Priest, Dana. "Panel Issues Broad Demand for Iraq Intelligence Data." Washington Post, 31 Oct. 2003, A18. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, which is investigating the quality of prewar intelligence on Iraq, sent stern letters" on 30 October 2003 to national security adviser Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, and Secretary of State Colin L. Powell "demanding that they produce previously requested documents and allow interviews to be scheduled by noon" on 31 October 2003. A "toughly worded letter" was sent to DCI George Tenet on 29 October 2003, "giving him the same noon deadline ... to turn over requested documents."
Priest, Dana. "Panel Leaders Favor an Intelligence Czar." Washington Post, 8 Dec. 2002, A18. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
In its final report, the joint congressional intelligence committee investigating the 9/11 attacks is "expected to recommend the appointment of a Cabinet-level intelligence czar..., according to government officials familiar with a draft of the study. The final report also will likely recommend that the CIA and Justice Department conduct a one-year study of the creation of a separate domestic intelligence agency, during which time the FBI would be given a last chance to remake itself into a force capable of collecting intelligence on domestic terror groups."
Priest, Dana. "Panel Warns of 'Headstrong Agencies': Bush Is Urged to Intervene to Break Adherence to 'Irrelevant' Status Quo." Washington Post, 1 Apr. 2005, A7. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to the report of the WMD commission, "one of the toughest obstacles" U.S. policymakers face as they "search for ways to improve U.S. intelligence ... is the hardened psychological attitude against change, born of the spy business's secretive, insular nature.... Former and current intelligence officials said the [commission's] report echoed previous criticism by the Sept. 11 commission and a Senate panel's inquiry into prewar intelligence on Iraq, and that it gave too little credit to the changes the intelligence agencies have already undertaken."
Priest, Dana. "Senate Panel Expands Probe of Iraq Data: Inquiry to Determine Whether Information Was Exaggerated to Make Case for War." Washington Post, 13 Feb. 2004, A23. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 12 February 2004, the SSCI voted "to expand its investigation into the prewar intelligence on Iraq by probing whether President Bush and other top administration officials exaggerated intelligence information to make a case for war, a move Republicans on the panel had resisted for months.... For the past eight months, the committee has been investigating the underlying judgments that went into the intelligence assessments on Iraq. That part of the probe is to be completed by the end of March. The new findings will be contained in a second report to be released months later."
Priest, Dana. "Surveillance Operation in Pakistan Located and Killed Al Qaeda Official." Washington Post, 15 May 2005, A25. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to a U.S. official and two counterterrorism experts on 14 May 2005, Haitham al-Yemeni, the al Qaeda figure killed last week by a missile from a CIA-operated Predator drone, "had been under surveillance for more than a week by U.S. intelligence and military personnel working along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border."
Priest, Dana. "Telling Secrets: Not Just What, but How; Speech Is Revealing on Gathering Intelligence." Washington Post, 6 Feb. 2003, A23. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"Never had the U.S. government disclosed as much sensitive, recent intelligence as Secretary of State Colin L. Powell did [on 5 February 2003] when he released surreptitiously intercepted calls between Iraqi officials and information supplied by Iraqi informants apparently close to Saddam Hussein. Beyond the extraordinary array of U.S. intelligence capabilities put on display for the U.N. Security Council -- signals intercepts, satellite imagery, reports from captives and in-country agents -- 10 foreign intelligence services, both European and Middle Eastern, agreed to allow the United States to disclose classified information they had collected on Iraq." See also, Karen DeYoung and Walter Pincus, "Satellite Images, Communications Intercepts and Defectors' Briefings," Washington Post, 6 Feb. 2003, A1.
Priest, Dana. Tenet Taps Hutchings for CIA Council." Washington Post, 10 Dec. 2002, A17. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
DCI George J. Tenet has appointed "Robert L. Hutchings, a European specialist and author of a noted diplomatic history of the Cold War, to lead the National Intelligence Council."
Priest, Dana. "Violence, Turnover Blunt CIA Effort in Iraq." Washington Post, 4 Mar. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The CIA station in Iraq "has grown to more than 300 full-time case officers and close to 500 personnel in total, including contractors and people on temporary assignment.... Despite the size of the contingent, the agency's efforts to penetrate Iraq's ethnic factions and gain intelligence about the insurgency have been hampered by continued violence, the use of temporary and short-term personnel, and the pressing demands of military commanders for tactical intelligence they can use in daily confrontations with armed insurgents."
Priest, Dana. "White House, CIA Kept Key Portions of Report Classified." Washington Post, 25 Jul. 2003, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Two "politically volatile" questions regarding the 9/11 terrorist attacks "have been how personally engaged Bush and his predecessor were in counterterrorism before the attacks, and what role some Saudi officials may have played in sustaining the 19 terrorists.... To varying degrees, the answers remain a mystery....The CIA refused to permit publication of information potentially implicating Saudi officials on national security grounds.... The White House, meanwhile, resisted efforts to pin down Bush's knowledge of al Qaeda threats and to catalogue the executive's pre-Sept. 11 strategy to fight terrorists."
Priest, Dana. "Wrongful Imprisonment: Anatomy of a CIA Mistake: German Citizen Released After Months in 'Rendition.'" Washington Post, 4 Dec. 2005, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The case of German-citizen Khaled Masri "offers a rare study of how pressure on the CIA to apprehend al Qaeda members after the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks has led in some instances to detention based on thin or speculative evidence."
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