Mucciolo, Aaron. "Less Interesting Than '60 Minutes': Recent NSA Releases Add Little to the U.S.S. Liberty Debate." Strategic Insights 3, no. 3 (Mar. 2004). [http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/mar/muccioloMar04.asp]
Mucciolo, Aaron. "Less Interesting Than '60 Minutes': Recent NSA Releases Add Little to the U.S.S. Liberty Debate." Strategic Insights 3, no. 3 (Mar. 2004). [http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/mar/muccioloMar04.asp]
"The NSA releases ... provide an incomplete picture of the attack. There are no transcripts or recordings of any communications before or during the attack and nothing from the Israeli boats at the scene. Furthermore, sections of these declassified documents are ... whited out in the transcripts and deleted from the audio. Some of these deletions seem to be references to communication channel numbers and other data that should remain classified, but at points entire paragraphs are missing."
For the NSA releases see http://www.nsa.gov/docs/efoia/released/liberty.html.
Mueller, Michael. Canaris: The Life and Death of Hitler’s Spymaster. London: Chatham Publishing, 2007.
Peake, Studies 51.4 (2007), notes that the author's "description of Canaris’s life and career -- especially his role in the resistance to Hitler that cost him his life -- though interesting, adds nothing new."
[WWII/Eur/Germany/Canaris]
Muench, Kris [CAPT/USA]
"Preparing for Digitalization: Surviving the Army Before the 'Army
After Next.'" Military Intelligence 24, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun. 1998): 21-24.
Trying to anticipate some of the challenges of digitalization.
[MI/Army]
Mufson, Steven [Washington
Post]
Muggeridge,
Malcolm. The Infernal Grove. Chronicles of Wasted Time, No. 2. London: Collins, 1973. New York: Morrow, 1974.
Constantinides: In this second volume of his memoirs, Muggeridge tells of his World War II intelligence work with SIS in Africa and Europe. The book, a "collection of memorable phrases and bon mots about intelligence," is "superbly written."
[UK/WWII/Services/MI6]
Mukerjee,
Dulip. The Terrorists. New York: Vantage, 1980.
Wilcox: "Study of terrorism, main terrorists, their motives, psychology, tactics and strategy around the world."
[Terrorism]
Mueller, Robert S., III. "Congressional Testimony: Statement of Robert S. Mueller, III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary, July 27, 2005." http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/mueller072705.htm.
The FBI Director addresses a range of issues concerning his organization. He begins with the President's announcement of the creation of an intelligence service within the FBI (National Security Branch), an amalgam of the Bureau's Directorate of Intelligence, Counterterrorism Division, and Counterintelligence Division. He also discusses "three areas that directly impact the success of this new intelligence service: our Language Program, our Information Technology capabilities, and our ability to recruit, hire, train, and retain the expertise we need to build this service."
[FBI/00s/05/Gen]
Mulcahy, Kevin V. "The
Bush Administration and National Security Policymaking: A Preliminary Assessment."
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 4,
no. 2 (Summer 1990): 167-180.
The author describes President Bush's policymaking style as "managerial, collegial, incremental, and pragmatic.... President Bush seems content to manage events as they arise rather than to shape alternatives and fine-tune the changes in national security policy required by the openness in East-West relations."
[GenPostwar/NatSec][c]
Mulcahy, Kevin V. "U.S. National Security: A Presidential Perspective." Presidential Studies Quarterly 30, no. 4 (Dec. 2000): 802-805.
[GenPostwar/NatSec/00s]
Mull, Alexander. "Notes on the Wennerstrom Case." Studies in Intelligence 10, no. 3 (Summer 1966): 67-76.
The author highlights "some details of handling technique and tradecraft revealed in the testimony" at Wennerström's trial.
[OtherCountries/Sweden/Wen]
Mullahey,
Thomas F., Jr. "Counter-Intelligence." Marine Corps Gazette,Oct.
1945, 36-38. [http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usamhi/RefBibs/intell/counter.htm]
[MI/CI & Marines]
Mullan, Don. The Dublin and Monaghan Bombings. Dublin: Wolfhound, 2000.
Bombings in 1972-1974.
[UK/Postwar/IRA]
Mullan, Don, and John Scally. Eyewitness Bloody Sunday. Dublin: Wolfhound, 1998.
[UK/Postwar/IRA]
Muller, David G., Jr. "Intelligence Analysis in Red and Blue." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 1 (Spring 2008): 1-12.
The author argues that the Red-Blue dichotomy in American culture reflects "two different and incompatible understandings of how the world works.... So an analyst's worldview has a fundamental impact on the accuracy of his or her analysis."
[AnalysisGen]
Müller-Enbergs, Helmut. Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter des Ministeriums für Staatssicherheit, Teil 2: Anleittungen für die Aebeit mit Argenten, Kundschaftern und Spion in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag, 1998.
According to Childs, I&NS 16.3, this work "deals with the work of the HV A, the GDR's external intelligence service, for most of its existence under the leadership of General Markus Wolf." It is "[b]ased on the Stasi archives as well as mass of published materials."
[Germany/East&Wolf]
Müller, Klaus-Jürgen
"A German Perspective on Allied Deception Operations in the Second
World War." Intelligence and National Security 2, no. 3 (Jul.
1987): 301-326.
The author takes issue with the positive evaluation of Allied strategic deception operations by such writers as Ewen Montagu. "[V]ery often ... an exaggerated evaluation of the effects of deception operations is well founded.... Even where these strategems were 'bought' by those they were sold to, their effect at the strategic level was minimal in many cases. Deception at the tactical level, however, was very often successful."
David Hunt, "Remarks on 'A German Perspective on Allied Deception Operations,'" Intelligence and National Security 3, no. 1 (Jan. 1988), 190-194, argues that "Müller is in error in supposing that Mincemeat ... did not work and had no effect on German strategy; and ... he has misunderstood the nature of the aims that the Allies were pursuing in the Mediterranean."
[WWII/Eur/Deception&Ger]
Müller-Wille, Björn. "Improving the Democratic Accountability of EU Intelligence." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 1 (Feb. 2006): 100-128.
The author "identifies the establishment of mechanisms for quality control of EU intelligence as the main challenge at the EU level."
[OtherCountries/EU]
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