Dana Priest

A - H


Priest, Dana. "Abu Nidal, Once-Feared Terrorist, Reported Dead." Washington Post, 20 Aug. 2002, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Palestinian officials reported on 19 Aug. 2002 that Abu Nidal had died in Baghdad of multiple gunshot wounds. Abu Nidal, whose real name was Sabri Banna, headed his own terrorist organization, the Fatah Revolutionary Council, but had been inactive for years.


Priest, Dana. "Congressional Oversight of Intelligence Criticized: Committee Members, Others Cite Lack of Attention to Reports on Iraqi Arms, Al Qaeda Threat." Washington Post, 27 Apr. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Responsibility for congressional oversight is vested in the House and Senate select committees on intelligence.... But as described by former members and outside experts, the committees' performance in oversight and investigations has deteriorated."


Priest, Dana. "Covert Action in Colombia: U.S. Intelligence, GPS Bomb Kits Help Latin American Nation Cripple Rebel Forces." Washington Post, 21 Dec. 2013. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"[A]ccording to interviews with more than 30 former and current U.S. and Colombian officials," a CIA covert action program "has helped Colombian forces kill at least two dozen rebel leaders." The covert program provides the Colombian forces with real-time intelligence, including "substantial eavesdropping help" from NSA, and, beginning in 2006, "a $30,000 GPS guidance kit that transforms a less-than-accurate 500-pound gravity bomb into a highly accurate smart bomb."

[CIA/10s/13; LA/Colombia]

Priest, Dana. "Covert CIA Program Withstands New Furor: Anti-Terror Effort Continues to Grow." Washington Post, 30 Dec. 2005, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"[F]ormer and current intelligence officials and congressional and administration sources" say that the effort launched by a top-secret presidential finding signed by President Bush six days after the 11 September 2001 attacks "has grown into the largest CIA covert action program since the height of the Cold War." The program has "expand[ed] in size and ambition despite a growing outcry at home and abroad over its clandestine tactics."

[CIA/00s/05/Gen; Terrorism/00s/05/War]

Priest, Dana. "Experts See a Strategy Behind CIA Shuffle: General May Help Intelligence Chief Rein In Rumsfeld and His Military Spy Plans." Washington Post, 9 May 2006, A9. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Intelligence specialists say Gen. Michael Hayden's nomination to be CIA Director "may turn out to be a clever move by intelligence czar John D. Negroponte to help him assert authority over Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and his burgeoning intelligence bureaucracy....

"The CIA establishment views the encroachment of the Pentagon into such sensitive areas as covert operations and human intelligence as a misguided effort that does not recognize the inherent difficulties in understanding, much less penetrating, terrorist networks.... Rumsfeld has moved hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of troops into clandestine intelligence collection and analysis. With little public discussion and a wall of secrecy, the military is poised to launch its own intelligence-gathering and man-hunting operations independent of the CIA or other authorities....

"[T]he Pentagon is demanding that the CIA share its most sensitive databases, that small teams of undercover soldiers be allowed to secretly collect information in friendly countries, and that clandestine teams of military man-hunters be allowed to sneak into countries with which the United States is not at war to kill or capture terrorism suspects."


Priest, Dana. "False Evidence Cited in Overturning Arms Dealer's Case." Washington Post, 30 Oct. 2003, A16. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

A federal judge in Houston has overturned Edwin P. Wilson's 1983 conviction for selling explosives to Libya, "saying the Justice Department 'knowingly used false evidence against him' and suppressed the fact that the CIA had employed him to trade weapons or explosives with Libya in exchange for sophisticated Soviet military equipment." Wilson "will not be freed because he is serving lengthy sentences for two other convictions -- selling firearms to Libya without permission and conspiring from prison to have prosecutors and witnesses against him killed." See also, Douglas Jehl, "Ex-C.I.A. Man Wins Verdict Reversal," New York Times, 30 Oct. 2003.


Priest, Dana. "FBI Pushes to Expand Domain Into CIA's Intelligence Gathering: Common Ground Not Yet Reached on Agency Roles in U.S." Washington Post, 6 Feb. 2005, A10. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III is pushing to rewrite the rules under which the CIA and FBI have operated domestically for decades and to assert what he views as the FBI's proper authority over all domestic intelligence gathering.... [F]or decades, the CIA has been allowed under U.S. law to recruit foreign officials, business executives and students living in or visiting the United States to spy for the agency when they return home. CIA case officers working in the National Resources Division, which has stations in major U.S. cities, routinely debrief, on a voluntary basis, U.S. business executives and others who work overseas."

[CIA/00s/05/Gen & Components/DO; FBI/00s/05]

Priest, Dana. "The Fix-It Man Leaves, but The Agency's Cracks Remain." Washington Post, 6 May 2006. A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Porter J. Goss was brought into the CIA to quell what the White House viewed as a partisan insurgency against the administration and to re-energize a spy service that failed to prevent the Sept. 11 attacks or accurately assess Iraq's weapons capability. But as he walked out the glass doors of Langley headquarters [on 5 May 2006], Goss left behind an agency that current and former intelligence officials say is weaker operationally, with a workforce demoralized by an exodus of senior officers and by uncertainty over its role in fighting terrorism and other intelligence priorities."

[CIA/00s/06/Gen & DCIs/Goss/Resignation]

Priest, Dana. "Foreign Network at Front of CIA's Terror Fight: Joint Facilities in Two Dozen Countries Account for Bulk of Agency's Post-9/11 Successes." Washington Post, 18 Nov. 2005, A1.

According to current and former U.S. and foreign intelligence officials, the CIA has established joint Counterterrorist Intelligence Centers (CTICs) "in more than two dozen countries." At the CTICs, "U.S. and foreign intelligence officers work side by side to track and capture suspected terrorists and to destroy or penetrate their networks.... The network of centers reflects what has become the CIA's central and most successful strategy in combating terrorism abroad: persuading and empowering foreign security services to help. Virtually every capture or killing of a suspected terrorist outside Iraq since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks -- more than 3,000 in all -- was a result of foreign intelligence services' work alongside the agency, the CIA deputy director of operations told a congressional committee in a closed-door session earlier this year."

[CIA/00s/05; Liaison/Gen; Terrorism/00s/05]

Priest, Dana. "Former Chief of CIA's Bin Laden Unit Leaves." Washington Post, 12 Nov. 2004, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Michael Scheuer, chief of the CIA's bin Laden station from 1996 to 1999 and previously anonymous author of Imperial Hubris, announced on 11 November 2004 "that he had resigned from the agency so he could speak openly about terrorism and what he sees as the government's failure to understand the threat from al Qaeda."


Priest, Dana. "Goss Vows to Rebuild, Expand CIA: Director Tells Agency of Plans to Upgrade Spying Operations Overseas." Washington Post, 22 Oct. 2004. A2. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

In a private address to CIA employees on 24 September 2004, DCI Porter J. Goss "pledged to overhaul and enlarge the section of the agency that spies and conducts operations overseas, according to a transcript of his speech" obtained by The Washington Post. Goss "said the Directorate of Operations should take more risks, leave people in positions around the world longer, improve its language capabilities and 'have the ability to understand what is actually going on.'"


Priest, Dana. "Help from France Key in Covert Operations: Paris's 'Alliance Base' Targets Terrorists." Washington Post, 3 Jul. 2005, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to U.S. and European intelligence sources, the CIA and French intelligence services established "a top secret center in Paris, code-named Alliance Base," in 2002. "Funded largely by the CIA's Counterterrorist Center, Alliance Base analyzes the transnational movement of terrorist suspects and develops operations to catch or spy on them." Alliance Base is "headed by a French general assigned to ... the General Directorate for External Security (DGSE).... It has case officers from Britain, France, Germany, Canada, Australia and the United States."

[CIA/00s/05/Gen; France/00s; Terrorism/00s/05/War]

Priest, Dana. "House Probers Conclude Iraq War Data Was Weak." Washington Post, 28 Sep. 2003, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"Leaders of the House intelligence committee have criticized the U.S. intelligence community for using largely outdated, 'circumstantial' and 'fragmentary' information with 'too many uncertainties' to conclude that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and ties to al Qaeda." The criticism is contained in a letter sent on 25 September 2003 by the committee chair and the ranking Democrat to DCI George J. Tenet. See also, Carl Hulse and David E. Sanger, "New Criticism on Prewar Use of Intelligence," New York Times, 29 Sep. 2003.

[GenPostCW/00s/03/Iraq/03; MI/Ops/Iraq]

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