McCormack, Alfred. The History of Special Branch, M.I.S. in World War II. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1994.
Surveillant 4.1: This is a "reprint of two declassified reports from the National Archives" -- SRH-116 and SRH-035. Together, they "provide an excellent historical review of Special Branch and the great value of the SSOs during WWII."
McCormick, Charles H. Seeing Reds: Federal Surveillance of Radicals in the Pittsburgh Mill District, 1917-1921. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1997.
For Wannall, IJI&C 12.1, the author "demonstrates an anti-government attitude ... [and] displays an inborn dislike of some government officials, including J. Edgar Hoover, on whose plate he ladled accusations, holding him responsible for the actions of the personnel of an agency he did not head or control."
McCormick, Donald. The Master Book of Spies: The World of Espionage, Master Spies, Tortures, Interrogations, Spy Equipment, Escapes, Codes, and How You Can Become a Spy. New York: Watts, 1974. [Petersen]
McCoy, Alfred W. The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia. New York: Harper & Row, 1972. The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug Trade. Brooklyn, NY: Lawrence Hill Books, 1991.
Surveillant 1.2 identifies the 1991 title of this book as "revised and expanded" to include Afghanistan. McCoy charges that "CIA and State Department officials ... covered up the involvement of our Indochinese allies in heroin trafficking ... [and] participated in aspects of the narcotics trade." Constantinides notes McCoy's "practice of using unidentified sources or questionable source attributions," and suggests that the book be compared with the results of later congressional investigations.
According to Sinkin, NameBase, McCoy recounts the "symbiotic relationship between drug merchants, and intelligence and law enforcement.... McCoy also examines the banks that preceded BCCI as havens for tax evaders and criminals protected from prosecution because they banked with covert operators, and pinpoints critical historical periods when the narcotics trade might have been stopped had it not been for U.S. intelligence agencies."
McCoy, Alfred W. A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation from the Cold War to the War on Terror. New York: Henry Holt, 2006.
Clark comment: If this book is no more accurate or scholarly than the author's previous tome that sought to link most elements of the U.S. government to the international drug trade, little advance in knowledge should be expected from it. Peake, Studies 50.3 (Sep. 2006) and Intelligencer 15.2 (Fall-Winter 2006-2007), finds that this work is an "unconstrained and unscholarly attack on the CIA," and dismisses it as "ad hominem scholarship masquerading as the truth."
McCreary, John F. "Warning Cycles." Studies in Intelligence 27, no. 3 (Fall 1983): 71-79.
Westerfield: "Prescribing steps for a warning process and for judging whether it has been a success or failure."
McCreary, John, and Richard A. Posner. "The Latest Intelligence Crisis." Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 3 (Jun. 2008): 371-380.
Using the 2007 NIE on Iran's "suspension" of the development of nuclear weapons as a pivot for their commentary, the authors argue that "[w]hen security concerns preclude publication of the key evidence on which an intelligence finding is based, the publication of the finding itself becomes doubly questionable." They conclude that there are better ways (less sensational art forms) for conveying this kind of information to a President.
[Analysis/Est/Iran & Gen; GenPostCW/00s/08]
McCubbins, Matthew, and Thomas Schwarz, "Congessional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms." American Journal of Political Science 28 (1984): 165-179.
McCue, Brian. "A Chessboard Model of the U-boat War in the Atlantic with Applications to Signals Intelligence." Naval Research Logistics (NRL) 52, no. 2 (Mar. 2005): 107136.
From Abstract: "This paper uses a simple Monte Carlo model to analyze the influence of signals intelligence on the Second World War's Battle of the Atlantic. The principle measure of effectiveness is the number of U-boat days of attack to which convoys were subjected. A secondary measure is the number of convoyed ships sunk.... Allied use of signals intelligence is shown to have been capable of completely offsetting German use of signals intelligence, and then some."
McCue, Paul. Behind Enemy Lines with the SAS: The Story of Amedee Maingard, SOE Agent. Barnsley, UK: Pen and Sword, 2007.
From publisher: "Amedee Maingard was a young Mauritian studying in London in 1939" who joined the SOE. "He parachuted into occupied France in 1943 to join the 'Stationer' circuit, initially as radio operator but soon was second-in-command in the circuit.... [H]e narrowly escaped the fate of his organiser who was captured by the Germans in May 1944. Undeterred, Maingard developed his own 'Shipwright' circuit in time to support the Forces Francaises de l'Interieure (FFI) and the arrival of fifty-five men of 1st SAS Regiment for the ill-fated Operation Bulbasket shortly after D-Day."
McCue, Paul. Operation Bulbasket: Behind the Lines in Occupied France, 1944. London: Cooper, 1996.
http://www.cloakanddagger.com/dagger: "Story of 55 SAS paratroopers dropped in enemy-occupied France to harass and disrupt German reinforcements headed to Normandy in June 1944. One of the most remarkable stories ever written about WWII."
McCuen, John J. The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counterinsurgency. Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole, 1966.
McCullagh, Declan. "A'Hacking the Military Will Go." Wired News, 5 Jan. 2000. [http://www.wired.com]
The U.S. Space Command "took over the job of protecting Defense Department computers from hacker attacks" in October 1999. Gen. Richard Myers has "told reporters that Pentagon planners are currently devising general hacker-war procedures, which must be approved by the Defense Secretary and should be complete by October." Bill Gertz, "U.S. Set to Take Warfare On-Line," Washington Times, 6 Jan. 2000, 3, adds that Myers' announcement on 5 January 2000 "was the first time the Pentagon publicly acknowledged its plans to conduct offensive information warfare operations. Previously, only defenses against such attacks were discussed."
McCullagh, Declan. "Clinton Honors Navajo Heroes." Wired News, 18 Apr. 2000. [http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,35730,00.html]
In a ceremony in Shiprock, New Mexico, on 17 April 2000, President Clinton "highlighted the accomplishments of the roughly 420 Navajo tribe members turned cryptographers who served in WWII."
See also, Aaseng, Navajo Code Talkers (1992); Bixler, Winds of Freedom (1992); Huffman, "The Navajo Code Talkers: A Cryptologic and Linguistic Perspective," Cryptologia 24.4 (Oct. 2000): 289-320; Purdun, "Navajo War Effort No Longer Unheralded," New York Times, 11 Oct. 1999; and Weadon, Origins of the Navajo Code Talkers (2002).
McCullough, James. "Commentary on 'Congress as a User of Intelligence,'" Studies in Intelligence (Spring 1998): 71-84.
This is the text of remarks made at a 20 March 1997 conference at Georgetown University, where discussions centered around a monograph written by L. Britt Snider, Sharing Secrets with Lawmakers: Congress as a User of Intelligence (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, Center for the Study of Intelligence, 1997).
McCullough, James. "Personal Reflections on Bill Casey's Last Month at CIA: Coping with Iran-Contra." Studies in Intelligence 39, no. 5 (1996): 75-91.
The author was Director of the DCI Executive Staff during this time period. As he notes, what he has to say "probably will disappoint conspiracy theorists" but it does "have the ring of truth to those who have actually experienced the rough-and-tumble of Washington politics." Anyone interested in the CIA's role in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair should read this article. If readers do not believe McCullough's conclusion, so be it: "Bill Casey ... does not deserve to have his memory stained by false charges of involvement in a conspiracy to conceal the facts of the Iran affair. It just did not happen that way."
David Gries, who was Director of the Office of Congressional Affairs at the time of the events of November-December 1986, supplies a brief "commentary" on McCullough's article (pp. 93-94). Gries calls the deterioration of Casey a "tragedy" in which "a larger-than-life man [was] destroyed by a small tumor, just at the time when he needed all his powers to defend himself from questionable charges." Gries blames "vertical compartmentation" within the CIA for the failings that "led much of the public to an inaccurate, but understandable, conclusion[: that] CIA was deeply involved in the affair, and Bill Casey was its mastermind."
McCune, Shannon. Intelligence on the Economic Collapse of Japan in 1945. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989.
Surveillant 1.5: "Economic intelligence on Japan was disseminated in the last months of WWII ... in the Weekly Summary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The editing and writing of this economic intelligence was the responsibility" of McCune as "the Foreign Economic Administration's representative on the Joint Intelligence Staff. With the Weekly Summary now declassified, McCune gives us a measured and contemporary view of Japan's economic collapse as it was going on in 1945."
McCutcheon, Chuck [CQWR].
McCutchen, Eric [CAPT/USAF]. "Kinetic Targeting of U.S. Citizens in the War on Terror: A Legal and Policy Perspective." American Intelligence Journal 28, no. 2 (2010): 72-82.
The author concludes: "The law of war justifies the Obama Administration's expanded use of drone strikes, including strikes on American al-Qaeda personnel."
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