McPeek, Robert L. "Electronic Warfare British Style." Military Intelligence 22, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1996): 23-26.
This article reviews the "organization and capabilities of the British Army's electronic warfare (EW) unit, the 14th Signal Regiment (EW). As the only organization of its kind in the British Army, the 14th Signal Regiment has kept quite busy supporting all levels of command from tactical to strategic."
McPherson, James M. "A Failed Richmond Raid and Its Consequences." Columbiad: A Quarterly Review of the War Between the States 2, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 130ff.
McRae, Ronald M. Mind Wars: The True Story of Government Research into the Military Potential of Psychic Weapons. New York: St. Martin's, 1984. [Petersen]
McRaven, William H. [ADM/USN] Special Operations -- Case Studies in Special Operations Warfare: Theory and Practice. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995.
See Craig Whitlock, "Adm. William McRaven: The Terrorist Hunter on Whose Shoulders Osama bin Laden Raid Rested," Washington Post, 4 May 2011.
Renken, MI 23.2, says that this is "an excellent book for special operators and the intelligence personnel who support them." McRaven "examines eight classic special operations in fascinating detail": the rescue of Mussolini (1943); the prisoner of war rescue at Cabanatuan (1945); Son Tay (1970); the Israeli rescue at Entebbe (1976); and raids on Fort Eban Emael (1940), Alexandria (1941), Saint Nazaire (1942), and the Tirpitz (1943). This is "good history, plus an analytical approach worth thinking about."
For Johnson, Parameters 27 (Autumn 1997), the author's application of his framework for analysis makes Special Operations "a breath of fresh air and a genuine joy to read and study.... McRaven's theory of special operations states, 'special operations forces are able to achieve relative superiority over the enemy if they prepare a simple plan, which is carefully concealed, repeatedly and realistically rehearsed, and executed with surprise, speed, and purpose'.... Practitioners and students of special operations would do well to examine the utility of the author's analytical device as a possible planning tool. It appears to be more than adequate."
[Israel/Entebbe; MI/SpecOps; Vietnam/SonTay; WWII/FEPac/Alamo & Gen]
McShane, Mark. Neutral Shores: Ireland and the Battle of the Atlantic. Cork: Mercier, 2012.
McSherry, J. Patrice. "Argentina: Dismantling an Authoritarian Legacy." NACLA [North American Congress on Latin America] Report on the Americas, Mar.-Apr. 2000, 1.
"The new administration of Frenando de la Rua has taken several important steps to reduce the power of the Argentine intelligence apparatus.... In January and February, the President ordered the dismissal of hundreds of agents from two notorious intelligence structures, the army's Battalion 601 ... and the Secretariat of State Intelligence (SIDE), and said that Battalion 601 would be dissolved.... The administration also reduced SIDE's budget."
McSherry, J. Patrice.
1. "Operation Condor: Clandestine Inter-American System." Social Justice 26, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 144-175.
This article traces "[a]nti-insurrection collusion among the intelligence services of the 'southern cone' countries of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay." Swenson, IJI&C 16.1/127/fn25.
2. Predatory States: Operation Condor and Covert War in Latin America. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005.
From publisher: "Operation Condor was a military network created in the 1970s to eliminate political opponents of Latin American regimes. Its key members were the anticommunist dictatorships of Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Brazil, later joined by Peru and Ecuador, with covert support from the U.S. government." The author draws "on a wealth of testimonies, declassified files, and Latin American primary sources." McSherry "shows how ... Operation Condor hunted down, seized, and executed political opponents across borders."
[LA/Gen & Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay]
McVety, Pete [LTCDR/USN]. "An Unmanned Revolution." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 126, no. 3 (Mar. 2000): 88-92.
"The integration of unmanned aircraft into the existing platforms of the battle group could enhance the combat power of manned platforms and bring more capability and flexibility to the warfare commander."
McWethy, John. "Y2K Bug Causes Intelligence Losses; Defense Silent Due to Terrorist Fears." ABCNews, 4 Jan. 2000. [http://www.abcnews.go.com]
Deputy Defense Secretary John Hamre acknowledged on 4 January 2000 that the "intelligence blackout on New Year's Eve ... was a big deal." Hamre said: "'It was not an unimportant dimension. It was a significant dimension.' ... [F]or two hours, the United States lost all information from spy satellites that take pictures over places like the Middle East and Russia. The data was beamed back to Earth, officials say, but computers at Fort Belvoir, Va., could not translate the information.... Temporary repairs were begun quickly, but it took two days to complete the job."
See also, Joseph C. Anselmo, "Y2K Knocks Out NRO Imagery," Aviation Week & Space Technology, 10 Jan. 2000, 27; John Diamond, "Satellites on Blink for Days." Chicago Tribune, 13 Jan. 2000, 1; Richard Lardner, "Pre-Y2K Problems Undercut Operation of U.S. Satellite Imagery Network." Inside the Pentagon, 13 Jan. 2000, 1; and John Diamond, "Pentagon Defends Reliabilty of Satellites." Chicago Tribune, 14 Jan. 2000, 1.
McWilliams, John C. The Protestors: Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1990.
Anslinger was commissioner of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics 1930-1962.
McWilliams, John C., and Alan A. Block. "All the Commissioner's Men: The Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the Dewey-Luciano Affair, 1947-54." Intelligence and National Security 5, no. 1 (Jan. 1990): 171-192.
This is one of the least sustainable articles to appear in Intelligence and National Security. The problem is not the authors' thesis -- that Federal Bureau of Narcotics officials participated in clandestine activities "which ultimately led to charges that Dewey was dishonest" -- but rather their failure to offer compelling sources to substantiate their argument. This is a largely "he-was-there-so-he-must-have-been-there-for-this-reason" presentation.
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