers much new material" and is "[h]ighly recommended as a fi[n]e cloak-and-dagger read."

For Peake, Studies 51.1 (Mar. 2007), even the author's "illustrations and thorough documentation ... provide[] no basis for concluding communications cannot be secure in the future." To Kruh, Cryptologia 31.3 (Jul. 2007), the author has written an "excellent" and "exceptionally informative book." Gallehawk, Cryptologia 32.1 (Jan. 2008), finds "some loose or inaccurate descriptions of technical matters, and indeeed, some omissions." Nonetheless, it "is a major addition to the existing literatrure on code breaking" during World War II.

[UK/WWII/Ultra; WWII/Eur/Germany]

Ratcliff, R. A. [Rebecca Ann] "Searching for Security: The German Investigations into Enigma's Security." Intelligence and National Security 14, no. 1 (Spring 1999): 146-167.

Rather than address the possibility that their cipher machine could be broken, the Germans tended to focus on "human betrayal," that is, a high-level spy, and Allied technical superiority in areas other than cryptanalytic work.

[WWII/Eur/Ger][c]

Ratcliff, Rebecca. "Cryptology and World War II: NSA's 1995 History Symposium." Cryptologia 20, no. 2 (Apr. 1996): 135-140.

"ABSTRACT: Highlights of the National Security Agency's Sixth Annual Cryptologic History Symposium [25-27 October 1995] focusing on the War in the Pacific and a Cryptologic Assessment of World War II."

[WWII/Magic][c]

Ratcliffe, Peter, with Noel Botham and Brian Hitchen. Eye of the Storm: Twenty-Five Years in Action with the SAS. London: Lewis International, 2000. [pb] London: Michael O'Mara, 2001.

From publisher: The author was "SAS's Regimental Sergeant-Major during the Gulf War.... Spanning action in Northern Ireland, Oman, and South Georgia and the Falklands, the author's SAS career reached its peak during the Gulf War.... [H]e provides the most authoritative explanation to date for the failure of the disastrous Bravo Two Zero patrol."

[UK/Postwar/SAS/Gen & Iraq]

Rathbone, Richard. "Police Intelligence in Ghana in the later 1940s and 1950s." Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 21, no. 3 (Sep. 1993): 107-128.

[OtherCountries/Ghana]

Rathmell, Andrew.

Ratliff, Michael. "Joint Doctrine, Service Intelligence and Support to the Warfighter." Defense Intelligence Journal 4, no. 2 (Fall 1995): 45-65.

The author traces the development of joint and service doctrinal products for military intelligence activities. With regard to the future, he notes that joint intelligence doctrine will need "to better account for the role of Service Intelligence."

[MI/Warfighter/DIJ][c]

Ratner, Margaret. "The Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism: New Threat to Civil Liberties." Covert Action Information Bulletin 12 (Apr. 1981): 32-34.

Rattray, Gregory J. [LTCOL/USAF]  Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001.

Cronin, The Information Society 19.4 (2003), calls this a "compendious and remarkably level-headed" book. It "is a most welcome antidote to the hyperbole and simplifications to be found in much of what is written on the subject of information warfare and the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)."

[GenPostwar/InfoWar]

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