Miller, A-F

 

Miller, Abraham H. "The CIA and the Crack Cocaine Story: Fact or Fiction?" The World and I, Feb. 1998, 304-317.

[CIA/90s/95-96/Crack]

Miller, Abraham H. "How the CIA Fell Victim to Myth Posing as Journalism." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 10, no. 3 (Fall 1997): 257-268.

Referring to the power and effect of myth, Miller makes a valiant effort to explain the unexplainable -- how a story of doubtful origin and credibility could gain the level of attention and currency that this one did. Whether Miller has the answer or not, his hypothesis is better than most. Miller's description of DCI John Deutch's visit to South Central Los Angeles as "an unprecedented and incomprehensible act of folly" needs no further elaboration.

[CIA/90s/97-00/Crack][c]

Miller, Abraham H., and Brian Alexander. "Structural Quiescence in the Failure of IC21 and Intelligence Reform." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 14, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 234-261.

"IC21 was, in a large sense, the boldest, most innovative and most radical of the proposals" of the time for Intelligence Community reform. However, the "[r]eforms necessary to deal with the issues that brought IC21 into existence were beyond its reach." The HPSCI "provided no linkage between its diagnosis of the problem and its prescription for reform." IC21's writers "created a model that had little if anything to do with why they were initially convened.... Structural reform was ultimately prevented because of the competing efforts of powerful officials.... [T]he interests of the Pentagon ... prevailed in the battle over reform."

[Reform/90s/96/HPSCI]

Miller, Abraham H., and Nicholas Damask. "Thinking About Intelligence After the Fall of Communism." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 6, no. 3 (Fall 1993): 257-269.

"The inappropriate emphasis on prediction as a standard of scientific judgment is built on a false sense of science.... [T]he original mission of the CIA to provide intelligence about other nations' threats to U.S. national security is as relevant now as it ever was. Diluting that mission by providing fewer resources at the same time that the role of the agency is being expanded is an obvious mistake that will not be rectified by reorganization."

[CIA/90s/93-94/Gen; Reform/90s/CIA][c]

Miller, A. Ray. The Cryptographic Mathematics of Enigma. Ft. George G. Meade, MD: National Security Agency, Center for Cryptologic History, 2001.

[UK/WWII/Ultra; WWII/Magic]

Miller, Bill, and Mike Allen. "Homeland Security Dept. Could Receive Raw FBI, CIA Data; Bush Still Opposes Merging of FBI." Washington Post, 19 Jun. 2002, A8. [http://www. washingtonpost.com]

On 18 June 2002, Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge delivered the draft of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to Congress, along with a message from President George W. Bush. The legislation would give the Department of Homeland Security "access to raw intelligence about domestic terror threats collected by the FBI, the CIA and other agencies.... White House officials said Bush remains determined not to merge the FBI into the new agency."

[Terrorism/02/Homeland]

Miller, Bill, and Walter Pincus. "Defense Analyst Accused of Spying for Cuba." Washington Post, 22 Sep. 2001, A1. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

Ana Belen Montes, the DIA's senior analyst for Cuba, was arrested at her office at Bolling Air Force Base on 21 September 2001. She is "accused of providing classified information about military exercises and other sensitive operations to the Cuban government."

[SpyCases/U.S./Montes]

Miller, Bill, and Walter Pincus. "Ex-CIA Agent Given 5 Years in Extortion Case." Washington Post, 26 Sep. 1998, A2. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]

On 25 September 1998, "[f]ormer CIA covert operative Douglas F. Groat was sentenced to five years in prison ... after admitting attempts to extort money from the agency.... Groat's sentence, which follows the terms of the plea agreement, calls for the prison time to be spent in a minimum-security facility. Upon his release, he will be put on three years of supervised probation. As part of the plea, Groat promised that he would never disclose any classified information learned during his CIA career or offer secrets to any foreign government."

[SpyCases/U.S./Groat]

Miller, Bowman H. "The Death of Secrecy: Need to Know...with Whom to Share." Studies in Intelligence 55, no. 3 (Sep. 2011): 13-18.

"The rolling disclosures from the 2010-11 WikiLeaks scandal ... are having a chilling effect on the reporting that policy makers and analysts rely upon for interpretive perspective, cogent assessment, and informed policy formulation and implementation."

[GenPostCW/10s/Gen]

Miller, Bowman H. "Improving All-Source Intelligence Analysis: Elevate Knowledge in the Equation." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 21, no. 2 (Summer 2008): 337-354.

"Filling intelligence gaps and avoiding 'intelligence failures' (policy decisions[] somehow never account for failures) demand more than adding analytic manpower and creating new tools; first and foremost, they require more expertise."

[Analysis/Gen]

Miller, Bowman H. "U.S. Strategic Intelligence Forecasting and the Perils of Prediction." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 27, no. 4 (Winter 2014): 687-701.

[Analysis/Est]

Miller, Brian R.E. [CAPT/USA] "Counterterrorism and Intelligence." Military Intelligence 14, no. 4 (Oct. 1988): 11-13.

[Terrorism/80s]

Miller, David W. "Cryptanalysis Reexplored." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 2 (1986): 136-144.

[Cryptography/Gen][c]

Miller, David W. "007's Analysis of KAL's Flight 007." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 1, no. 1 (Spring 1986): 109-119.

The author is a Columbia University mathematician and a World War II Signal Corps cryptanalyst. The article here is an ostensibly comparative review of Dallin's Black Box and Clubb's KAL Flight 007. The review is as interesting as either of the two books. Miller takes a probabilistic approach to the issue and concludes, as erroneously as both Dallin and Clubb, that the flight was U.S. intelligence mission.

[GenPostwar/80s/KAL-007][c]

Miller, Davina. "Democracy, Dictators and the Regulation of Arms Exports: the UK and Iraq." Intelligence and National Security 9, no. 3 (Jul. 1994), 536-543.

Miller, Davina. "Intelligence and Proliferation: Lessons from the Matrix-Churchill Affair." Intelligence and National Security 11, no. 2 (Apr. 1994), 193-206.

Miller, Dawn M. "Dark Waters: Britain and Italy's Invasion of Albania, 7 April 1939." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 290-323.

"[T]he Albania venture left a significant legacy, especially in the handling of intelligence.... [T]he inability of intelligence to provide a clear warning of Italy's intentions was at the heart of British surprise over Albania.... To prevent a repeat, Britain began to reform its system of intelligence. These reforms laid the foundation of the centralized intelligence system which served Britain so well in World War II."

[UK/Interwar/30s]

Miller, Dawn M. "'Raising the Tribes': British Policy in Italian East Africa, 1938-41." Journal of Strategic Studies 22, no. 1 (Mar. 1999): 96-123

[UK/WWII/Af].

Miller, Francis Tevelyan, ed. Soldier Life and the Secret Service. Vol. 8, The Photographic History of the Civil War. New York: A.S. Barnes, 1911. [Reprinted] New York: Castle Books, 1957.

See King, Charles, et al. The Photographic History of the Civil War. Vol IV. Soldier Life and Secret Service, Prisons and Hospitals. Secaucus, NJ: Blue & Gray Press, 1987.

[CivWar/Overviews]

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