Peb - Pelk

 

Pechan, Bruce L. "The Collector's Role in Evaluation." Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 3 (Summer 1961): 37-47. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford Westerfield, 99-107. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.

The field collector is already performing, for his own purposes, a number of evaluative activities, and should be a part of the process of producing an in-depth or definitive Evaluation (with a capital "E") of the significance of the information collected.

[Analysis; CIA/C&C/Culture][c]

Pechatnov, V. "Exercise in Frustration: Soviet Foreign Propaganda in the Early Cold War, 1945-47." Cold War History 1, no. 2 (Jan. 2001): 1–27.

From abstract: This article "examines the evolution of Soviet foreign propaganda from World War II to the Cold War by analysing its organization, methods and outcome. Emphasis is placed on the internal constraints of the Soviet foreign propaganda machine and its systemic flaws both of which made Soviet foreign propaganda relatively ineffective."

[Russia/D&D]

Pedahzur, Ami. The Israeli Secret Services and the Struggle against Terrorism. New York: Columbia University Press, 2009.

Peake, Studies 54.1 (Mar. 2010) and Intelligencer 54.1 (Winter-Spring 2010), finds that the author "has produced an excellent study of the Israeli intelligence services and their battle against terrorism.... Pedahzur provides insightful attention to the organizational battles of the intelligence services." This work "is a well-documented exposition of the problem and what has and has not worked in efforts to resolve it."

On the other hand, Wirtz, IJI&C 23.1 (Spring 2010), focuses on the author's argument that "the vast majority of Israeli counterterrorism efforts have failed to make much impact on the terrorists." Newton, I&NS 26.1 (Feb. 2011), notes that the author offers "a compelling analysis of the Israeli security state and its activities," but "rejects their doctrines in favour of his own conceptual framework." However, "because Pedahzur's focus is upon a critique of tactical operations, he leaves the reader hankering after a more strategic prescription."

[Israel/Overviews]

Pedlow, Gregory W., and Donald E. Welzenbach.

1. The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance: The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992.

This study was written in the 1980s as a CIA internal history. Robarge: "Chapter 6 on OXCART declassified October 2004."

2. The CIA and the U2 Program, 1954-1974. Washington, DC: History Staff, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1998. ["Synopsis" and 9.48 mb PDF file available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/the-cia-and-the-u-2-program-1954-1974/synop.htm]

For Goulden, Intelligencer 10.2, "[t]he technical and political problems of the U-2's birth are grippingly told" by this work.

Click for Table of Contents.

[CIA/60s/U-2; Recon/Planes]

Peebles, Curtis.

Peed, George L. "Voices in the Sand: Deception Operations at the NTC (National Training Center)." Armor 97 (Sep.-Oct. 1988): 26-31. [Seymour]

[MI/Deception]

Peers, William R. [LTGEN/USA]

See Richard Stewart, "Army Values: Integrity," Special Warfare, April 2000, which focuses on Peers, who headed the "Peers Commission" to investigate the My Lai Massacre.

1. "Intelligence Operations of OSS Detachment 101." Studies in Intelligence 4, no. 3 (Summer 1960): A1-A13.

The author was commander of Detachment 101. "For Detachment 101 intelligence was an all-pervasive mission. The Detachment did plan and carry out espionage operations specifically to collect both strategic and tactical information, but intelligence was also a by-product of all its other operations, including guerrilla actions, sabotage, and psychological measures."

2. And Dean Brelis. Behind the Burma Road: The Story of America's Most Successful Guerrilla Force. Boston: Little, Brown, 1963.

According to Pforzheimer, Peers commanded OSS Detachment 101 which operated behind Japanese lines in Burma. The unit conducted both paramilitary and tactical intelligence collection operations. Constantinides notes that the emphasis here is on the "strategic and tactical picture of both military and paramilitary operations," with intelligence activity receiving lesser treatment.

[WWII/OSS/CBIOps]

Peis, Günter. The Mirror of Deception: How Britain Turned the Nazi Spy Machine Against Itself. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1977. New York: Pocket Books, 1980. [pb]

Constantinides sees this effort to chronicle the activities of Tate and others in the XX system as "rather disjointed." The work has value, however, in its approach from the German viewpoint.

[UK/WWII/Services/MI5]

Pekel, Kent. "Integrity, Ethics, and the CIA: The Need for Improvement." Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1998): 85-94.

The article is based on the author's "participation in an Office of Training and Education working group charged with looking at how ethics education is conducted at the CIA" and "50 one-on-one interviews" in 1996 with "a rough cross-section" of the CIA population. At the time, Pekel was serving at the CIA as a White House Fellow.

[Overviews/Ethics]

Pekelney, Richard. "Excellent, Exceptional, Enormous Crypto Source." Cryptologia 29, no. 3 (Jul. 2005): 255256.

"The usefulness of NARA's online catalog varies depending on the age and quality of the finding aids, but it is a place to start: http://www.archives.gov/research_room/arc." There are additional finding aids at the Historic Naval Ships Association Web site: http://www.hnsa.org/doc/nara.

[Cryptography/RefMats]

Pelham, Ann, and John Felton. "Attempting the Rescue of Hostages: Why the American Operation Failed." Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report 38 (3 May 1980): 1162-1163.

[GenPostwar/80s/IranRescue]

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