Pincus, Walter. "CIA Alters Policy After Iraq Lapses: Analysts to Receive Details About Sources." Washington Post, 12 Feb. 2004, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to officials on 11 February 2004, "[t]he CIA is making changes in how it handles intelligence after identifying specific problems in its disputed prewar assessment that Iraq's Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction." DCI George J. Tenet "has ordered an end to the long-standing practice of withholding from analysts details about the clandestine agents who provide the information that analysts must evaluate."
In a speech on 11 February 2004 to the agency's analysts, DDI Jami A. Miscik said that "[t]he changes were ordered after an internal CIA review revealed several occasions when CIA analysts mistakenly believed that Iraq weapons data had been confirmed by multiple sources, when in fact it had come from a single source.... 'Analysts can no longer be put in a position of making a judgment on a critical issue without a full and comprehensive understanding of the source's access to the information on which they are reporting,' Miscik said, according to a text of her speech given to The Post."
[Analysis/Gen; CIA/00s/04/Gen; CIA/C&C/DI]
Pincus, Walter. "CIA Asked Britain To Drop Iraq Claim; Advice on Alleged Uranium Buy Was Refused." Washington Post, 11 Jul. 2003, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to "senior Bush administration officials" on 10 July 2003, the CIA tried "in early September 2002 to persuade the British government to drop from an official intelligence paper a reference to Iraqi attempts to buy uranium in Africa that President Bush included in his State of the Union address four months later.... The British government rejected the U.S. suggestion, saying it had separate intelligence unavailable to the United States."
Pincus, Walter. "CIA Can Waive Prohibition Against Using U.S. Clergy Abroad for Covert Work." Washington Post, 22 Feb. 1996, A26.
"A controversial loophole permit[s] CIA officers in extraordinary circumstances ... to waive a ... 19-year-old ban on employing clerics or missionaries for clandestine work overseas, according to intelligence officials.... The issue of CIA use of various nondiplomatic covers abroad has attracted publicity as a result of a recommendation last week by a task force sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations. The panel proposed a review of the 'legal and policy restraints' that limited use of nondiplomatic covers....
"CIA rules, approved in 1977, prohibit establishment of a covert intelligence relationship 'with any U.S. clergy or missionary whether or not ordained, who is sent out by a mission or church organization to preach, teach, heal, or proseltyze,' an intelligence official said. One exception, he added, permitted such individuals to carry out nonclandestine activities such as teaching or speaking with agency personnel 'if their supervisors agree.' However, the official added, 'as with any federal agency internal regulation, which is not required by law the agency has the authority to waive an internal regulation' and use clergy or missionaries."
Pincus, Walter. "CIA Chief Cited Loss of Agency's Capabilities; Remarks Preceded Indian Bomb Tests." Washington Post, 25 May 1998, A4. "The CIA Did Espy Its Own Problems: Even Before the India Fiasco, Director Tenet Was Flagging the Agency's Shortcomings." Washington Post National Weekly Edition, 1 Jun. 1998, 26.
"One week before the Indian nuclear test caught the U.S. intelligence community by surprise, CIA Director George J. Tenet told his employees [in a speech at CIA Headquarters in which he laid out his 5 to 10-year strategic plan for the nation's intelligence agencies] he believed the agency's espionage capabilities had eroded since the Cold War and its analysts were depending too much on Pentagon spy satellites."
[CIA/90s/98/IndianNukes & DCIs/Tenet]
Pincus, Walter. "CIA Chief's Power a Hurdle in Intelligence Reform: Control Over Agency, Budget Authority Among Issues Still Unresolved by Congress, White House." Washington Post, 17 Oct. 2004, A13. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"Congressional leaders and the White House have yet to reach agreement on two major elements of intelligence reform legislation -- the powers of the new national intelligence director, and the specific roles of the new national counterterrorism center.... Porter J. Goss, as a result of executive orders signed by the president in August, already has much of the power and authority in his role" as DCI that the new legislation would give to the proposed national intelligence director.
Pincus, Walter. "CIA Cited for Not Disclosing Covert Action." Washington Post, 10 May 2007, A13. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
On 9 May 2007, the HPSCI said that "the CIA violated the law last year when it failed to inform the panel of 'a significant covert action activity.'" In its report on the fiscal 2008 intelligence authorization bill, the committee said that "'[d]espite agency explanations that the failure was inadvertent, the committee is deeply troubled over the fact that such an oversight could occur, whether intentionally or inadvertent.'... The committee gave no hint of what the covert activity involved."
[CA/Gen; CIA/00s/07; Oversight/00s]
Pincus, Walter. "CIA Defector Edward Lee Howard Said to Have Died in Moscow." Washington Post, 21 Jul. 2002, A19. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"Edward Lee Howard, the former CIA case officer who escaped to Moscow in September 1985 after coming under suspicion as a spy for the Soviet Union, died there [12 July 2002,] according to a family friend."
Pincus, Walter. "CIA Did Not Share Doubt on Iraq Data." Washington Post, 12 Jun. 2003, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
According to senior administration officials and a former government official, "[a] key component of President Bush's claim ... that Iraq had an active nuclear weapons program -- its alleged attempt to buy uranium in Niger -- was disputed by a CIA-directed mission to the central African nation in early 2002 .... But the CIA did not pass on the detailed results of its investigation to the White House or other government agencies, the officials said."
Pincus, Walter. "CIA Director George J. Tenet Discusses the National Intelligence Estimate." Washington Post, 10 Aug. 2003, A10. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
This article presents excerpts from DCI Tenet's written responses to a series of oral and written questions from the Washington Post about the 1 October 2002 NIE on Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction.
Pincus, Walter. "CIA Director Picks a No. 3 and Shifts Roles: Hayden Says the Change Will Let Him Focus on Agency's Mission." Washington Post, 12 Jul. 2006, A6. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
CIA Director Gen. Michael V. Hayden announced on 11 July 2006 that he has appointed Michael J. Morell as associate deputy director, the No. 3 job at the agency. The position was previously called the executive director. "Hayden also said he was changing the role for that position, a move that recognizes the CIA's loss of leadership of the entire intelligence community." The change "allows for him and his new deputy, Stephen R. Kappes, 'to focus exclusively on the mission of the agency,' he said."
Pincus, Walter. "CIA's Espionage Capability Found Lacking: Recent Confrontation With Iraq Shows Need to Rebuild, Head of House Panel Says." Washington Post, 10 May 1998, A4. [http://washingtonpost.com]
HPSCI Chairman Porter J. Goss (R-FL) stated in an interview that "[t]he CIA's human espionage capability has dwindled since the ColdWar and needs to be rebuilt.... Goss said 'there was a serious shortfall' in pinning down Iraq's weapons of mass destruction.... In another area of clandestine operations, Goss said he wants the intelligence community and particularly the CIA to be 'bold and imaginative' in finding new ways to deal with leaders of rogue countries, such as Saddam Hussein."
Pincus, Walter. "CIA's Goss Names Undercover Officer to No. 3 Position." Washington Post, 5 Nov. 2004, A2. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
DCI Porter J. Goss "has selected a 22-year undercover logistics officer nicknamed 'Dusty' [Kyle Foggo] as executive director, the third-ranking position at the agency. A public announcement of the choice is being delayed until his name can be 'cleared' and made public, a senior administration official said" on 4 November 2004.
Pincus, Walter. "CIA Handles Disgruntled Workers with Caution." Washington Post, 7 Apr. 1998, A10.
Pincus, Walter. "CIA Ignored Tips Alleging Contra Drug Links, Report Says." Washington Post, 3 Nov, 1998, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The declassified version of a report by the CIA Inspector General Frederick Hitz "discloses ... that the agency did little or nothing to respond to hundreds of drug allegations about contra officials, their contractors and individual supporters.... [The] report disclosed ... that in 1982, after the CIA's covert support of the contras began, then-Reagan Attorney General William French Smith and CIA Director William J. Casey agreed to drop a previous requirement that agency personnel report information about alleged criminal activities when undertaken by persons 'acting for' the CIA."
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