Murray, Williamson. "Appeasement and Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 4 (Oct. 1987): 47-66.
"British intelligence analysis in the late 1930s responded to attitudes of its political masters.... In terms of their own attitudes, it was inconceivable to the British that the Germans would take the kinds of risks that they did."
1. Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe, 1933-1945. Washington, DC: GPO, 1983.
Sexton notes that the author "illuminates the relationship of ULTRA to the strategic air offensive..., as well as discussing air operations in Normandy and the Mediterranean." The main themes of this book are summarized in Murray's "Ultra: Some Thoughts on Its Impact on the Second World War," Air University Review 35 (Jul.-Aug. 1984), 52-64.
2. "Ultra: Some Thoughts on Its Impact on the Second World War." Air University Review 35 (Jul.-Aug. 1984): 52-64. [http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/ RefBibs/intell/ww2/ultra.htm]
3. "World War II: Ultra -- The Misunderstood Allied Secret Weapon." MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History, Spring 2002. [http://www.historynet.com/magazines/mhq/3033696.html]
"While historians and military analysts tell us that the Germans were extraordinarily proficient in the operational and tactical spheres, we should also recognize that the Germans were incredibly sloppy and careless in the fields of intelligence, communications, and logistics, and consistently (and ironically) held their opponents in contempt in those fields.... [T]he German defeat in World War II suggests that to underestimate the capabilities and intelligence of one's enemies is to suffer dangerous and damaging consequences to one's own forces."
Murray, Williamson, and Robert H. Scales, Jr. The Iraq War: A Military History. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003.
Freedman, FA 83.1 (Jan.-Feb. 2004), says that "the academic depth of Williamson Murray and the professional experience of Major General Robert Scales ensure that their lively account of the war against Iraq is a superior, authoritative product." Reese, DIJ 14.1 (2005), calls this a "good old-fashioned campaign study." The authors "craft a smooth narrative portraying tactics, operations, and strategy in a manner friendly to both serious and casual students of warfare."
For Warner, Studies 48.1, the authors "offer a clear and readable text ... that covers all phases of the war effort. They tell us relatively little about decisions made in Washington and London, or even at Central Command Forward in Doha, Qatar, but they nevertheless present some thoughtful observations in a chapter entitled 'Military and Political Implications.'"
Murray, Williamson, ed. Strategic Challenges for Counterinsurgency and the Global War on Terrorism. Carlisle, PA: U.S. ArmyWar College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2006. [http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB710.pdf]
This edited work has 14 chapters covering a wide-range of loosely related topics.
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