Ps - Pz

Publisher's Weekly. "Publishers, Writers Quit OWI." 17 Apr. 1943, 1576. [Winkler]

[WWII/PsyWar]

Puchalla, Edward F. "Communist Defense Against Aerial Surveillance in Southeast Asia." Studies in Intelligence 14, no. 2 (Fall 1970): 31-78

"[T]he war in Southeast Asia has produced extensive and at times ingenious attempts at deception. Communist forces ... have relied heavily on deception to conceal their activity."

[GenPostwar/D&D; Vietnam/Gen]

Puddington, Arch. Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2000.

Kaiser, Washington Post, 6 Aug. 2000, and WPNWE, 21 Aug. 2000, says that "despite its cheerleading tone," this book "is sufficiently thorough to be useful to anyone interested in the minutiae of American foreign policy in Eastern Europe after World War II."

To Lucas, H-Diplo, H-Net Reviews, Sep. 2000 [http://www.h-net.org], "there is some value in passages on political divisions amongst the staff, concern over the tone of broadcasts, and the problems of locating RFE's European headquarters in Munich." The book also "has some broader insights into the tensions caused by the Reagan Adminstration's more aggressive broadcasting strategy. Apart from this, however, Puddington's only distinction is a gung-ho defence of RFE's troops and their mission."

[CA/Radio]

Pugh, Marshall. Frogman: Commander Crabbe's Story. New York: Scribner, 1956. [Chambers]

[UK/Postwar]

Pughe, George A. "The Dust That Isn't There." Studies in Intelligence 2, no. 2 (Spring 1958): 71-74.

Reports on the Air Intelligence Division's efforts to exploit the Soviet Union and its satellites for scientific, technical, and other information.

[OpenSource]

Pugliese, David. Canada's Secret Commandos: The Unauthorized Story of Joint Task Force Two. Ottawa: Esprit de Corps Books, 2002.

[Canada/PostCW]

Pugliese, David. Shadow Wars: Special Forces in the New Battle against Terrorism. Ottawa: Esprit de Corps Books, 2003.

[MI/SpecOps; Terrorism/00s]

Pujol, Juan, with Nigel West. Garbo. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1985. Garbo: The Personal Story of the Most Successful Double Agent in World War II. New York: Random House, 1986.

According to Wheeler, IJI&C 2.1, this is a "valuable contribution to filling a gap in knowledge about the British MI-5 'Double-Cross System' of World War II.... Pujol, codenamed 'Garbo' by MI-5 and 'Arabel' by the Germans,... becomes the most successful double-agent in the vast Fortitude deception operation, 1943-1945."

Although he believes it to be a "valuable source," Sexton cautions that "Chapters 5, 7-10 by West are marred by egregious errors." Campbell, I&NS 2.2, is also critical of West's contribution, specifically of what he sees as extraneous detail and unnecessary mistakes.

[WWII/Eur/Deception]

Puleo, Steve. "Benedict Arnold: The Making of a Traitor." American History, Aug. 2001. [http://www.historynet.com/ah/blbenedictarnold/]

"Benedict Arnold's performance at the Battles of Saratoga contributed to the American victory there. But a bitter rivalry with his commander [Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates] helped start Arnold down the road to treason.... Arnold ultimately defected due to perceived grievances he had suffered at the hands of Congress and the military, his mounting debts, corruption charges filed against him by Pennsylvania civil authorities that resulted in Arnold demanding an investigation to clear his name, and his indignation at the French alliance."

[RevWar/Arnold]

Purcell, Victor. Malaya: Communist or Free. London: Gollancz, 1954.

[UK/Postwar/Malaya]

Purdum, Todd S. "A Final Verdict on Prewar Intelligence Is Still Elusive." New York Times, 1 Apr. 2005. [http://www.nytimes.com]

The WMD commission "found no evidence that intelligence had been politically twisted to suit preconceptions about Iraq's unconventional weapons programs, and made no formal judgments about how top policy makers had used that intelligence to justify war.... So the latest and presumably the last official review of such questions leaves unresolved what may be the biggest question of all: Who was accountable, and will they ever be held to account....

"The old C.I.A. leadership is portrayed by the commission as either troublingly unaware or disturbingly dismissive of deep concerns within the agency that the principal source of prewar intelligence about Mr. Hussein's chemical and biological weapons programs was reported to have problems with drinking, reliability and truthfulness. At the same time, warnings by unnamed analysts within the agency who questioned this information before the war were disregarded."

[genPostCW/00s/WMD/05]

Purdom, Todd S. "Swift Action on Advice From the 9/11 Commission Is Unlikely." New York Times, 23 Jul. 2004. [http://www.nytimes.com]

Achieving consensus on adopting the recommendations of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States will not be easy. "The partisan wrangling of a presidential election and the capital's entrenched resistance to change make swift action unlikely.... The Pentagon and the C.I.A., Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge and some in Congress already oppose the commission's call for a new national intelligence director to supplant some of the functions of the director of central intelligence."

[GenPostCW/00s/04/CommissionReport]

Purdun, Todd S. "Navajo War Effort No Longer Unheralded." New York Times, 11 Oct. 1999. [http://www.nytimes.com]

"[T]the embroidery on the battered red and yellow caps covering their grizzled heads and tanned faces proclaims their proud name: Navajo Code Talkers."

[WWII/FE/Pac]

Purdy, Anthony, and Douglas Sutherland. Burgess and Maclean. London: Secker & Warburg, 1963. [Chambers]

[UK/SpyCases/Four]

Puri, Samir. "The Role of Intelligence in Deciding the Battle of Britain." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 3 (Jun. 2006): 416-439.

For the RAF, "[t]he operational contribution made by intelligence was highly significant simply because enemy attacks could only be repelled if they had been anticipated." For the Luftwaffe, however, "[t]he faulty intelligence that was supplied proved highly detrimental."

[WWII/Eur/Ger; UK/WWII/Services/RAF]

Pushies, Fred J.

Pustam, Anil R. "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles: Trends and Prospects." Military Technology 26, no.11 (2002): 44-55.

[Recon/UAVs]

Pustay, John. Counterinsurgency Warfare. New York: Free Press, 1965. [Wilcox]

[MI/SpecOps]

Puthoff, H.E. "CIA-Initiated Remote Viewing at Stanford Research Institute." Intelligencer 12, no. 1 (Summer 2001): 60-67.

The program's founder and first director (1972-1985) presents the early history of the remote viewing program and discusses some of the early results.

[GenPostwar/Issues/Psychic]

Putney, Diane T. "Reflections on Intelligence and History." American Intelligence Journal 13, no. 3 (Summer 1992): 85-87.

[GenPostCW/90s/Gen][c]

Putney, Diane T., ed. Ultra and the Army Air Forces in World War II: An Interview with Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1987.

According to Sexton, Powell served as Ultra liaison officer with the U.S. Strategic Air Forces in Europe. Here, he gives "valuable insights into the use made of ULTRA in target selection and Anglo American intelligence cooperation."

Bates, NIPQ 13.3, notes that the interview "is heavily footnoted. Each time he mentions an individual a footnote provides a short biography. When he mentions an operation, battle or event, it is described in a footnote."

[WWII/U.S./Services/Air; UKWWII/ULTRA]

Pyes, Craig. "Canada Adds Details on Algerians' Suspected Bomb Plot." New York Times, 21 Jan. 2000. [http://www.nytimes.com]

On 20 January 2000, Canadian prosecutors "offered the most detailed picture to date of a bomb plot they said stretched from Canada to Brooklyn and involved a number of Algerians, including one they said was trained at camps in Afghanistan operated by Islamic militants."

[Canada; Terrorism]

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