Os

Osanka, Franklin Mark, ed. Modern Guerrilla Warfare: Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941-1961. Intro., Samuel P. Huntington. New York: Free Press, 1962.

The thematic thrust of this work is made plain in the subtitle, in that the "major emphasis" ("Preface," p. xi) is on the use of guerrilla warfare by Communist groups and movements.

[MI/SpecOps]

Oseth, John M. "Intelligence and Low-Intensity Conflict." Naval War College Review 37 (Nov.-Dec. 1984): 19-36. [http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/RefBibs/intell/since45.htm]

[MI/SpecOps]

Oseth, John M. Regulating U.S. Intelligence Operations: A Study in Definition of the National Interest. Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1985.

Valcourt, IJI&C, 5.2, says this is the "best overall study of executive branch oversight." Similarly, Lowenthal sees the book as "a very thoughtful discussion of the issues involved in having an operational capability that is in some way accountable to proper political control."

For Strong, IJI&C 1.2, "most of the work ... serves well as a tutorial on the opinions presented." However, the "broad, general condemnation of intelligence as an institution ... fails."

Johnson, I&NS 1.2, finds Oseth's work to be "largely free of ideological passion" in its examination of how the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations "responded to the pressures for increased intelligence regulation." For the reviewer, the main weakness of the book "is its failure to emphasize the enduring significance of the reforms that did take place in 1976-77 and 1980."

[Oversight/To90s]

Osgood, Kenneth. Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad. Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 2006.

"Total Cold War Roundtable: Review" (chaired by Scott Lucas and with reviews by Sarah-Jan Corke, Chris Tudda, and Hugh Wilford), dated 26 Feb. 2007, at http://www.h-net.org/~diplo/roundtables/PDF/TotalColdWar-complete.pdf, provides multiple reviews of Osgood's work.

In his introduction, Lucas suggests that "any success of psychological operations under Eisenhower was not that they fulfilled a global strategy that encompassed both American positions of strength such as Western Europe and disputed areas in Europe, Asia, and beyond but that they covered up the tensions and contradictions that were present in the strategic approach throughout the 1950s." (4)

Corke, despite some "quibbles" over the author's use of specific terminology, says that this "masterful ... book is a must-read for anyone interested in the relationship between policy, strategy and operations." Osgood "demonstrates scholarship of the highest quality," and he "has a firm grasp of the subtleties and nuances of psychological warfare."

For Tudda, this work is a "significant contribution to our understanding of how psychological warfare can fit into national security strategy,. However, the "weakest part of Osgood’s analysis is his examination of the Eisenhower administration’s psychological warfare program."

Wilford notes that Eisenhower "emerges from Osgood’s account as a tireless advocate of 'psy-war' methods in the fight against communism." An "extremely impressive array of primary materials" is used to support Osgood's "powerful arguments." However, the book does not address "the actual impact of psychological warfare on its target populations."

The material here concludes with a gentle reply by Osgood to some of the issues raised by the reviewers.

[CA/PsyOps]

O'Shaughnessy, Gary W. [MGEN/USAF] "Air Force HUMINT." American Intelligence Journal 14, no 1 (Autumn/Winter 1993/1994): 17-20.

[MI/AF & Humint/90s]

Ostensoe, James G. "The Problem of Scientific Surprise." Studies in Intelligence 5, no. 4 (Fall 1961): 15-20.

"Progress report on efforts to pin down an elusive estimative problem."

[Analysis/Est; Genpostwar/Issues/S&T/To90s]

Ostrovsky, Erika. Eye of Dawn: The Rise and Fall of Mata Hari. New York: Macmillan, 1978.

Wheeler, IJI&C 1.3, characterizes Eye of Dawn as a "portrait of the courtesan-dancer-reluctant spy by an empathetic writer of talent."

[France/WWI]

Ostrovsky, Victor. The Other Side of Deception: A Rogue Agent Exposes the Mossad's Secret Agenda. New York: HarperCollins, 1994. 1995. [pb]

According to Quandt, FA 73.4, this book "suffers from some of the same flaws" as By Way of Deception. "And there is almost no way of checking the truth of his assertions.... No doubt some of this book is true, but to sort out fact from deception is extremely difficult. A common thread in the two books is the author's high opinion of himself."

Surveillant 4.1 notes that Ostrovsky "suggests that a rightwing faction of Israel's intelligence organization plotted to kill U.S. President George Bush at the 1991 Madrid peace conference." The book includes a number of other "eye-opening claims," including assassinations and biological experimentation on Palestinians and Soweto blacks.

Namebase sees this book as "more autobiographical" than By Way of Deception. The book follows "a rough chronology, diary-style, from 1986 to 1991, and includes much reconstructed dialogue." Ostrovsky says "the following deaths were all Mossad hits, and includes new details: British publisher Robert Maxwell, Canadian scientist Gerald Bull, German official Uwe Barschel, and Iran-contra figure Ian Spiro."

[Israel/O&V]

Ostrovsky, Victor, and Claire Hoy. By Way of Deception: The Making and Unmaking of a Mossad Officer. New York: St. Martin's, 1990. 1991. [pb] By Way of Deception: A Devastating Insider's Portrait of the Mossad. Toronto: Stoddart, 1990.

Surveillant 2.1 notes that this autobiography by an ex-Mossad case-officer is full of case histories. According to I&NS 8.4, this book "should not be overestimated."

NameBase says that By Way of Deception is "the first book to offer some major dirty laundry" about Israeli intelligence. "Among other things, it charges that Mossad had advance knowledge of the 1983 truck bombing in Lebanon that killed 241 U.S. Marines, but refused to warn the American authorities for policy reasons."

To Winslow, The Nation, 22 Oct. 1990, Ostrovsky's book is "a saucy, chatty firsthand account of being trained by the Mossad and a largely secondhand account of the agency's involvement in events of worldwide renown, which includes some spectacular allegations." This review also includes some details on the tribulations (including court cases in Canada and the United States) that the publishers went through in getting the book onto the market.

The following excerpts are taken from a review posted by Charles Gillen to the alt.politics.org.cia Internet newsgroup: "I ... wish to recommend his book for several reasons. [Ostrovsky's] detailed description of his training is persuasive that no other intel service in the world provides its regular case officers with training as intense in the areas of street tradecraft, operational security, and cover. Any reader with the slightest personal experience of some other intelligence or security service is bound to be left feeling strictly amateurish. Perhaps more significantly, Ostrovsky is not shy about stating that such training turns out amoral, glib confidence men continually seeking to sink hooks into the next mark who turns up. He also acknowledges that as a case officer he himself experienced a certain undeniable 'high' from operating in alias to manipulate unsuspecting civilians. And of course this sort of deceptive manipulation went on inside the MOSSAD as well as outside. These factors do much to explain the problems which seem endemic to humint services."

[Israel/O&V][c]

O'Sullivan, Arieh. "Mossad Head: We Need Spies, Not Just Electronics." Jerusalam Post, 25 Sep. 2001. [http://www.jpost.com]

[Israel/00s]

O'Sullivan, Donal. "Dealing With the Devil: The Anglo-Soviet Parachute Agents (Operation 'Pickaxe')." Journal of Intelligence History 4, no. 2 (Winter 2004). [http://www.intelligence-history.org/jih/journal.html]

From abstract: "From 1941 to 1944, the Royal Air Force dropped more than twenty NKVD agents into Western Europe by parachute. The goal of ... operation ... 'Pickaxe' was to organize resistance and sabotage in Nazi-occupied territories." The majority of the agents "were arrested and executed by the Gestapo.... Anglo-Soviet subversion efforts lacked the necessary level of trust and consequently could not influence the war effort substantially."

[Russia/WWII/Gen; WWII/Eur/Gen]

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