Office of the Director of National Intelligence - 2005.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence - 2006.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence - 2007-2008.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence - 2009.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence - 2010-2015.
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. Annual Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage -- 2002. Feb. 2003. [http://www.ncix.gov]
This is the eighth of these annual reports, first, from the National Counterintelligence Center and, now, the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. "It seeks to assess efforts by foreign entities ... to unlawfully target or acquire critical US technologies, trade secrets, and sensitive financial or proprietary economic information."
[CI/Gen/00s; GenPostwar/Econ/CI/Govt & Ref]
Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. "Michelle Van Cleave." [http://www.nacic.gov/info/bio_cleave.html]
On 28 July 2003, President George W. Bush appointed Michelle Van Cleave as the National Counterintelligence Executive (NCIX). As the NCIX, she "chairs the National Counterintelligence Policy Board, which is the principal mechanism for developing policies and procedures for the approval of the President to govern the conduct of CI activities. She is also the director of the Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive (ONCIX), which is located in the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence."
Offley, Ed. Turning the Tide: How a Small Band of Allied Sailors Defeated the U-boats and Won the Battle of the Atlantic. New York: Basic Books, 2011.
Goulden, Washington Times, 10 Jun. 2011., refers to the author's "masterly military writing."
Offner, Arnold A. Another Such Victory: President Truman and the Cold War, 1945-1953. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2002.
According to Skinner, FA 81.5 (Sep.-Oct. 2002), the author "argues that Truman's unsophisticated, confrontational approach to statecraft made the Cold War longer, meaner, and more expensive than necessary.... Another Such Victory adds up to an authoritative sum of all doubts about Truman's foreign policy.... Sadly, the calculus is not as original as it is comprehensive." Corke, I&NS 18.4, seems disappointed that the author of this "revisionist" interpretation did not spend more space beating up on the CIA ("glaring deficiency").
O'Flaherty, Eamon. "Ireland's Nazis." History Ireland 15, no. 2 (Mar.-Apr. 2007): 48-49.
This review of two 1-hour programs on Ireland television, "Ireland's Nazis," on 9 and 16 January 2007, notes that the main theme "is the use of Ireland as a safe haven or refuge for a number of fugitive Nazis in the immediate post-war era."
Daniel Leach, "Irish Post-War Asylum: Nazi Sympathy, Pan-Celticism or Raisons d'Etat?" History Ireland 15, no. 3 (May-Jun. 2007): 36-41, "takes issue with some of the conclusions" in the "Ireland's Nazis" documentary. He points out that "it is now commonly understood that Ireland's neutrality [during World War II] was 'friendly' toward the Allies in practical, if discreet terms."
Ogburn, Charlton, Jr. The Marauders. New York: Harper, 1956. New York: Crest/Fawcett, 1964. [pb] New York: Ballantine, 1974. [pb]
Clark comment: The author served with Merrill's Marauders. Hunter, Studies 5.1 (Winter 1961), says that as "skillful a narrator as Ogburn is, he was not in a position to view the campaign in its command and intelligence aspects nor to take fully into account the failures in planning, coordination, and intelligence that characterized CBI Theater operations under General Joe Stllwell's erratic and nepotistical direction." See also, McGee, The History of the 2d Battalion, Merrill's Marauders (1987).
Ogden, Alan. Through Hitler's Back Door: SOE Operations in Hungary, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria 19391945. Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword, 2010.
Peake, Studies 55.2 (Jun. 2011), finds that the author "describes in considerable detail more than 30 missions, with emphasis on the persistent operational glitches encountered and their often herculean efforts to overcome them.... This book is reasonably well documented, often with primary sources, though in some cases lengthy operational descriptions are not referenced to sources."
Ogilvie-White, Tanya. "Nuclear Intelligence and North-South Politics." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 24, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 1-21.
"Despite the logic of systematically developing a full-fledged IAEA intelligence unit, many member states would strongly resist moves in this direction." Nonetheless, "a significant ad hoc expansion of IAEA intelligence apparatus has occurred since 1991."
Ogilvy, David. Blood, Brains and Beer. New York: Atheneum, 1978. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1978.
The author worked with Stephenson's British Security Coordination (BSC) during World War II. Nevertheless, Constantinides warns us that Ogilvy "has very little to say of his wartime intelligence work."
Ogle, James V. "The Intelligence of Literature." Studies in Intelligence 7, no. 4 (Fall 1963): 23-29.
In his following of the open literature, the author finds a reemergence of the trends that culminated in the 1956 Hungarian revolt.
O'Halpin, Eunan - A-L.
O'Halpin, Eunan - M-Z.
O'Hanlon, Michael E. "A Flawed Masterpiece." Foreign Affairs 81, no. 3 (May-Jun. 2002): 47-63.
"Operation Enduring Freedom has been, for the most part, a masterpiece of military creativity and finesse.... [However,] it has apparently failed to achieve a key war goal: capturing or killing Osama bin Laden and other top enemy leaders.... [T]he prospects for success ... were reduced considerably by U.S. reliance on Pakistan forces and Afghan militias for sealing off enemy escape routes."
O'Hanlon, Michael E., et al. Protecting the American Homeland: A Preliminary Analysis. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2002.
Wiggins, NWCR, Spring 2003, finds that this work "analyzes the problems of national security, determines the progress of current programs, and designs an agenda for future endeavors.... The authors argue that first identifying U.S. weaknesses and vulnerabilities will make it possible to correct them or at least lessen the effects of attacks we cannot prevent.... [This book] is a logical, flowing, step-by-step analysis to defining policy issues involving the development of a comprehensive protection plan."
O'Hara, Terence. "Four Months Later, In-Q-Tel Again Needs New CEO." Washington Post, 24 Apr. 2006, D1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"Amit Yoran resigned over the weekend as chief executive of In-Q-Tel ... after less than four months on the job.... He said [on 23 April 2006] that his reasons for leaving were entirely personal, including a desire to spend less time on the road and more with his family.... Yoran ... said the organization has an annual budget of more than $50 million ... and includes as 'investors' several other intelligence and homeland security agencies in addition to the CIA."
O'Hara, Terence. "In-Q-Tel, CIA's Venture Arm, Invests in Secrets." Washington Post, 15 Aug. 2005, D1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
"In the five years since it began active operations as the 'venture capital arm' of the CIA, In-Q-Tel's reach and activities have become vast for so small an operation. It has invested in more than 75 companies and delivered more than 100 technologies to the CIA, most of which otherwise would never have been considered by the intelligence agency."
O'Harrow, Robert, Jr.
O'Hern, Steven K. [COL/USAF (Ret.)] The Intelligence Wars: Lessons from Baghdad. Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2009.
Hanley, Proceedings 135.6 (Jun. 2009), finds that this work's "governing idea ... is that our obsessive faith in gadgets and, collaterally, our view of intelligence as principally a technical activity justify a reckless under-appreciation of human intelligence." The book has some flaws, "among them a willingness to assume that current strategic priorities will remain so.... Nevertheless, O'Hern is on target in regard to the specific reforms that will make our intelligence agencies perform their invaluable services with greater skill."
The author's contention that HUMINT is underutilized and underresourced resonates with Bebber, NIPQ 26.2 (Jun. 2010). However, "there are several factors ... that make HUMINT less reliable than [O'Hern] would have us believe." Beyond that, he "has done a great service by providing the perspective of an intelligence officer recently returned from the field." Peake, Studies 54.4 (Dec. 2010), and Intelligencer 18.2 (Winter-Spring 2011), notes that O'Hern makes "a very strong case for an improved HUMINT counterinsurgency program."
Price, A&SPJ 26.3 (Fall 2011), notes the author's background in the Air Force's Office of Special Investigations and his 6 months in 2005 leading the Strategic Counterintelligence Directorate (SCID) of Multi-National Force-Iraq. "When the book discusses HUMINT tradecraft and demonstrates such techniques via personal experiences or anecdotes, it is an engaging, often educational, read." Unfortunately, O'Hern "wastes too many pages either regurgitating 'generational warfare' myths or railing against issues often better addressed in professional journals."
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