National Cryptologic School. On Watch: Profiles from the National Security Agency's Past 40 Years. Ft. George G. Meade, MD: 1986.
National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community. Report of the National Commission for the Review of the Research and Development Programs of the United States Intelligence Community. Washington, DC: 2013. Available at: http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/ncrdic.pdf.gencCommunity. <
"U.S. technological superiority is diminishing in important areas, and our adversaries' investments in S&T -- along with their theft of our intellectual property, made possible in part by insufficient cyber protection and policies -- are giving them new, asymmetric advantages. The United States faces increasing risk from threats against which the IC could have severely limited warning, deterrence, or agility to develop effective countermeasures." See also, Greg Miller, "Panel: U.S. Spy Agencies Hampered by Poor Collaboration, Inadequate Cyberdefense," Washington Post, 5 Nov. 2013.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. New York: Norton, 2004. [pb]
Ignatius, Washington Post, 1 Aug. 2004, finds that "in its meticulous compilation of fact, the report makes the horrors of 9/11 even more shocking.... The strength of the report is ... in its narrative power; by telling all the little stories, it reveals the big story in a different way... [T]his book has a comprehensiveness that seems likely to stand the test of time.... The report's tone is evenhanded and nonpartisan, but the facts gathered here are devastating for the Bush administration.... [T]he report is at its weakest when it leaves the narrative behind and offers two final chapters on 'What to Do' and 'How to Do It'.... [I]ts recommendations are questionable -- and ignore some of the lessons of the report itself."
In a tightly written and superbly argued review, Judge Richard A. Posner, "The 9/11 Report: A Dissent," New York Times, 29 Aug. 2004, finds that "the 9/11 commission report is an uncommonly lucid, even riveting, narrative of the attacks, their background and the response to them.... The prose is free from bureaucratese and, for a consensus statement, the report is remarkably forthright. Though there could not have been a single author, the style is uniform.... However, the commission's analysis and recommendations are unimpressive....
"Combining an investigation of the attacks with proposals for preventing future attacks is the same mistake as combining intelligence with policy.... [W]ith the aid of hindsight it is easy to identify missed opportunities ... to have prevented the attacks, and tempting to leap from that observation to the conclusion that the failure to prevent them was the result ... of systemic failures in the nation's intelligence and security apparatus that can be corrected by changing the apparatus. That is the leap the commission makes, and it is not sustained by the report's narrative....
"The commission's contention that 'the terrorists exploited deep institutional failings within our government' is overblown.... The commission's statement that Clinton and Bush had been offered only a 'narrow and unimaginative menu of options for action' is hindsight wisdom at its most fatuous. The options considered were varied and imaginative.... But for political or operational reasons, none was feasible....
"So what to do? One possibility would be to appoint as director a hard-nosed, thick-skinned manager with a clear mandate for change.... Another would be to acknowledge the F.B.I.'s deep-rooted incapacity to deal effectively with terrorism, and create a separate domestic intelligence agency on the model of Britain's Security Service (M.I.5)....
"The report's main proposal ... is for the appointment of a national intelligence director.... [T]o layer another official on top of the director of central intelligence, one who would be in a constant turf war with the secretary of defense, is not an appealing solution. Since all executive power emanates from the White House, the national security adviser and his or her staff should be able to do the necessary coordinating of the intelligence agencies. That is the traditional pattern, and it is unlikely to be bettered by a radically new table of organization....
"When the nation experiences a surprise attack, our instinctive reaction is not that we were surprised by a clever adversary but that we had the wrong strategies or structure and let's change them and then we'll be safe. Actually, the strategies and structure weren't so bad; they've been improved; further improvements are likely to have only a marginal effect; and greater dangers may be gathering of which we are unaware and haven't a clue as to how to prevent."
For Krause, Air & Space Power Journal 18.4 (Winter 2004), "the commission and its report took the form of a hybrid mix of politics and policy, research and drama.... A strength of the report is its great detail concerning the execution of the attacks." Nevertheless, "[w]ithout the proper context and background, the information presented as fact and the recommendations presented as essential are insufficient to guide America's defense policy and international affairs."
Mazzafro, I&NS 20.4 (Dec. 2005), notes that only time will tell whether what the 9/11 Commission recommended (and did not recommend) will result in improvements in the way America conducts its intelligence activities. Nonetheless, the Report "established a new benchmark of cogency and readability for government reports of national ... importance." To Clemens, Military Intelligence 31.1 (Jan.-Mar. 2005), "[t]he Commission prepared a monumental yet readable document that serves not only to help the current U.S. population work through the tragedy of 9/11, but future generations as well."
National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Press Release. "Vice Adm. Albert 'Bert' M. Calland III, National Counterterrorism Center's Deputy Director for Strategic Operational Planning, to Retire." 27 Apr. 2007. [http://www.nctc.gov/press_room/press_releases/27_apr_2007.html]
D/NCTC VADM (Ret.) John Scott Redd on 27 April 2007 "announced that Vice Adm. Albert M. 'Bert' Calland III, Deputy Director for Strategic Operational Planning, will retire on July 1, 2007."
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. Office of Corporate Relations. Public Affairs. Media Release: OCRP 03-15, 24 Nov. 2003. [http://www.nima.mil]
With the signing on 24 November 2003 of the FY2004 Defense Authorization Act, "the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) officially became the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA)....
"Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, NIMA accelerated the convergence of various analytic tradecrafts (cartography, geospatial analysis, imagery analysis, marine analysis, aeronautical analysis, regional analysis, geodesy) into a new intelligence discipline -- geospatial intelligence, or GEOINT -- that is clearly greater than the sum of its parts....
"NGA is both a national intelligence as well as combat support agency whose mission is to provide timely, relevant and accurate geospatial intelligence in support of our national security. Geospatial intelligence is the exploitation and analysis of imagery and geospatial information to describe, assess and visually depict physical features and geographically referenced activities on the Earth."
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency. "NGA Awards EnhancedView Commercial Imagery Contract." Release Number 10-10. Washington, DC: Public Affairs Office, 6 Aug. 2010. [https://www1.nga.mil/Newsroom/PressReleases/Press%20Releases/nga_10_10.pdf]
On 6 August 2010, NGA "awarded contracts for the EnhancedView commercial imagery program. DigitalGlobe Inc. of Longmont, Colo., received an award for $3.5 billion and GeoEye Imagery Collection Systems Inc. of Dulles, Va., an award for $3.8 billion. The period of performance for the contracts is 10 years if all options are exercised.... EnhancedView provides greater access, priority tasking and improved capability and capacity to government customers from the next series of U.S. commercial imagery satellites."
National Institute for Public Policy. Modernizing Intelligence. Fairfax, VA: NIPP 1997.
National Intelligence Book Center. Catalog Budapest 1989-1990. Washington, DC: NIBC, 1989.
National Intelligence Council.
National Law Journal. "Former Employee Sues CIA over Memoirs." 25, no. 74 (24 Mar. 2003).
Jeffrey Sterling, a former CIA operations officer, "has sued the agency [Sterling v. Central Intelligence Agency, No. 03-CV-603 (D.D.C. March 4)], alleging violation of his First Amendment right to publish. Sterling charges that the CIA has improperly made rulings relating to his memoirs, which he was required to submit to the agency for approval.... Sterling's suit seeks only declaratory and injunctive relief, asking the court to establish that he has a First Amendment right to publish his memoirs and to prohibit the agency from bringing criminal or civil legal proceedings against him."
National Military Intelligence Association (NIMA). "Air Force Reorganizes Its Intelligence Structure." NIMA Newsletter 19, no. 1 (Winter 2007): 5.
The Air Force has announced plans "to relign all programs and personnel related to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) by taking them out of the operations community and consolidating them under one command element" -- the deputy chief of staff for intelligence (A2) at Air Force Headquarters. "Other significant organizational actions -- including realigning the Air Intelligence Agency as a field operating agency reporting directly to to the AF/A-2 -- will occur over the next year.
National Security Archive.
National Women's History Museum. "Clandestine Women: Spies in American History." At http://www.nmwh.org/spies/1.htm.
"Women have traditionally and in great numbers volunteered to help protect the nation. Besides enlisting in the military, women have effectively served in the shadowy world of espionage as couriers, guides, code breakers, intelligence analysts, even as covert agents -- spies."
Topics covered are: Introduction, American Revolution, Civil War, World War I, World War II, Cold War, and Post Script.
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