Walter Pincus

And Dana Priest

 

Pincus, Walter, and Dana Priest. "Bush, Aides Ignored CIA Caveats on Iraq: Clear-Cut Assertions Were Made Before Arms Assessment Was Completed." Washington Post, 7 Feb. 2004, A17. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

"In its fall 2002 campaign to win congressional support for a war against Iraq, President Bush and his top advisers ignored many of the caveats and qualifiers included in the classified report on Saddam Hussein's weapons.... In fact, they made some of their most unequivocal assertions about unconventional weapons before the October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) was completed."

[GenPostCW/00s/04/WMD]

Pincus, Walter, and Dana Priest. "Bush Orders the CIA to Hire More Spies; Goss Told to Build Up Other Staffs, Too." Washington Post, 24 Nov. 2004, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

In a presidential order, dated 18 November 2004 and released by the White House on 23 November 2004, President Bush has ordered DCI Porter J. Goss "to increase by 50 percent the number of qualified CIA clandestine operators and intelligence analysts.... Bush also ordered the doubling of CIA officers involved in research and development."

[CIA/00s/04/Gen]

Pincus, Walter, and Dana Priest. "CIA Analysts to Help FBI Shift Focus: Terrorism Prevention Key to New Approach." Washington Post, 26 May 2002, A1. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]

According to senior FBI officials, more than 25 CIA analysts and a senior manager from the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence will be dispatched "to help the FBI upgrade its ability ... to analyze intelligence and criminal data for use in preventing terrorist acts" and to "assist FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III in reshaping the bureau into an agency more focused on counterterrorism. Another group of CIA analysts will soon be dispatched to 10 major U.S. cities to review FBI terrorist cases being pursued in field offices to see whether intelligence information has been missed....

"The CIA transfers illustrate one of the major changes involved in Mueller's FBI overhaul, an approach that will emphasize gathering information to prevent terrorist acts inside the United States while reducing the bureau's traditional criminal work" on matters that the FBI Director "believes can be handled by local law enforcement."

[CIA/00s/02/Gen; FBI/02; Terrorism/02/Fallout]

Pincus, Walter, and Dana Priest. "Despite Scrutiny of Iraq Data, It's Business as Usual for Tenet; Working Relationship With Bush Still Solid, Officials Say." Washington Post, 4 Feb. 2004, A18. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 3 February 2004, DCI "George J. Tenet sat down on the couch [in the Oval Office], cracked open a notebook and spent a half-hour ... describing threats to the United States -- as he has nearly every day since Bush took office in January 2001. Faulty prewar intelligence on Iraq has put the CIA under scrutiny as never before in Tenet's nearly seven-year tenure. But White House officials point to yesterday's business-as-usual briefing as a sign that Tenet's working relationship with Bush remains solid."

[CIA/DCIs/Tenet/04]

Pincus, Walter, and Dana Priest. "The Focus On Tenet Sharpens After Leak: Criticism of CIA and Director Intensifies." Washington Post, 5 Oct. 2003, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

DCI "George J. Tenet is under fire as never before. With efforts unsuccessful so far to find weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, some conservative lawmakers and pundits are blaming the agency for inadequate intelligence on Saddam Hussein. Democrats are accusing Tenet of bending the intelligence to support President Bush's policy of preemption in Iraq."

[CIA/DCIs/Tenet/03]

Pincus, Walter, and Dana Priest. "Goss Brings 4 Staffers From Hill to CIA: New Director Quickly Makes His Mark on Agency With Personnel Decision." Washington Post, 1 Oct. 2004, A4. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 30 September 2004, DCI Porter J. Goss named four HPSCI staff members to top-level positions at the CIA. Michael V. Kostiw, previously staff director of the committee's terrorism subcommittee, was named to be "executive director -- the third-ranking spot at the agency." Kostiw "was at CIA for 10 years in the 1970s and 1980s."

"Goss also named Patrick Murray, the House committee's staff director, to be his chief of staff and Jay Jakub and Merrell Moorhead, two other committee staffers, as special assistants. Moorhead is to deal with strategic planning and Jakub with operations and analysis, according to a senior administration official. Jakub, who worked as an analyst at the agency before he joined the committee, was staff director of the panel's subcommittee on human intelligence and one of the authors of a highly critical report on the CIA's human intelligence operations."

[CIA/DCIs/Goss]

Pincus, Walter, and Dana Priest. "Goss Reportedly Rebuffed Senior Officials at CIA: Four Fear New Chief Is Isolating Himself." Washington Post, 14 Nov. 2004, A6. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to former CIA officials, "four former deputy directors of operations have tried to offer CIA Director Porter J. Goss advice about changing the clandestine service without setting off a rebellion, but Goss has declined to speak to any of them." The four former DDOs who have tried to offer Goss advice are "Thomas Twetten, Jack Downing, Richard F. Stoltz and the recently retired James L. Pavitt."

[CIA/00s/04/Gen; CIA/DCIs/Goss]

Pincus, Walter, and Dana Priest. "Lawmakers Begin Iraq Intelligence Hearings." Washington Post, 19 Jun. 2003, A16. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 18 June 2003, "[t]he House and Senate intelligence committees began closed-door hearings ... on the intelligence that provided the basis for the U.S.-led attack on Iraq, as President Bush and his top policymakers continued to defend their decision to go to war despite the continuing failure to find chemical or biological weapons or indications of a reconstituted nuclear arms program in Iraq."

[GenPostCW/00s/03/CongInvestigation]

Pincus, Walter, and Dana Priest. "NSA Intercepts on Eve of 9/11 Sent a Warning." Washington Post, 20 Jun. 2002, A1.

[NSA/02]

Pincus, Walter, and Dana Priest. "Spy Agencies Faulted: Senate Cites Lack of Coordination." Washington Post, 13 May 2003, A17. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

According to the SSCI's report on the FY 2004 intelligence spending authorization bill, there should be "more cooperation and less competition between the Defense Department's intelligence agencies and the rest of the intelligence community, including the CIA.... Although the total for intelligence spending in fiscal 2004 is classified, the best estimate is about $38 billion, of which more than $30 billion goes to Pentagon agencies," including the DIA, NSA, and NIMA. "An estimated $4.7 billion will go to the CIA, and the rest to the FBI and the State, Treasury and Homeland Security departments."

The committee also called on NSA "to end resistance to sharing raw data, much of which it has no time to process, with analysts from other intelligence agencies." In addition, NSA's "acquisition of large, expensive signals intelligence systems was described as needing oversight. 'The lack of a fundamentally sound acquisition process . . . raises concerns with respect to the efficiency and execution of major acquisitions,' the report said."

[GenPostCW/00s/03; NSA/03]

Pincus, Walter, and Dana Priest. "U.S. Had Uranium Papers Earlier: Officials Say Forgeries on Iraqi Efforts Reached State Dept. Before Speech." Washington Post, 18 Jul. 2003, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

At the closed-door SSCI hearing on 16 July 2003, Alan Foley, director of the CIA's intelligence, nonproliferation and arms control center, disclosed that "on the eve of [President] Bush's Jan. 28 State of the Union address, Robert Joseph, an assistant to the president in charge of nonproliferation at the National Security Council (NSC), initially asked the CIA if the allegation that Iraq sought to purchase 500 pounds of uranium from Niger could be included in the presidential speech....

"Foley ... told committee members that the controversial 16-word sentence was eventually suggested by Joseph in a telephone conversation just a day or two before the speech, according to congressional and administration sources who were present at the five-hour session. At the hearing, Foley said he called Joseph to object to mentioning Niger and that a specific amount of uranium was being sought. Joseph agreed to eliminate those two elements but then proposed that the speech use more general language, citing British intelligence that said Iraq had recently been seeking uranium in Africa."

[GenPostCW/00s/03/IraqUranium]

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