Mowbray, Stephen de. "Soviet Deception and the Onset of the Cold War: The British Documents for 1943 -- A Lesson in Manipulation." Encounter 62 (Jul.-Aug. 1984): 16-24.
Rocca and Dziak: "Discusses Soviet strategic political deception in the period 1943-1945 and the concomitant roles of Communists, near Communists and Soviet agents in influencing official British thinking and therefore policy towards the USSR."
Mowry, David P. German Cipher Machines of World War II. Ft. George G. Meade, MD: Center for Cryptologic History, National Security Agency, 2003.
Kruh, Cryptologia 28.2, says that "[t]his valuable booklet [32 pages] includes photographs of the various German cipher machines used in World War II."
Moyar, Mark. "Hanoi's Strategic Surprise." Intelligence and National Security 18, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 155-170.
In 1964-1965, the North Vietnamese changed from a strategy based on "protracted guerrilla warfare aimed at weakening the enemy" to one of "conventional warfare aimed at destroying the enemy rapidly." The U.S. intelligence failure to detect that shift in strategy "exerted extraordinary influence on both American and North Vietnamese policy."
Moyar, Mark. Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: The CIA's Secret Campaign to Destroy the Viet Cong. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1997. Lincoln NE: Bison Books, 2007. [pb]
Peake, History 26.3, calls the book "remarkable," and notes that Moyar's account is both balanced and corrective of the popular view of the Phoenix program, the Viet Cong, and the nature of the Vietnam War. Along the way, the author "displays an uncommon grasp of the problems of agent recruitment and handling peculiar to Vietnam." He also uncovers a number of often-repeated fabrications that continue to mar discussions of Phoenix.
Lauding Moyar's "balance and objectivity," Periscope 22.2 says that Phoenix and the Birds of Prey "is the definitive work on the Phoenix program to date, and will remain so for a long time." Similarly, Jonkers, AIJ 18.1&2, comments that Moyar "does not engage in moralizing, provides a clear-eyed account and thereby contributes to understanding of the facts." Dunn, Infantry, Jan.-Apr. 1999, refers to the author's thorough research and balanced perspective, and concludes that "[t]his is a fine, readable, and captivating book that I recommend most highly."
Interestingly, McGehee, from email@example.com, comes to somewhat the same conclusion as the above reviewers: "The book presents a thorough description of the development of the Phoenix program and its administrative structure.... Mr. Moyar's presentation of this seems generally accurate and is the most detailed available." Regrettably, McGehee cannot resist a parting shot at one of his staple targets, commenting that the author's "reliance on William Colby raises serious questions of objectivity."
Moyar, Mark. "The Phoenix Program and Contemporary Warfare." Joint Forces Quarterly 47 (4th Quarter 2007): 155-159. [http://www.ndu.edu]
This article "is an abridged chapter" from a new edition of Moyer's Phoenix and the Birds of Prey. The author argues that "indigenous forces are much more effective than foreigners at quelling local subversion.... The great question is whether the local forces can become strong enough to establish and maintain security on their own."
Moyar, Mark. A Question of Command: Counterinsurgency From the Civil War to Iraq. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009.
For Cohen, Washington Post, 6 Dec. 2009, "this brilliant young scholar of the Vietnam War reminds us that it takes a special kind of soldier -- reflective, patient, creative -- to lead counterinsurgency operations." Dennis, JFQ 62 (3d Quarter, Jul. 2011), finds this work to be "a thoughtful analysis from which we all can learn, but Moyar's notion of leader-centric doctrine addresses only part of the solution to an enormously complex problem, and, therefore, is not the panacea that he claims it to be."
Cassidy, Parameters 36.4 (Winter 2009-2010), notes the author's view that "[i]f a military culture eschews counterinsurgency as a core role, as the US Army did for the last 25 years of the last century, the development of good counterinsurgency-capable leaders is hampered." The chapter on Afghanistan finds that "US forces during the first years of the resurgent insurgency arrived with little knowledge of counterinsurgency." Therefore, "[u]nits were forced to adapt under fire." Moyer also argues that "many regular Army commanders lacked creativity, flexibility, and other attributes more in demand during counterinsurgency than conventional war. The contrast between Special Forces officers, who often exhibited the desired attributes, and the regular Army officers was discernible."
Moynahan, Brian. Jungle Soldier: The True Story of Freddy Spencer Chapman. London: Quercus, 2009.
From publisher: Chapman was an "SOE-trained guerrilla soldier" who was "dispatched to Singapore [in 1941] to train British guerrillas for the coming war with Japan. Setting out from Kuala Lumpur on 7 January 1942 on a mission to sabotage Japanese supply lines, he became a veritable one-man army.... Following Japan's invasion of Malaya and the fall of Singapore in February 1942, Chapman found himself stranded." He was finally "rescued and evacuated to Ceylon on 13 May 1945. Chapman returned to Malaya by parachute in August to take the Japanese surrender at Penang." See also, Chapman, The Jungle Is Neutral (1949).
Moynihan, Daniel P. "The Culture of Secrecy." Public Interest 128 (Summer 1997): 55-72.
Moynihan, Daniel P. "Do We Still Need the C.I.A.? The State Department Can Do the Job." New York Times, 19 May 1991, E17.
The New York Senator proves himself as provocative as ever.
Moynihan, Daniel P. "Secrecy as Government Regulation." PS Political Science and Politics 30, no. 2 (Jun. 1997): 160-165.
Moynihan, Daniel P. Secrecy: The American Experience. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1998.
Knott, Review of Politics 61.2, sees Moynihan urging "a return to a pre-World War I 'culture of openness,' that will ... free the United States from the bondage of its twentieth-century obsession with concealment.... However, Moynihan underemphasizes the early origins of American secrecy...: as a result his entire work is tainted by a distorted understanding of American principles and practice." Nevertheless, Moynihan "rightly argues that the government is too quick to classify documents," and he "makes a plausible case that compartmentalizing information impairs the ability of analysts and policymakers to respond intelligently to events."
For Friend, IJI&C 12.4, "the senator doesn't bother to address certain practical problems" and "is unable to convincingly make his case that overclassification or even mere classification has 'blighted prudent policymaking.'"
Moyzisch, L.C. Operation Cicero. New York: Coward-McCann, 1950. New York: Bantam, 1952. [pb] New York: Pyramid, 1958. [pb]
Pforzheimer sees this book as being written too soon after the events to "take into account later accounts and evaluations, including the possibility that the British ... [used the operation] for deception purposes of their own." To Constantinides, the author's declaration that only he knew all the facts was "hasty." His knowledge of the case, while first-hand, was only of the German side. Keatts, Studies 1.4 (Fall 1957), refers to Operation Cicero as "a competent and factual piece of work."
Mrayati, Mohamad, Yahya Meer Alam, and H. Hassan at-Tayyan, eds. Al-Kindi's Treatise on Cryptanalysis. Volume One of Series, Arabic Origins of Cryptology. Riyadh, Saudi Arabia: King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic Studies, 2003.
Kruh, Cryptologia 28.1, says that this work presents "the text of the oldest known manuscript in the world on cryptanalysis and offers a commentary by the editors on it." This is a "breakthrough discovery, excellent translation and invaluable contribution to the history of cryptology."
Mrozek, Donald J. "The Cold War." In Encyclopedia of the American Military, 985-1018. New York: Scribner's, 1994.
MSNBC News. "New White House Order Bolsters Intelligence Chief's Power." 3 Mar. 2008. [http://www.msnbc.com]
According to a senior White House official, a new "executive order splits the watchdog duties of the Intelligence Oversight Board [IOB]," a five-member advisory board of private citizens created in 1976, with DNI Mike McConnell. "Rather than intelligence agencies reporting their activities to the board for review, they will now report them to McConnell." The IOB will make sure the DNI "fulfills these new duties."
MSNBC News. "Report: Spy Betrayed Stealth Fighter." 27 Aug. 1999. [http://www. msnbc.com]
A Scottish newspaper, quoting NATO sources, reported on 27 August 1999 that "[a] Russian spy penetrated NATO's command structure during the Kosovo war and passed information on to Yugoslavia that helped Belgrade's anti-aircraft units bring down an American Stealth fighter at the beginning of the war." The report "quoted a senior NATO official as saying that the operational details of the mission were given to Russian intelligence services by a military officer attached to NATO. The Russians passed them on to Belgrade, giving details of the target, the defense research base at Budjanovci, north-west of Belgrade." See also BBC, "Spy 'Betrayed' Stealth Fighter," 27 Aug. 1999.
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