Macrae, Robert Stuart. Winston Churchill's Toyshop: The Invention and Making of England's Secret Weapons. New York: Walker, 1972. Winston Churchill's Toyshop: The Inside Story of Military Intelligence (Research). Rev. ed. Stroud, UK: Amberley; 2010. 2011. [pb]
From publisher: "Written by Colonel Stuart Macrae, who helped found M.D.1. and was its second-in-command throughout its life," this is "[t]he inside story of one of the most famous of all the 'back rooms' of the Second World War.... Conceived by Winston Churchill to circumvent the delays, frustrations and inefficiencies of the service ministries," Department M.D.1 produced "an astonishing array of secret weapons ranging from the 'sticky bomb' and 'limpet mine' to giant bridge-carrying assault tanks, as well as the PIAT, a tank-destroying, hand-held mortar."
Madden, Patrick M. [MAJ/USA], and Robert Hallagan [LTCOL/USA]. "Army Intelligence Split-Based Operations." Military Intelligence 20, no. 2 (Apr.-Jun. 1994): 5-8.
Focuses on role of the Deployable Intelligence Support Element (DISE).
Maddox, Robert James.
1. The New Left and the Origins of the Cold War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973.
2. Weapons for Victory: The Hiroshima Decision Fifty Years Later. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1995.
Giangreco, NWCR, Spring 1998, says that the author follows a "solid, journeyman's approach" to his conclusion that "President Truman meant exactly what he said when he stated that the atom bombs were dropped in the hope that they would induce the Japanese to surrender before U.S. forces ... would be forced into a prolonged, bloody ground invasion of Japan."
For Cohen, FA 74.5 (Sep.-Oct. 1995), Maddox' work is a "concise and convincing study." The author is "[a] vigorous defender of the traditional interpretation,... [and] brings to bear considerable scholarly research. He is particularly scathing in documenting the errors of revisionists in handling historical evidence."
Auer and Halloran, Parameters (Spring 1996), see Maddox's work as "a lean, well-focused, and tightly argued volume seen largely from the standpoint of American leaders who influenced the President's decision. The book is carefully documented and has a useful bibliography."
Maddrell, Paul. "British-American Scientific Intelligence Collaboration during the Occupation of Germany." Intelligence and National Security 15, no. 2 (Summer 2000): 74-94.
Abstract: "That they were fellow-Occupiers of Germany was ... central to the development of British-American scientific intelligence collaboration.... Their intelligence agencies had to collaborate to do their job properly and in partnership they achieved in Germany the first significant penetration of the USSR's military-industrial complex."
Maddrell, Paul. "British Intelligence through the Eyes of the Stasi: What the Stasi's Records Show about the Operations of British Intelligence in Cold War Germany." Intelligence and National Security 27, no. 1 (Feb. 2012): 46-74.
"SIS was a successful gatherer of intelligence in the GDR in the late 1940s and for most of the 1950s. Its success greatly declined in the late 1950s and was ended completely by Blake's treason."
Maddrell, Paul. "Einfallstor in die Sowjetunion: Die Besatzung Deutschlands und die Ausspahung der UdSSR durch den britischen Nachrichtendienst" [The Occupation of Germany and the Penetration of the USSR by the British Intelligence Service]. Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 51, no. 2 (2003): 183-228.
Maddrell, Paul. "Failing Intelligence: U.S. Intelligence in the Age of Transnational Threats." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 22, no. 2 (Summer 2009): 195-220.
"The outstanding challenge of the new era for the Intelligence Community is that its two main tasks involve an intensive global search for targets that are very easy to hide: conspiracies of people, and weapons research and development projects.... The task of couterterrorism intelligence collection is not merely very difficult: it must be conducted throughout the world in combination with allies whose interests are often considerably different from those of the United States."
Maddrell, Paul. "The Opening of the State Security Archives of Central and Eastern Europe." International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 27, no. 1 (Spring 2014): 1-26.
This article focuses on "the opening of the German and Romanian archives. The process is far advanced in Germany and much less so in Romania."
Maddrell, Paul. "The Scientist Who Came in from the Cold: Heinz Barwich's Flight from the GDR." Intelligence and National Security 20, no. 4 (Dec. 2005): 608-630.
Based on documents from the GDR Ministry of State Security (MfS), the author concludes that Barwich began spying for the CIA around September 1962 in exchange for assistance in getting his family out of the GDR when he carried out his planned defection. He, then, defected in 1964. Barwich "is the most distinguished scientist to spy for the CIA yet to be revealed." See also, Heinz and Elfriede Barwich, Das Rote Atom (Munich and Bern: Scherz Verlag, 1967).
Maddrell, Paul. Spying on Science: Western Intelligence in Divided Germany, 1945-1961. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006.
According to Peake, Studies 51.3 (2007), this work "focuses on the scientific intelligence obtained" from interrogations of refugees, defectors, and former POWs, as well as from "traditional agents, special technical collection teams, mail interception units, and telecommunications monitoring," and "the beneficial results for Western military capabilities." The author leaves "the impression that the tremendous human intelligence effort he describes was less productive than he implied" earlier.
Fischer, IJI&C 21.3 (Fall 2008), comments that the author's "original contribution ... is to put intelligence at the center of the story" of the use of German scientists after World War II. In the process, Maddrell "depicts intelligence operations from the ground up.... Spying on Science is an important contribution to Cold War and intelligence history."
Maddrell, Paul. "The Western Secret Services, the East German Ministry of State Security and the Building of the Berlin Wall." Intelligence and National Security 21, no. 5 (Oct. 2006): 829-847.
Although "the Communists' principal motive for closing the sectoral border in Berlin was to stop the flight of refugees..., the border closure was also motivated by security considerations.... [T]he Western secret services did not fail to see what might happen" and, in fact, "made extensive preparations to ensure that their operations could continue in the harder conditions which would ensue."
[CIA/60s/Gen; Germany/East; UK/Postwar/Gen]
Maddrell, Paul. "What We Have Discovered about the Cold War Is What We Already Knew: Julius Mader and the Western Secret Services during the Cold War." Cold War History 5, no. 2 (May 2005): 235-258.
According to the abstract accompanying this article, the author seems to believe that the books written by Communist propagandist Julius Mader "represent a valuable resource for the historians of today" because much of his information came from East Germany's Ministry of State Security (MfS/Stasi).
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