Pipes, Richard. The Degaev Affair: Terror and Treason in Tsarist Russia. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003.
According to Unsinger, IJI&C18.2 (Summer 2005), the author covers the transformation of Sergei Degaev from a member of the pre-Russian Revolution "People's Will" terrorist organization to the University of South Dakota's Dr. Alexander Pell.
Pipes, Richard. "Team B: The Reality Behind the Myth." Commentary 82 (Oct. 1986): 25-40.
Pipes, who headed Team B, thinks the exercise had significant, far-reaching consequences. He praises Bush's decision to go forward with the exercise as "a very bold action" in which the DCI showed "great courage."
Pipes, Richard. Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003.
Pozefsky, H-Russia, H-Net Reviews, May 2006 [http://www.h-net.org], notes that one of the highlights of the author's chapter on his time in Washington is "his leadership of the now 'infamous' Team B" in 1976. Pipes regarded the CIA-staffed group (Team A) "as making errors in judgment based on wishful thinking and mirror-imaging." Team B had "little immediate impact on policy. Its findings were ... rejected by Bush, who limited their influence by keeping the report classified. However, Team B's perspective was resurrected" in the Reagan administration in which Pipes served on the National Security Council (1980-82).
Clak comment: Because of my background, I have to mention that Pipes began his academic career in the United States by enrolling (according to Pozefsky's review) "as a student at Muskingum College, a small liberal arts college in eastern Ohio.... In small-town Ohio, Pipes, the European Jew, was regarded as exotic, but embraced by students and faculty. He found it the perfect place to learn English and a comfortable environment in which to adapt to American culture. In the middle of his junior year, he enlisted in the Army Air Corps."
Pipes, Richard. "What To Do About the CIA." Commentary 99, no. 3 (Mar. 1995): 36-43.
"President Truman created a central intelligence organization to collect and analyze information obtained by the government's separate intelligence services." But the CIA is neither the largest nor the most expensive of the country's intelligence agencies. "Thus, even if the CIA were abolished, a huge and costly intelligence apparatus would remain: Lost would be an organ capable of bringing together the evidence obtained by the different services." Pipes maintains that the CIA's shortcomings are not organizational, but rather intellectual and political, in nature.
Among his other conclusions, Pipes argues that "a central intelligence agency is indispensable ... [to] provide the President with disinterested assessments.... A CIA reduced in size and properly staffed, willing to rely more than heretofore on open sources and human informants, and allowed to operate free of political interference, should be in a position to render decision-makers invaluable advice."
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