Pincus, Walter. "Intelligence Panel's Findings Criticized: Experts Call Suggestions Uninformed." Washington Post, 31 Mar. 2005, A17. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Some of the recommendations to be officially presented on 31 March 2005 by President Bush's WMD commission "were already drawing criticism" on 30 March 2005 "inside and outside the intelligence community."
Pincus, Walter. "Intelligence Redo Is Harshly Judged: A Judge Critiques 9/11 Overhaul, and Finds It Top-Heavy." Washington Post, 31 Mar. 2006, A17. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
Speaking on 24 March 2006 at an off-site conference of the CIA's Office of General Counsel, "U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Richard A. Posner sharply criticized the restructuring of U.S. intelligence agencies." He said that "the overhaul has done nothing to rectify flaws exposed by al-Qaeda's Sept. 11, 2001, attacks." Posner "questioned 'the wisdom and consequences' of the intelligence overhaul passed by Congress in December 2004, which he said was based on 'a deep misunderstanding of the limitations of national security intelligence.'"
Pincus, Walter. "Intelligence Reform Will Not Be Quick; Many Groups to Weigh In on Changes." Washington Post, 4 May 2004, A23. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"The White House, Congress and two independent commissions are discussing wholesale reform of the nation's intelligence community.... None of the panels has completed its work, and any recommendations for substantial change will be politically controversial, particularly if they involve control of the Pentagon's intelligence programs."
Pincus, Walter. "Intelligence Shakeup Would Boost CIA: Panel Urges Transfer of NSA, Satellites, Imagery from Pentagon." Washington Post, 8 Nov. 2001, A1. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]
According to sources familiar with the panel's findings, a presidential commission headed by PFIAB chairman retired Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft plans to recommend that the NRO, NIMA, and NSA "be transferred" to the DCI. The House and Senate intelligence committees "are expected to support the plan.... Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld ... is expected to strongly oppose the recommendations.... Strong opposition is also expected from the Senate and House Armed Services Committees."
Pincus, Walter. "Intelligence Spending at Record $80.1 Billion in First Disclosure of Overall Figure." Washington Post, 28 Oct. 2010. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"The government announced [on 28 October 2010] that it had spent $80.1 billion on intelligence activities over the past 12 months." The National Intelligence Program "cost $53.1 billion in fiscal 2010,... while the Military Intelligence Program cost an additional $27 billion." Intelligence spending at $80.1 billion represents "an increase of nearly 7 percent over the year before and a record high." SSCI Chairman Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-CA) and HPSCI Chairman Rep. Silvestre Reyes (D-TX) are "calling for fiscal restraint on the part of the intelligence community."
Pincus, Walter. "Intelligence Voices Blend Into One: Negroponte Dominates Threat Briefing to Senate Panel." Washington Post, 3 Feb. 2006, A3. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 2 February 2006, DNI John D. Negroponte showed "that he could certainly dominate what the leaders of the primary U.S. intelligence agencies say at a public hearing.... In his first time presenting the annual worldwide threat assessment" to the SSCI, he "took an hour and a half to deliver his ... prepared statement, while ... other intelligence officials sat silently beside him.... Negroponte's paper was prepared by the staff of the National Intelligence Council, with each intelligence agency supplying its views and the final product representing material to which they all agreed."
Pincus, Walter. "Intelligence Weaknesses Are Cited; Draft Says Agencies Not Equal to Needs of Preemptive Attack Policy." Washington Post, 29 Nov. 2003, A18. [http://www.washingtonpost. com]
A nongovernmental study by Anthony H. Cordesman, a Middle East and intelligence expert and senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), asserts that "[m]ore than 10 years' work by U.S. and British intelligence agencies on Iraq's chemical, biological and nuclear weapons or programs has 'major gaps and serious intelligence problems.'" He found that "the Iraq experience shows that U.S. intelligence is 'not yet adequate to support grand strategy and tactical operations against proliferating powers or to make accurate assessments of the need to preempt.'"
A second nongovernmental study, by physicist David Albright, president of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) and a consultant to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), "on the Bush administration's controversial claim that Iraq was seeking specialized aluminum tubes to use in a centrifuge to create nuclear weapons material, raises questions about whether senior policymakers ignored technically qualified critics to promote the Iraqi threat."
According to congressional sources, "Cordesman's and Albright's conclusions reflect many of the draft findings of inquiries underway by the House and Senate intelligence committees.... Those committees are not expected to report their findings until next year."
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