Mobley, Blake W. Terrorism and Counterintelligence: How Terrorist Groups Evade Detection. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.
Shelton, IJI&C 26.4 (Winter 2013-2014), sees this as "an important guide on how to disrupt terrorist groups by exploiting the weaknesses of their counterintelligence and security practices." However, the reviewer cautions that "success depends on procuring and acting on accurate and reliable information about terrorist operations."
Mobley, Richard A.
Mochulsky, Fyodor Vasilevich. Gulag Boss: A Soviet Memoir. New York: Oxford University Press, 2011.
According to Peake, Studies 55.3 (Sep. 2011), despite postwar assignments to the UN and Beijing, among others, the author focuses on "supervising railroad-building prisoners crews in the Arctic permafrost." This "is the only book that describes life in the [Gulag] camps from an NKVD supervisor's point of view."
Mock, James R. Censorship 1917. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1941. [Petersen]
Mock, James R., and Cedric Larson. Words that Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information, 1917-1919. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1939.
Woolbert, FA (Apr. 1940): "This scholarly study is based on a careful examination of the papers of the Creel 'Committee on Public Information.'"
Mockaitis, Thomas R.
1. British Counterinsurgency, 1919-60. London: Macmillan, 1990. New York: St. Martin's, 1990.
For Miller, I&NS 7.3, this is more than merely a history of British counterinsurgency campaigns; rather, "it is an attempt to discern the distinctive approach taken by the British." Popplewell, I&NS 10.2, sees this as the "most comprehensive account to have appeared on the subject.... According to Mockaitis, the key to Britain's success in combating insurgency lay in the careful application of minimum force.... Mockaitis' model reveals much about how Britain defeated insurgencies. It is less convincing as an explanation of why they failed."
2. British Counterinsurgency in the Post-Imperial Era. New York: Manchester University Press, 1995.
Mockaitis, Thomas R. Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency. Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2008.
Keiser, Proceedings 134.10 (Oct. 2008), notes that the author believes that behind the mistakes made in Iraq "are longer term structural deficiencies." Mockaitis' "recommendations regarding the absolute need for our Services to greatly strengthen COIN training and organization make good sense."
[MI/Ops/Iraq/Books & SpecOps/00s]
Modin, Yuri Ivanovich, with Jean-Charles Deniau and Aguieszka Ziarek. Tr., Anthony Roberts. My Five Cambridge Friends: Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt, and Cairncross by Their KGB Controller. London: Headline, 1994. New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1994.
The author "was initially the Five's deskman in Moscow Centre during World War Two, and after 1948, he became the London controller of John Cairncross,... Guy Burgess,... and Anthony Blunt." (p. 2)
According to Chambers (see also IWRQ 2.1), there are "no major revelations" in Modin's biographic sketches of the members of the ring "except to give credit to the veterans Deutsch and Maly for recruiting the ring, and to support the view that Morris Dobb was a talent spotter rather than a recruiter, and his opinion that the prime mover in the formation of the ring was Burgess.... The overall tone of the book is that of an old soldier who did his duty and who is proud of his service.... Praise must go to the translator (Anthony Roberts) for his role.... This book may not be the very last word on the Cambridge ring, but it is a significant contribution and a highly entertaining one that is strongly recommended." Click for Chambers' full review.
Surveillant 3.6 says Modin "reveals previously unknown details.... Burgess, he tells us, was far more an important player than previously thought.... [He] admits that most of the book comes from his memory." For Kerr, I&NS 11.3, "Modin's book gave the general impression that he was closely connected to the Cambridge network throughout their careers ... from the 1930s to 1951.... When Modin's career is juxtaposed with the movements of the Cambridge network this general impression of omniscience fades away.... Modin's access to ... these agents fluctuates from being a firsthand witness to ... relying upon secondary source material.... [Nevertheless,] Modin is a valuable source but ... in Mclean's case he has marginal value."
See also, Jamie Bisher, "Colonel Modin on Philby, Burgess, and Blunt," Foreign Intelligence Literary Scene 12, no. 6: 1-2.
Mogelever, Jacob. Death to Traitors: The Story of General Lafayette C. Baker, Lincoln's Forgotten Secret Service Chief. Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1960. [Petersen]
Mohs, Polly A. Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern Intelligence War. New York: Routledge, 2007.
According to Peake, Studies 52.3 (Sep. 2008) and Intelligencer 16.2 (Fall 2008), this is a "precedent-setting," "extensively documented," and "valuable contribution to the study of military intelligence."
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