Marbes,
Wilhelm. "Psychology of Treason." Studies in Intelligence
30, no. 2 (Summer 1986): 1-11. In Inside CIA's Private World: Declassified
Articles from the Agency's Internal Journal, 1955-1992, ed. H. Bradford
Westerfield, 70-82. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995.
A CIA psychiatrist discusses the mental makeup of defectors. He makes a number of interesting assertions, one of which is that "the percentage of [major] mental disorders ... among defectors is less than one would expect to find in an ordinary population of the same size." Stated simply, defectors are no crazier than the rest of us. The Agency's psychiatrists were not able to establish a single profile that would describe all defectors, but "there are clusters of characteristics which fit most defectors."
Richards J. Heuer, Jr., calls this article "a first class piece. Recent research suggests that what is written here about Soviet defectors applies equally well to many of the American traitors ostensibly motivated by money or revenge."
[Russia/DefectorLiterature; SpyCases/U.S./TreasonGen][c]
Marburger, Joan C.
"Defense Department Partners with Industry for Signals Intelligence."
Signal 54, no. 4 (Dec. 1999): 79-80.
NSA "is spearheading a U.S. Defense Department effort to develop, with commercial assistance, joint tactical signals intelligence systems.... A basic tenet of this architecture is to select standards that are widely accepted and proven by commercial use.... A Defense Department policy supports JASA [Joint Airborne Signals Intelligence Architecture] by requiring interoperability between existing and future SIGINT systems, connectivity between national and tactical systems, and modernization of existing airborne SIGINT systems."
[MI/Tactical]
Marchenko,
Anatoliy. My Testimony. New York: Dutton, 1969.
Wilcox: "Account of testimony given by a Soviet agent who defected to the West."
[Russia/Defectors]
Marchetti, Victor,
and John D. Marks. The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence. New York: Knopf, 1974. London: Jonathan Cape, 1974. Revised ed. New York: Dell, 1980. [pb]
Petersen calls this book a "well-researched attack on CIA by two former mid-level intelligence officers. Informative, but to be used with caution."
To Pforzheimer, the work is "marked by its heavy attacks on CIA's Clandestine Services ... and covert operations.... It is an uneven book whose polemics tend to unbalance what valid material it may contain."
It is the opinion of the NameBase reviewer that "[a]long with Philip Agee's 'Inside the Company: CIA Diary,' this was one of the most important works on the CIA to appear in the 1970s. While Agee's book is a detailed look at one officer's activities in several Latin American countries, Marchetti and Marks give an overview of the CIA's administrative structure and operational history."
Constantinides argues that, despite the authors' tendency to mix fact and opinion, "the amount of accurate material that is divulged is enormous." The 1980 edition contains passages previously deleted.
Hugh Tovar, IJI&C 13.2/224, reminds us that while "Marchetti has been touted over the years as a senior Agency officer, an authority on virtually everything," he was in actuality neither of these. "As an assistant to the Deputy Director, he served in much the same capacity as a general's aide...-- a good paper-pusher, knowledgeable on many topics, but not a key personage and certainly not privy to all that he claims to know about."
[CIA/Overviews/To89][c]
Marchinko. Richard.
Rogue Warrior. New York: Pocket Books, 1992.
Training and exploits of U.S. Navy SEALS.
[MI/SpecOps]
Marchio, Jim. "Resistance
Potential and Rollback: US Intelligence and the Eisenhower Administration's
Policies Toward Eastern Europe, 1953-56." Intelligence and National
Security 10, no. 2 (Apr. 1995): 219-241.
"Recently declassified intelligence assessments and national security memoranda strongly suggest that intelligence played a significant role in molding the Eisenhower administration's liberation strategy and overall policies toward Eastern Europe.... The flawed intelligence assessments produced by the intelligence community on Eastern Europe during the administration's first term provided an unstable foundation for policy formulation.... Frankly, the policy-makers asked too much of intelligence, crafting policies that required intelligence clearly beyond the capabilities of the community."
[CIA/50s][c]
Marchio, James D. "Support to Military Operations: The Evolution and Relevance of Joint Intelligence Centers." Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 1 (2005): 41-54. "[Part I] The Evolution and Relevance of Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations." Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 22, no. 3 (Jun. 2006): 33-34. "[Part II] Naval Intelligence Professionals Quarterly 22, no. 4 (Sep. 2006): 36-38.
The idea of joint intelligence centers (JICs) "did not fully take root until the Gulf War. The historical record demonstrates that the birth, death, and resurrection of the concept of joint intelligence centers were tied to the changing fortunes of the larger interservice and interagency community, the evolving nature of armed conflict during the last 60 years, and the cyclical political and budgetary environment in which post–World War II US military forces have developed and operated. These same factors augur well for the longevity of JICs as they enter their second decade of continuous service."
[MI/00s/05]
Marchio, James D. "Will They Fight? US Intelligence Assessments and the Reliability of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, 1946–89." Studies in Intelligence 51, no. 4 (2007): 13-27.
This article is the author's "reconstruction of the story of the US Intelligence Community's (IC) efforts to address one of the central analytical questions of the Cold War -- whether and how well Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) military forces would fight for their Soviet masters in the event of a conflict."
[Analysis/Sov]
Marcus, Amy Dockser.
"Israel Embraces Efforts to Free Pollard." Wall Street Journal,
25 Jan. 1996, A18.
[SpyCases/U.S./Pollard]
Marder,
Murrey. "Monitoring Not-So-Secret-Secret." Washington Post,
19 Jun. 1981, A10.
Concerns U.S. agreement with China for cooperation in monitoring Russian missile shots.
[China; Liaison]
Marenches, Alexandre de, comte, and David A. Andelman. The Fourth World War: Diplomacy and Espionage in the Age of Terrorism. New York: William Morrow, 1992.
Clark comment: The author was Director-General of the French foreign intelligence service, Service de Documentation Exterieure et de Contra-espionage (SDECE), from 1970 to 1981, under Presidents Pompidou and d'Estaing.
Surveillant 2.6 notes that this is an "updated and adapted version of the original work Dans le Secret des Princes, published in 1986 by Editions Stock and signed Alexandre de Marenches and Christine Ockrent. The de Marenches/Ockrent version was reprinted in English in the U.K. under the title The Evil Empire: The Third World War Now. This is an impressive presentation of responses by the Count de Marenches ... to questions posed by journalist Ockrent in a series of interviews."
Valcourt, IJI&C 6.1, adds that de Marenches is "[o]ften referred to as the Henry Kissinger of France." The Fourth World War "combatants are the Northern nations versus the Southern.... The intelligence organizations of the Western nations must be redirected to study the new opposition." The author's "views must be considered seriously."
Rurarz-Huygens, IJI&C 2.1, comments that "'Dans le secret des princes' is a powerful book." It is both a "political and philosophical statement." The author is "profoundly troubled by the behavior of the 'soft democracies.'" McCormick, I&NS 4.1, concludes that "this is a constructive book which should be read widely by all who care about the future of intelligence and security services."
According to Pierre, FA 71.5, the author "tells his many cloak and dagger stories with verve and color," but he "goes off track ... when he looks to the future. He sees the opening skirmishes of a new world war -- between South and North -- the new enemies being terrorists, drug lords and dictators. 'Mutual Assured Destruction' must now be replaced by a doctrine of 'Certain Destruction' of terrorist groups; a 'Decent People's Club' of nations that believe in individual liberty must be created. These extreme views inadvertently cast some doubt on his judgment while running French intelligence."
[France; Terrorism/90s]
Margolin, Leo Jay.
Paper Bullets: A Brief Story of Psychological Warfare in World War II.
New York: Froben, 1946. [Wilcox]
[WWII/OSS/Topics]
Marinos, Themistocles. Tr., Petros Ladas. Harling Mission--1942: The Gorgopotamos Operation. Athens: Papazisis Publications, 1993.
Surveillant 3.4/5 identifies this book as an "account of the destruction of the Gorgopotamos Bridge in Greece in WWII, one of the key railway bridges, northwest of Athens, used by Rommel to supply troops on the African front."
According to Potts, FILS 12.6, this book is about a "single special operation..., albeit one of the most effective and significant of its kind.... [It] offers much practical insight into wartime resistance in Greece." The book is to be "highly commended" for its "broad and balanced view."
[OtherCountries/Greece/WWII; UK/WWII/Med]
Marion,
Pierre. La Mission Impossible: A la tête des Services Secrets.
Paris: Calmann-Levy, 1991.
Clark Comment: The author headed the French counter-espionage agency, the Service de Documentation et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE), for the 17 months following the coming of the Socialist government to power in June 1981.
According to Kieger, I&NS 7.3, Marion's "only real claim to fame" is to have changed the organization's name to Direction Générale de la Sécurité Extérieure (DGSE). This is the kind of "bleeding-heart and self-justificatory account to be expected of such a short-lived spy- master. But it does contain many nuggets of information on foreign secret services and their relations with their French counterpart."
[France]
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