Dana Priest

With Others

F - O

 

Priest, Dana, and Barton Gellman. "U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations." Washington Post, 26 Dec. 2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Deep inside the forbidden zone at the U.S.-occupied Bagram air base in Afghanistan,... sits a cluster of metal shipping containers.... [They] hold the most valuable prizes in the war on terrorism -- captured al Qaeda operatives and Taliban commanders.

"Those who refuse to cooperate inside this secret CIA interrogation center are sometimes kept standing or kneeling for hours, in black hoods or spray-painted goggles, according to intelligence specialists familiar with CIA interrogation methods. At times they are held in awkward, painful positions and deprived of sleep with a 24-hour bombardment of lights -- subject to what are known as 'stress and duress' techniques.

"Those who cooperate are rewarded with creature comforts.... Some who do not cooperate are turned over -- 'rendered' in official parlance -- to foreign intelligence services whose practice of torture has been documented by the U.S. government and human rights organizations."

[CIA/00s/02; Terrorism/02]

Priest, Dana, and Kamran Khan. "Al Qaeda Leaders May Be Cornered: Pakistani Forces Wage Battle on Afghan Border." Washington Post, 19 Mar. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to senior Pakistani and U.S. officials on 18 March 2004, "Pakistani security forces backed by U.S. spy planes were engaged in a pitched battle with tribal fighters and Islamic militants who were believed to be protecting key members of al Qaeda.... Hundreds of Pakistani troops backed by artillery and helicopter gunships were on the attack around the villages of Azam Warsak, Kaloosha and Shin Warsak in remote southern Waziristan province, officials said....

"As part of the coordinated spring offensive, U.S. troops are working the other side of the border in Afghanistan. The forces include the clandestine Task Force 121, a recently reconstituted Special Operations and CIA unit, other Special Forces teams and 11,000 soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division, said several U.S. defense officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity. Small CIA paramilitary teams are also active in the region, several counterterrorism officials said.

"Supporting the U.S. and Pakistani troops is a newly refined technology that allows for the quick processing and analysis of images and communications intercepts from U.S. Air Force spy planes, CIA drones and National Security Agency satellites. New techniques allow for speedy transfer of the information to commanders in the field, said counterterrorism officials."

[MI/Ops/Afghan; Terrorism/04/War]

Priest, Dana, and Dafna Linzer. "Panel Condemns Iraq Prewar Intelligence: Senate Report Faults 2002 Estimate Sent to Hill, Accuses the CIA of 'Group-Think.'" Washington Post, 10 Jul. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

The SSCI's report on pre-Iraq war intelligence, released on 9 July 2004, says that "[t]he U.S. intelligence community gave lawmakers debating whether to wage war on Iraq a deeply flawed and exaggerated assessment of Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.... The report refutes every major weapons assessment laid out in a key 2002 intelligence estimate provided to lawmakers before the war and cited by Bush administration officials to justify publicly the case for an invasion. The findings also offer a broad indictment of the way the CIA carried out its core mission, accusing the agency's leadership of succumbing to 'group-think,' of being too cautious to slip spies into Iraq and of failing to tell policymakers how weak their information really was."

The panel agreed "with the CIA's conclusion that 'there was no evidence proving Iraqi complicity or assistance in an al Qaeda attack,' including the Sept. 11, 2001, strikes at the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.... Senate aides ... said they found no evidence that junior or senior officials knowingly distorted or withheld information to make a particular case. Nor did they find evidence of undue political pressure by policymakers. But they did conclude that contradictory information was often ignored or dismissed."

[GenPostCW/00s/03/04/Iraq]

Priest, Dana, and Colum Lynch. "Spying Much Denied but Done a Lot at U.N., Experts Say." Washington Post. 27 Feb. 2004, A14. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to UN diplomats and U.S. intelligence experts, "the United Nations has been a magnet for spies" from its very beginning. "The tapping of phone lines and the planting of microphones in U.N. offices are common enough that the organization employs a team of debuggers ... to routinely sweep offices and respond to requests from nations that suspect their officials are being monitored."

[GenPostCW/00s/04]

Priest, Dana, and Dana Milbank. "Intelligence Panel Will Cast Net Beyond Iraq." Washington Post, 3 Feb. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to administration officials on 2 February 2004, "[t]he commission that President Bush will appoint to investigate the failures of prewar intelligence on Iraq will also review the CIA's misjudgments about weapons programs in Iran, Libya and North Korea." White House officials said that the nine-member panel "would include current and former officials with experience in intelligence matters."

[GenPostCW/00s/04/WMD]

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