[McLaughlin, John E.] "The Changing Nature of CIA Analysis in the Post-Soviet World." 2 Apr. 2001. [Special to washingtonpost.com]
This is a speech given by the DDCI at a March 2001 conference at Princeton University on CIA analysis of the Soviet Union from 1947 to 1991. A report on McLaughlin's remarks was carried as Vernon Loeb, "CIA's Analysis Becomes Transnational," Washington Post, 2 Apr. 2001.
McLaughlin, John. "McLaughlin: NIE Is Not as Decisive as It May Seem." CNN, 10 Dec. 2007. [http://www.cnn.com]
"National estimates are a widely misunderstood art form. When they become public,... they are always heralded as the 'most authoritative' documents the intelligence agencies produce.... [E]stimates are treated by critics and proponents alike as though what they say is chiseled in stone -- 'facts' that can be established like evidence in a courtroom trial.... [E]veryone seems to forget that these are not facts but judgments. In the best of cases, they are judgments based on a sizeable body of fact ... but the facts are never so complete as to remove all uncertainty from the judgment."
McLaughlin, John E. [CIA Deputy Director for Intelligence] "New Challenges and Priorities for Analysis." Defense Intelligence Journal 6, no 2 (Fall 1997): 11-21.
Changes in the world around us and in the expectations of consumers "add up to a fundamental shift in the analytical priorities for CIA and others in the [Intelligence] Community.... Tapping into analytic expertise across the Community and coordinating on collection activity will be essential to overcome budget and personnel constraints."
McLaughlin, John. "The New Intelligence Challenge." Washington Post, 7 Jan. 2007, B7. [http://www.washingtonpost.com]
The former DDCI (2000-2004) argues that the top priority for the next DNI "must be achieving a more integrated and collaborative effort among 16 agencies with diverse foreign and domestic missions. These agencies have worked together more smoothly in recent years than is commonly perceived, but deeper collaboration has been hindered by a shortage of critical 'enablers,' such as common information systems, common hiring and personnel evaluation policies, uniformly understood standards for collecting and analyzing information, and shared security policies.... Success in these endeavors could transform American intelligence. To succeed, any DNI will have to keep the priority on long-range strategic objectives and avoid getting caught up in the day-to-day minutiae of analysis and clandestine operations."
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