Dana Priest

With Others

P - Z

 

Priest, Dana, and Walter Pincus. "CIA Chief Seeks to Reassure Employees: E-Mail Sent After 2 Officials Resign." Washington Post, 16 Nov. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 15 November 2004, DCI Porter J. Goss "wrote in an internal e-mail to CIA employees" that they should "expect 'a series of changes' in the days and weeks ahead, 'in the organization, personnel' and mission of the agency." The e-mail was read to the Washington Post by "two people."

[CIA/00s/04/Gen' CIS/DCIs/Goss]

Priest, Dana, and Walter Pincus. "Deputy Chief Resigns From CIA: Agency Is Said to Be in Turmoil Under New Director Goss." Washington Post, 13 Nov. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John E. McLaughlin resigned on 12 November 2004. According to current and former CIA officials, McLaughlin's resignation came "after a series of confrontations over the past week between senior operations officials and CIA Director Porter J. Goss's new chief of staff [Patrick Murray] that have left the agency in turmoil." See also, Douglas Jehl, "No. 2 Official at the C.I.A. Announces He's Stepping Down," New York Times, 13 Nov. 2004; and Douglas Jehl, "New Chief Sets Off Turmoil Within the C.I.A.," New York Times, 14 Nov. 2004.

[CIA/00s/04/Gen; CIA/DCIs/Goss]

Priest, Dana, and Walter Pincus. "Hill Probers Fault Iraq Intelligence: Panels' Early Findings Are Similar to Kay's." Washington Post, 30 Jan. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to congressional officials, "[t]he House and Senate intelligence committees have unearthed a series of failures in prewar intelligence on Iraq similar to those identified by former weapons inspector David Kay, leading them to believe that CIA analysts and their superiors did not seriously consider the possibility Saddam Hussein no longer possessed weapons of mass destruction.... The committees, working separately for the past seven months, have determined that the CIA relied too heavily on circumstantial, outdated intelligence and became overly dependent on satellite and spy-plane imagery and communications intercepts."

[GenPostCW/00s/04/Cong]

Priest, Dana, and Walter Pincus. "Key Official in Clandestine Service of CIA to Retire." Washington Post, 9 Sep. 2005, A5. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to current and former intelligence officials, "Robert Richer, the second-ranking official in the CIA's clandestine service, has announced his retirement, telling colleagues that he lacked confidence in the agency's leadership."

[CIA/00s/05/Gen]

Priest, Dana, and Walter Pincus. "Strife, Dissent Beset Hill's Sept. 11 Panel." Washington Post, 20 May 2002, A11.

[GenPostCW/00s/02/Cong]

Priest, Dana, and Walter Pincus. "U.S. 'Almost All Wrong' on Weapons: Report on Iraq Contradicts Bush Administration Claims." Washington Post, 7 Oct. 2004, A1. [http:www.washingtonpost.com]

According to a report by the chief U.S. weapons inspector in Iraq, Charles A. Duelfer, "[t]he 1991 Persian Gulf War and subsequent U.N. inspections destroyed Iraq's illicit weapons capability and, for the most part, Saddam Hussein did not try to rebuild it."

[GenPostCW/00s/04/WMD]

Priest, Dana, and Thomas E. Ricks. "CIA Poised to Quiz Hussein; Rumsfeld Says Agency To Control Interrogations." Washington Post, 17 Dec. 2003, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost. com]

Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said on 16 December 2003 that the CIA "will take the lead in questioning Saddam Hussein.... Rumsfeld ... said he asked CIA Director George J. Tenet to take responsibility for the interrogation because the agency has 'the people who have competence in that area....' The CIA, he said, 'will be the regulator over the interrogations -- who will do it, the questions that'll get posed, the management of the information that flows from those interrogations.'"

[CIA/00s/03/Gen; MI/Ops/Iraq]

Priest, Dana, and Susan Schmidt. "Intelligence Agencies Defended: CIA, FBI Called Understaffed, Overworked and Successful." Washington Post, 27 Sep. 2002, A1. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]

Speaking to the congressional panel on 26 September 2002, Cofer Black, the CIA's former director of counterterrorism, offered "an impassioned public rebuttal to reports of intelligence failures before the Sept. 11 terror attacks." He told the panel that "overwhelmed anti-terror analysts have performed admirably with inadequate resources."

[GenPostCW/00s/02/Cong]

Priest, Dana, and Joe Stephens. "Secret World of U.S. Interrogation: Long History of Tactics in Overseas Prisons Is Coming to Light." Washington Post, 11 May 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"The Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq ... is just the largest ... in a worldwide constellation of detention centers ... that the U.S. military and CIA have operated in the name of counterterrorism or counterinsurgency operations since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.... The largely hidden array includes three systems that only rarely overlap: the Pentagon-run network of prisons, jails and holding facilities in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantanamo and elsewhere; small and secret CIA-run facilities where top al Qaeda and other figures are kept; and interrogation rooms of foreign intelligence services ... to which the U.S. government delivers or 'renders' mid- or low-level terrorism suspects for questioning....

"[E]very aspect of this new universe -- including maintenance of covert airlines to fly prisoners from place to place, interrogation rules and the legal justification for holding foreigners without due process afforded most U.S. citizens -- has been developed by military or CIA lawyers, vetted by Justice Department's office of legal counsel and, depending on the particular issue, approved by White House general counsel's office or the president himself....

"Today, the CIA probably holds two to three dozen captives around the world.... Among them are al Qaeda leaders Khalid Sheik Mohammed and Ramzi Binalshibh in Pakistan and Abu Zubaida. The CIA is also in charge of interrogating Saddam Hussein, who is believed to be in Baghdad."

[CIA/00s/04/Gen]

Priest, Dana, and Ann Scott Tyson. "Bin Laden Trail 'Stone Cold': U.S. Steps Up Efforts, But Good Intelligence on Ground Is Lacking." Washington Post, 10 Sep. 2006, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to U.S. and Pakistani officials, the "U.S. commandos whose job is to capture or kill Osama bin Laden have not received a credible lead in more than two years.... But in the last three months, following a request from President Bush to 'flood the zone,' the CIA has sharply increased the number of intelligence officers and assets devoted to the pursuit of bin Laden. The intelligence officers will team with the ... Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and with more resources from the National Security Agency and other intelligence agencies."

[CIA/00s/06; Terrorism/00s/06]

Priest, Dana, and Robin Wright. "Iraq Spy Service Planned by U.S. to Stem Attacks; CIA Said to Be Enlisting Hussein Agents." Washington Post, 11 Dec. 2003, A41. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]

According to U.S. government officials, "[t]he Bush administration has authorized creation of an Iraqi intelligence service to spy on groups and individuals inside Iraq that are targeting U.S. troops and civilians working to form a new government.... The new service will be trained, financed and equipped largely by the CIA with help from Jordan..... Although no deadline has been set, officials hope to have the service running by mid-February. Congress had approved money for the effort in the classified annex of this year's budget."

[CIA/00s/03/Gen; MI/Ops/Iraq]

Priest, Dana, and Robin Wright. "Relationship With Bush Will Be Key: Negroponte Needs President's Support as He Negotiates Agencies' Bureaucracy." Washington Post, 18 Feb. 2005, A8. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

When he takes over as the nation's first intelligence czar, John D. Negroponte's "mission is to tame and unify a sprawling 15-agency intelligence bureaucracy." At the same time, he is stepping "into the job without clear guidance on how to implement" the new intelligence law.

[Reform/00s/05/DNI]

Return to Pri-Pril