Marrin, Stephen. "At Arm's Length or at the Elbow?: Explaining the Distance between Analysts and Decisionmakers." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 401-414.
Marrin, Stephen. "At Arm's Length or at the Elbow?: Explaining the Distance between Analysts and Decisionmakers." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 20, no. 3 (Fall 2007): 401-414.
The author suggests that an approach similar to the British government's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) "might be useful as a way to close the distance between intelligence analysts and decisionmakers without necessarily compromising analytic independence."
[Analysis/Critiques]
Marrin, Stephen. "CIA's Kent School: Improving Training for New Analysts." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16, no. 4 (Winter 2003-2004): 609-637.
This is a judicious overview of the CIA's Career Analyst Program (CAP), located within the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis. The author does not overreach and promise better intelligence analysis as a direct result of this training, but instead carefully notes the cognitive and institutional impediments to such improvements. Nevertheless, he sees the CAP and the Kent School moving in the right direction.
[CIA/C&C/DI]
Marrin, Stephen. "The
CIA's Kent School: A Step in the Right Direction." Intelligencer
11, no. 2 (Winter 2000): 55-57.
"The establishment of the Kent School is a substantial step towards creating [Sherman] Kent's vision of intelligence as a profession.... A 'CIA University' ... would go even farther towards providing the DI ... with the knowledge to build effective business practices."
[CIA/C&C/DI]
Marrin, Stephen. "Homeland Security and the Analysis of Foreign Intelligence (Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age)." Intelligencer 13, no. 2 (Winter-Spring 2003): 25-36.
This is a general overview of the Counterterrorism Center (CTC), with some broad discussion of the analytical process and its products.
[Analysis/Gen; CI/00s/Gen]
Marrin, Stephen. "Homeland Security Intelligence: Just the Beginning." Intelligencer14, no. 1 (Winter/Spring 2004): 43-51. Journal of Homeland Security, Nov. 2003 (http://www.homelandsecurity.org/journal/Articles/marrin.html)
"[D]omestic intelligence ... has historically had minimal institutionalization at the federal level." Nevertheless, given the events of 11 September 2001 and the new domestic intelligence programs proposed and implemented since then, "the study of foreign intelligence indicates that the roles and missions of domestic intelligence will likely increase.... The expanding roles and missions of domestic intelligence agencies will likely pose a threat to civil liberties. This threat can ... be countered through the incorporation of overlapping procedural guidelines and oversight mechanisms."
[Terrorism/Homeland/04]
Marrin, Stephen. "Improving CIA Analysis by Overcoming Institutional Obstacles." In Bringing Intelligence About: Practitioners Reflect on Best Practices, ed. Russell G. Swenson, 40-59. Washington, DC: Joint Military Intelligence College, 2003.
According to the author, this article "looks at how institutional practices can prevent full utilization of lessons learned in training, education, or other knowledge-building endeavors. For case studies [he] use[s] the dissolution of CIA's Office of Leadership Analysis and the changing emphasis on current versus long-term intelligence, and in the end argue[s] that organizational and procedural modifications may be necessary in order to take full advantage of an individual analyst's expertise. Specifically, [he] recommend[s] that CIA re-constitute its Office of Current Intelligence and Office of Research and Reports to take advantage of an individual analyst's cognitive strengths."
[Analysis/Critiques; CIA/C&C/DI]
Marrin, Stephen. "Intelligence Analysis: Structured Methods or Intuition?" American Intelligence Journal 25, no. 1 (Summer 2007): 7-16.
This article focuses "on the utility of structured methods, their fit with the reigning analytic culture, and when they should be used, or not used, by analysts." In the end, the author remains "agnostic about the value of mandating use of more structured methods," although "it is important to teach them."
[Analysis/T&M]
Marrin, Stephen. "Intelligence Analysis Theory: Explaining and Predicting Analytic Responsibilities." Intelligence and National Security 22, no. 6 (Dec. 2007): 821-846.
From abstract: "This paper presents a theoretical framework ... to explain why there was such a wide variety of perspectives regarding the future need for intelligence, embeds these ideas within the existing intelligence theory literature, applies this framework more generally in a way that can be used to explain variations in the substantive coverage of intelligence analysis in the past and predict possible variations in the future, and then tests the theory's ability to explain the analytical focus of domestic intelligence organizations."
[Analysis/T&M]
Marrin, Stephen. "Preventing Intelligence Failures by Learning from the Past." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 17, no. 4 (Winter 2004-2005): 655-672.
"The best safeguard against catastrophic surprise will be continued vigilance against the potential for intelligence failure. This entails recognition of the tradeoffs and pathologies that cause failure, the self-conscious administration of rigor to identify and hopefully correct deficiencies in analysis, and the continued efforts to better integrate accurate intelligence into policymaking."
[Analysis/Surprise]
Marrin, Stephen, and Jonathan D. Clemente. "Improving Intelligence Analysis by Looking to the Medical Profession." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 18, no. 4 (Winter 2005-2006): 707-729.
This is an interesting, even intriguing, article by a former CIA analyst and a physician. They argue that while "[s]ome limitations to the analogy are inevitable due to intrinsic differences between the fields,... the study of medicine could provide intelligence practitioners with a valuable source of insight into various reforms with the potential to improve the craft of intelligence."
[Analysis/Critiques; GenPostwar/Medical]
Marrin, Stephen, and Jonathan D. Clemente. "Modeling an Intelligence Analysis Profession on Medicine." International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 19, no. 4 (Winter 2006-2007): 642-665.
"[I]ntelligence analysis has historically been practiced more as a craft reliant on the intrinsic skill and expertise of the individual analysts than as a highly developed profession with structured personnel practices to select and develop desired characteristics, skills, and behaviors.... Any occupation that lacks performance standards or other formal personnel practices will have difficulties improving both its practices and management.... Modeling the intelligence analysis professionalization process on an existing profession such as medicine would provide a more efficient, effective, and uniform push toward its improvement."
James B. Ellsworth, "Network-Centric Professional Development: Intelligence Associations in the Global Century," American Intelligence Journal 24 (2006): 34-40, comments that while the authors' "overall message is one the broader intelligence profession critically needs to hear -- and their framework for a constructive role for the intelligence association in safeguarding and evolving the profession is quite possibly groundbreaking -- there are several key differences between the 'professional terrain' confronted by pre-AMA medicine and that facing the IC today. Notable among these is the fact that an array of intelligence associations already exists, many active in at least some of the roles in the Marrin/Clemente framework."
[Analysis/Critiques; GenPostwar/Medical]
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